Publication: Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement
dc.contributor.author | Estache, Antonio | |
dc.contributor.author | Iimi, Atsushi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-19T19:09:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-19T19:09:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009-03-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality. | en |
dc.identifier | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304110004 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4853 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4049 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4853 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS | |
dc.subject | AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS | |
dc.subject | ANTI-CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | AUCTION | |
dc.subject | AUCTION PROCESS | |
dc.subject | AUCTIONS | |
dc.subject | BID EVALUATION | |
dc.subject | BID EVALUATION PROCESS | |
dc.subject | BID PRICE | |
dc.subject | BIDDER | |
dc.subject | BIDDERS | |
dc.subject | BIDS | |
dc.subject | CAPABILITIES | |
dc.subject | CIVIL WORKS | |
dc.subject | COLLUSION | |
dc.subject | COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY | |
dc.subject | COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION POLICY | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE BIDDING | |
dc.subject | CONSTRUCTION WORKS | |
dc.subject | CONTRACTOR | |
dc.subject | CONTRACTORS | |
dc.subject | COST ESTIMATE | |
dc.subject | COST ESTIMATES | |
dc.subject | COVARIANCE MATRICES | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS | |
dc.subject | DONOR AGENCY | |
dc.subject | E-GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | E-PROCUREMENT | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRICS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC THEORY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIES OF SCALE | |
dc.subject | ELECTRICITY | |
dc.subject | ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES | |
dc.subject | EQUATIONS | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | EQUIPMENT | |
dc.subject | EVALUATION SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | EVALUATION SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | EXOGENOUS VARIABLES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN BIDDERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FUNCTIONAL FORMS | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT | |
dc.subject | ICT | |
dc.subject | INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | INSTALLATION | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL FIRMS | |
dc.subject | JOINT VENTURES | |
dc.subject | LEAST COST ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | MARKET CONCENTRATION | |
dc.subject | MARKETPLACE | |
dc.subject | MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | POTENTIAL BIDDERS | |
dc.subject | PRICE BID | |
dc.subject | PRICE COMPARISON | |
dc.subject | PRICE COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | PRICE CRITERIA | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | PROCUREMENT | |
dc.subject | PROCUREMENT PROCESS | |
dc.subject | PROCUREMENTS | |
dc.subject | PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC CONTRACTS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC ENTITIES | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC PROCUREMENT | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC TENDERS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC WORKS | |
dc.subject | QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | |
dc.subject | QUALIFIED BIDDERS | |
dc.subject | QUALIFIED FIRMS | |
dc.subject | QUALITY REQUIREMENTS | |
dc.subject | QUALITY STANDARD | |
dc.subject | QUALITY STANDARDS | |
dc.subject | RESULT | |
dc.subject | RESULTS | |
dc.subject | SUBSTITUTE | |
dc.subject | TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS | |
dc.subject | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS | |
dc.subject | TECHNICAL STANDARD | |
dc.subject | TECHNICAL STANDARDS | |
dc.subject | TENDERING | |
dc.subject | TRANSMISSION | |
dc.subject | USER | |
dc.subject | WAGES | |
dc.subject | WEB | |
dc.subject | WINNING BID | |
dc.title | Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Auctions With Endogenous Participation And Quality Thresholds: Evidence From ODA Infrastructure Procurement | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T12:20:07.095411Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.docurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304110004 | |
okr.guid | 776651468166767698 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4853 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20090304110004 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 10315774 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS4853 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/03/04/000158349_20090304110004/Rendered/PDF/WPS4853.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | The World Region | |
okr.region.administrative | The World Region | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | eeef1beb-b651-587f-bb16-a47ff170a096 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | eeef1beb-b651-587f-bb16-a47ff170a096 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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