Publication: Intertemporal Excess Burden, Bequest Motives, and the Budget Deficit
dc.contributor.author | Chen, Derek Hung Chiat | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-05-05T20:42:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-05-05T20:42:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-06 | |
dc.description.abstract | The author aims to empirically determine the significant factors that affect the levels of budget deficits of central governments across time and across countries. He empirically tests two prominent theories of budget deficits-the Barro (1979) tax-smoothing approach, and the still-untested theory of negative bequest motives advocated by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989). The author uses econometric techniques including fixed-effects (both country and time) panel regressions spanning 87 countries over the period 1975 to 1992, and the Griliches treatment of missing data. The author finds relatively stronger statistical support for the tax-smoothing approach among developing countries but not in industrial countries. The existence of empirical evidence supporting the theory of negative bequest motives is indeterminate. The author also conducted post-regression analyses to assess the proportion of observed differences in budget deficits the factors were actually able to explain. These reveal that both theories are generally weak in accounting for inter-temporal changes in budget deficit shares for both industrial and developing countries. The theories performed significantly better in accounting for cross-section differences. The author has many contributions to the literature. First, he analyzes the question of what determines the size of central government budget deficits using cross-country time series data leading into the 1990s. Second, he provides empirical tests of the still-untested Cukierman-Meltzer (1989) negative bequest motive theory of budget deficits. By using the panel data, the author attempts to determine the factors that influence not only the inter-temporal differences in budget deficits but also those factors that lead to cross-country differences. Last but not least, he provides some preliminary evidence that poverty reduction is necessary for long-term government budget deficit reduction. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2427516/intertemporal-excess-burden-bequest-motives-budget-deficit | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3086 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18179 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Workding Paper;No. 3086 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACCOUNTING | |
dc.subject | BALANCED BUDGETS | |
dc.subject | BUDGET CONSTRAINT | |
dc.subject | BUDGET DEFICIT | |
dc.subject | BUDGET DEFICIT REDUCTION | |
dc.subject | BUDGET DEFICITS | |
dc.subject | BUDGET SURPLUS | |
dc.subject | CAPACITY BUILDING | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETS | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | CITIZENS | |
dc.subject | CLOSED ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE | |
dc.subject | DEBT FINANCING | |
dc.subject | DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME | |
dc.subject | DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC BOOM | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC GROWTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC THEORY | |
dc.subject | EXOGENOUS VARIABLES | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | FISCAL | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DEFICIT | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DEFICITS | |
dc.subject | FISCAL ILLUSION | |
dc.subject | FISCAL POLICY | |
dc.subject | FISCAL YEAR | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GINI COEFFICIENT | |
dc.subject | GNP | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT BONDS | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT BUDGET | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEFICIT | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT DEBT | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SPENDING | |
dc.subject | GROWTH RATE | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INCOME DISTRIBUTION | |
dc.subject | INFLATION | |
dc.subject | INFLATION RATE | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS | |
dc.subject | INTEREST RATE | |
dc.subject | INTEREST RATES | |
dc.subject | LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS | |
dc.subject | MAJORITY RULE | |
dc.subject | MONEY INCOME | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | OPEN ECONOMIES | |
dc.subject | OPTIMIZATION | |
dc.subject | OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | PRESENT VALUE | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION FUNCTION | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC DEBT | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC EXPENDITURE | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC FINANCE | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC FINANCE THEORY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC GOODS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC SECTOR | |
dc.subject | RANDOM WALK | |
dc.subject | REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | REGRESSION ANALYSES | |
dc.subject | RETIREMENT | |
dc.subject | RETURN ON ASSETS | |
dc.subject | SAVINGS | |
dc.subject | SIZE OF GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL SECURITY | |
dc.subject | TAX | |
dc.subject | TAX ADMINISTRATION | |
dc.subject | TAX AUTHORITIES | |
dc.subject | TAX BURDEN | |
dc.subject | TAX COLLECTION | |
dc.subject | TAX COLLECTIONS | |
dc.subject | TAX RATE | |
dc.subject | TAX RATES | |
dc.subject | TAX REVENUE | |
dc.subject | TAX REVENUES | |
dc.subject | TAXATION | |
dc.subject | TIME SERIES | |
dc.subject | VOTERS | |
dc.subject | WAGE RATES | |
dc.subject | WAGES | |
dc.subject | WEALTH BUDGET DEFICITS | |
dc.subject | INTERTEMPORAL LAW (INTERNATIONAL LAW) | |
dc.subject | CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE | |
dc.subject | TAX SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | TAX SUBSIDIES | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC MODELS | |
dc.subject | MISSING OBSERVATIONS (STATISTICS) | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | DATA ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | POVERTY REDUCTION | |
dc.subject | BUDGET DEFICITS | |
dc.subject | WEALTH | |
dc.title | Intertemporal Excess Burden, Bequest Motives, and the Budget Deficit | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2427516/intertemporal-excess-burden-bequest-motives-budget-deficit | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.guid | 466821468766465704 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3086 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000094946_03071204151548 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 2427516 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3086 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/07/26/000094946_03071204151548/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf | en |
okr.sector | Public Administration, Law, and Justice :: Central government administration | |
okr.sector | Public Administration, Law, and Justice :: General public administration sector | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Stabilization | |
okr.topic | Governance::National Governance | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Economics and Finance | |
okr.topic | Urban Development::Municipal Financial Management | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
okr.unit | World Bank Institute | |
okr.volume | 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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