Publication:
Credit Rating Agencies in Emerging Democracies : Guardians of Fiscal Discipline?
dc.contributor.author | Hanusch, Marek | |
dc.contributor.author | Vaaler, Paul M. | |
dc.contributor.author | Hanusch, Marek | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-04-12T16:55:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-04-12T16:55:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-03 | |
dc.description.abstract | Credit rating agencies have drawn criticism for failing to anticipate and deter root causes of the 2008-2009 financial crisis in the United States. However, this paper presents evidence that credit rating agencies regularly anticipate and deter governments in emerging democracies from opportunistic borrowing and potential financial crises related to elections and the political budget cycle behavior they encourage. The paper considers a sample of 18 such countries holding 32 presidential elections from 1989 to 2004. The analysis shows that credit rating agencies induced greater fiscal discipline during election periods when governments had incentives to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain. Countries with higher credit rating agency sovereign ratings borrowed less than lower-rated countries in election periods, but borrowed more in non-election periods. Credit rating agencies promoted fiscal discipline during increasingly frequent election periods in emerging democracies. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17408765/credit-rating-agencies-emerging-democracies-guardians-fiscal-discipline | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13180 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6379 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACCESS TO CREDIT | |
dc.subject | ACCOUNTING | |
dc.subject | BOND ISSUANCES | |
dc.subject | BOND SPREADS | |
dc.subject | BORROWER | |
dc.subject | BUDGET BALANCE | |
dc.subject | BUDGET BALANCES | |
dc.subject | BUDGET CYCLE | |
dc.subject | BUDGET SURPLUSES | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS CYCLE | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS CYCLES | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL BANKS | |
dc.subject | CHECKS | |
dc.subject | CIVIL LIBERTIES | |
dc.subject | CREDIT HISTORIES | |
dc.subject | CREDIT RATING | |
dc.subject | CREDIT RATING AGENCIES | |
dc.subject | CREDIT RATING AGENCY | |
dc.subject | CREDITWORTHINESS | |
dc.subject | CURRENCY | |
dc.subject | CURRENCY CRISIS | |
dc.subject | DEBT | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRACY | |
dc.subject | DEPENDENT | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPING COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | DOMINANT PARTY | |
dc.subject | ELECTION | |
dc.subject | ELECTIONS | |
dc.subject | ELECTORAL SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | ELECTORAL SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | EMERGING DEMOCRACIES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL CRISES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL CRISIS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL MARKET | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SERVICES | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DEFICIT | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DISCIPLINE | |
dc.subject | FISCAL POLICY | |
dc.subject | FORBEARANCE | |
dc.subject | FUTURE CREDIT | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT BORROWING | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT BUDGET | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT FINANCES | |
dc.subject | HOLDING | |
dc.subject | INDIVIDUAL BOND | |
dc.subject | INFLATION | |
dc.subject | INFLATION RATE | |
dc.subject | INSTRUMENT | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL BANK | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT DECISIONS | |
dc.subject | LOCAL CURRENCY | |
dc.subject | MARKET PLAYERS | |
dc.subject | MARKET SHARES | |
dc.subject | MONETARY FUND | |
dc.subject | MORTGAGES | |
dc.subject | PENSION | |
dc.subject | PENSION FUNDS | |
dc.subject | POLICY ENVIRONMENT | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL PARTIES | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS | |
dc.subject | REPUDIATION | |
dc.subject | RESERVES | |
dc.subject | SOVEREIGN BOND | |
dc.subject | SOVEREIGN RATING | |
dc.subject | SOVEREIGN RATINGS | |
dc.subject | SOVEREIGN RISK | |
dc.subject | UNEMPLOYMENT RATE | |
dc.subject | WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS | |
dc.title | Credit Rating Agencies in Emerging Democracies : Guardians of Fiscal Discipline? | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2013-03-01 | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17408765/credit-rating-agencies-emerging-democracies-guardians-fiscal-discipline | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-6379 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20130304152520 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 17408765 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS6379 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/03/04/000158349_20130304152520/Rendered/PDF/wps6379.pdf | en |
okr.region.geographical | Africa | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Debt Markets | |
okr.topic | Governance :: Parliamentary Government | |
okr.topic | Private Sector Development :: Emerging Markets | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | e8191634-f6b7-4f49-928b-f42b51d2c37f | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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