Publication: Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s
dc.contributor.author | Desai, Raj M. | |
dc.contributor.author | Freinkman, Lev M. | |
dc.contributor.author | Goldberg, Itzhak | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-04-25T17:08:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-04-25T17:08:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-09 | |
dc.description.abstract | Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to serve two roles. First, local control over revenue collection is meant to provide a check on the capacity of central authorities to tax arbitrarily local capital. Second, retention of taxes raised locally is meant to establish incentives for subnational governmental authorities to foster endemic economic growth as a way of promoting local tax bases. But in the Russian Federation, fiscally autonomous regions have often resisted market-oriented reforms, the enactment of rules protecting private property, and the dismantling of price controls and barriers to trade. The authors find statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that fiscal incentives of the Russian regions represent an important determinant of regional economic performance. The authors also seek to understand the conditions under which fiscal autonomy prompts regional growth and recovery, and the conditions under which it has adverse economic effects. They argue that the presence of "unearned" income streams-particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government-has turned regions dependent on these income sources into "rentier" regions. As such, governments in these regions have used local control over revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms (natural resource producers or loss-making enterprises) from market forces. Using new fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996-99, the authors test this central hypothesis in both single- and simultaneous-equation specifications. Their results indicate that tax retention (as a proxy for fiscal autonomy) has a positive effect on the cumulative output recovery of regions since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But they also find that this effect decreases as rentable income streams to regions increase. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3138 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18059 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3138 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | AUDITING | |
dc.subject | AUTHORITY | |
dc.subject | AUTONOMOUS REGIONS | |
dc.subject | AUTONOMY | |
dc.subject | BANKRUPTCY | |
dc.subject | BUDGET REVENUES | |
dc.subject | BUDGETARY FUNDS | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | CENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | CITIES | |
dc.subject | COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE INCOME TAXES | |
dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | DEBT | |
dc.subject | DEBT RESTRUCTURING | |
dc.subject | DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRATIZATION | |
dc.subject | DEVOLUTION | |
dc.subject | DIVISION OF POWERS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC GROWTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC IMPACT | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC REFORM | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ENACTMENT | |
dc.subject | ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING | |
dc.subject | ENTREPRENEURSHIP | |
dc.subject | EQUALIZATION | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURE | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL AGENCIES | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL LEGISLATION | |
dc.subject | FEDERALISM | |
dc.subject | FEDERATIONS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SUPPORT | |
dc.subject | FISCAL | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | FISCAL FEDERALISM | |
dc.subject | FISCAL INCENTIVES | |
dc.subject | FISCAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | FISCAL POLICY | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | HOUSING | |
dc.subject | HUMAN CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INCOME INEQUALITY | |
dc.subject | LAWS | |
dc.subject | LEGAL FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | LOBBYING | |
dc.subject | LOCAL ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | LOCAL SPENDING | |
dc.subject | LOCAL TAX | |
dc.subject | LOCAL TAXES | |
dc.subject | MERITOCRACY | |
dc.subject | METALS | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPAL REVENUES | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPALITIES | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPALITY | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL LEVEL | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL TAXES | |
dc.subject | NATURAL RESOURCES | |
dc.subject | OIL | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | POLITICIANS | |
dc.subject | PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE PROPERTY | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE SECTOR | |
dc.subject | PRODUCERS | |
dc.subject | PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC FINANCE | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC FINANCE SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC GOODS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC PROCUREMENT | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC SERVICES | |
dc.subject | RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR | |
dc.subject | REPRESENTATIVES | |
dc.subject | REVENUE COLLECTION | |
dc.subject | REVENUE SHARING | |
dc.subject | REVENUE SHARING SCHEMES | |
dc.subject | SEPARATION OF POWERS | |
dc.subject | SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS | |
dc.subject | STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | STREAMS | |
dc.subject | SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | TAX ARREARS | |
dc.subject | TAX BURDEN | |
dc.subject | TAX COLLECTIONS | |
dc.subject | TAX EXEMPTIONS | |
dc.subject | TAX REVENUE | |
dc.subject | TAX REVENUES | |
dc.subject | TAX SHARING | |
dc.subject | TAXATION | |
dc.subject | TRANSITION ECONOMIES | |
dc.subject | TRANSPARENCY | |
dc.subject | UNFUNDED MANDATES | |
dc.subject | URBAN ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | UTILITIES FISCAL FEDERALISM | |
dc.subject | SUBNATIONAL FINANCES | |
dc.subject | REVENUE MOBILIZATION | |
dc.subject | TAX COLLECTION | |
dc.subject | INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS | |
dc.subject | INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX RELATIONS | |
dc.subject | INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS | |
dc.subject | NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION | |
dc.subject | ENTERPRISE SUPPORT | |
dc.subject | DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | UTILITIES | |
dc.title | Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:53:41.711188Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s | |
okr.globalpractice | Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.guid | 309621468763230436 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3138 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000160016_20031009172913 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 2542334 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3138 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/09/000160016_20031009172913/Rendered/PDF/wps3138.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | Europe and Central Asia | |
okr.region.country | Russian Federation | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | Governance::National Governance | |
okr.topic | Urban Development::Municipal Financial Management | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Economics and Finance | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 7d13264e-5b0a-57fc-8bc2-40dcec43acaf | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 7d13264e-5b0a-57fc-8bc2-40dcec43acaf | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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