Publication:
Selective Control: The Political Economy of Censorship

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dc.contributor.authorHamilton, Alexander
dc.contributor.authorCorduneanu-Huci, Cristina
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-23T15:41:14Z
dc.date.available2018-08-23T15:41:14Z
dc.date.issued2018-08
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targets that provide information to politically consequential audiences, while allowing media that caters to elite audiences to report freely. Second, the paper hypothesizes that coercion and inducements are substitutes, with censorship being employed primarily when bribes and ownership fail to control information. To test these hypotheses, a new data set was built of 9,000 salient censorship events and their characteristics across 196 countries between 2001 and 2015. The study finds strong empirical support for the theory of media market segmentation.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/329391534428575999/Selective-control-the-political-economy-of-censorship
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-8556
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/30283
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 8556
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectCENSORSHIP
dc.subjectMEDIA
dc.subjectANTI-CORRUPTION
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
dc.titleSelective Controlen
dc.title.subtitleThe Political Economy of Censorshipen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleSelective Control: The Political Economy of Censorship
okr.date.disclosure2018-08-16
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/329391534428575999/Selective-control-the-political-economy-of-censorship
okr.guid329391534428575999
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-8556
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b085f7f7aa_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum30352919
okr.identifier.reportWPS8556
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/329391534428575999/pdf/WPS8556.pdfen
okr.statistics.combined6716
okr.statistics.dr329391534428575999
okr.statistics.drstats6131
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicInformation and Communication Technologies::Broadcast and Media
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Corporate Governance and Corruption
okr.topicSocial Development::Civil Society
okr.topicSocial Development::Social Analysis
okr.topicGovernance::Politics and Government
okr.unitDevelopment Data Group, Development Economics
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationc99a9d87-0195-559b-96fd-488b83370cdf
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc99a9d87-0195-559b-96fd-488b83370cdf
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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