Publication:
Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement

dc.contributor.authorEstache, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorIimi, Atsushi
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-19T19:09:04Z
dc.date.available2012-03-19T19:09:04Z
dc.date.issued2009-03-01
dc.description.abstractInfrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality.en
dc.identifierhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304110004
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4853
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/4049
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4853
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
dc.subjectAFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
dc.subjectANTI-CORRUPTION
dc.subjectAUCTION
dc.subjectAUCTION PROCESS
dc.subjectAUCTIONS
dc.subjectBID EVALUATION
dc.subjectBID EVALUATION PROCESS
dc.subjectBID PRICE
dc.subjectBIDDER
dc.subjectBIDDERS
dc.subjectBIDS
dc.subjectCAPABILITIES
dc.subjectCIVIL WORKS
dc.subjectCOLLUSION
dc.subjectCOMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectCOMPETITION POLICY
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVE BIDDING
dc.subjectCONSTRUCTION WORKS
dc.subjectCONTRACTOR
dc.subjectCONTRACTORS
dc.subjectCOST ESTIMATE
dc.subjectCOST ESTIMATES
dc.subjectCOVARIANCE MATRICES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
dc.subjectDONOR AGENCY
dc.subjectE-GOVERNMENT
dc.subjectE-PROCUREMENT
dc.subjectECONOMETRICS
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subjectECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subjectELECTRICITY
dc.subjectENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
dc.subjectEQUATIONS
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEQUIPMENT
dc.subjectEVALUATION SYSTEM
dc.subjectEVALUATION SYSTEMS
dc.subjectEXOGENOUS VARIABLES
dc.subjectFOREIGN BIDDERS
dc.subjectFOREIGN COMPANIES
dc.subjectFOREIGN FIRMS
dc.subjectFUNCTIONAL FORMS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
dc.subjectICT
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINSTALLATION
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL FIRMS
dc.subjectJOINT VENTURES
dc.subjectLEAST COST ANALYSIS
dc.subjectMARKET CONCENTRATION
dc.subjectMARKETPLACE
dc.subjectMULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOTENTIAL BIDDERS
dc.subjectPRICE BID
dc.subjectPRICE COMPARISON
dc.subjectPRICE COMPETITION
dc.subjectPRICE CRITERIA
dc.subjectPRIVATE INFORMATION
dc.subjectPRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
dc.subjectPROCUREMENT
dc.subjectPROCUREMENT PROCESS
dc.subjectPROCUREMENTS
dc.subjectPROSPECTIVE BIDDERS
dc.subjectPUBLIC
dc.subjectPUBLIC CONTRACTS
dc.subjectPUBLIC ENTITIES
dc.subjectPUBLIC PROCUREMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPUBLIC TENDERS
dc.subjectPUBLIC WORKS
dc.subjectQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
dc.subjectQUALIFIED BIDDERS
dc.subjectQUALIFIED FIRMS
dc.subjectQUALITY REQUIREMENTS
dc.subjectQUALITY STANDARD
dc.subjectQUALITY STANDARDS
dc.subjectRESULT
dc.subjectRESULTS
dc.subjectSUBSTITUTE
dc.subjectTECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
dc.subjectTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
dc.subjectTECHNICAL STANDARD
dc.subjectTECHNICAL STANDARDS
dc.subjectTENDERING
dc.subjectTRANSMISSION
dc.subjectUSER
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectWEB
dc.subjectWINNING BID
dc.titleAuctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurementen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleAuctions With Endogenous Participation And Quality Thresholds: Evidence From ODA Infrastructure Procurement
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T12:20:07.095411Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304110004
okr.guid776651468166767698
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4853
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000158349_20090304110004
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum10315774
okr.identifier.reportWPS4853
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/03/04/000158349_20090304110004/Rendered/PDF/WPS4853.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeThe World Region
okr.region.administrativeThe World Region
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationeeef1beb-b651-587f-bb16-a47ff170a096
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryeeef1beb-b651-587f-bb16-a47ff170a096
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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