Publication: An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
dc.contributor.author | Avalos, Marcos | |
dc.contributor.author | De Hoyos, Rafael E. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-25T14:25:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-05-25T14:25:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the decision making process using two different discrete choice models. The results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The findings also show that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect on the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4527 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4527 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACCURATE INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS | |
dc.subject | ANTITRUST | |
dc.subject | ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT | |
dc.subject | ANTITRUST LAW | |
dc.subject | BARGAINING | |
dc.subject | BARRIERS TO ENTRY | |
dc.subject | CLAIM | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION COMMISSION | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION LAW | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION POLICY | |
dc.subject | COMPETITORS | |
dc.subject | DECISION MAKING | |
dc.subject | DEPENDENT | |
dc.subject | DOMINANT FIRM | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC MODELS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRICS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC INTEGRATION | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC MODELS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC THEORY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIES OF SCALE | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | EQUALITY | |
dc.subject | EQUITY SHARE | |
dc.subject | EQUITY SHARES | |
dc.subject | EXPANSION | |
dc.subject | EXPECTED VALUE | |
dc.subject | EXPORTS | |
dc.subject | FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN COMPANY | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRM | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FUTURE RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | HORIZONTAL MERGER | |
dc.subject | IMPERFECT INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | |
dc.subject | JUDGE | |
dc.subject | JUDGMENTS | |
dc.subject | JUDICIAL REVIEW | |
dc.subject | LAWYERS | |
dc.subject | LEGAL PROCESS | |
dc.subject | LIMITED | |
dc.subject | MAJORITY VOTE | |
dc.subject | MARKET ENTRY | |
dc.subject | MERGER | |
dc.subject | MERGER CONTROL | |
dc.subject | MERGERS | |
dc.subject | MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLIES | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | SHARES OF FIRM | |
dc.subject | SMALL FIRM | |
dc.subject | SMALL FIRMS | |
dc.subject | STATISTICAL ANALYSIS | |
dc.title | An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Jobs | |
okr.crossref.title | An Empirical Analysis Of Mexican Merger Policy | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:35:14.919001Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Social Protection and Labor | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.guid | 318821468044950160 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4527 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20080221163826 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 9026843 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS4527 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/02/21/000158349_20080221163826/Rendered/PDF/wps4527.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | Latin America & Caribbean | |
okr.region.country | Mexico | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Microfinance | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Law and Development::Corporate Law | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor::Labor Policies | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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