Publication:
How Stronger Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior of Transnational Pharmaceutical Industries

dc.contributor.authorFink, Carsten
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-23T23:19:51Z
dc.date.available2015-02-23T23:19:51Z
dc.date.issued2000-05
dc.description.abstractTo address questions about how stronger patent rights will affect India's pharmaceutical industry, the author simulates the effects of introducing such protection - as required by the World trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) - on market structure and static consumer welfare. (India must amend its current patent regime by 2005 and establish a transitional regime in the meanwhile.) The mode the author uses accounts for the complex demand structure for pharmaceutical goods. Consumers can choose among various drugs available to treat a specific disease. And for each drug, they have a choice among various differentiated brands. The author calibrates the model for two groups of drugs - quinolonnes and synthetic hypotensives - using 1992 brad-level data. In both groups, a subset of all available drugs was patent-protected in Western Europe but no India, where Indian manufacturers freely imitated them. The simulation analysis asks how the market structure for the two groups of drugs would have looked if India had granted patents for drugs. It does not take account of the fact that stronger patent protection will not apply to existing drugs and that the Indian government might be able to restrain high drug prices by imposing price controls or granting compulsory licenses. Still, the author concludes that if future drug discoveries are mainly new varieties of already existing therapeutic treatments, the effect of stronger patent protection is likely to be small, If newly discovered drugs are medicinal breakthroughs, however, prices may rise significantly above competitive levels and static welfare losses may be large. If demand is highly price-elastic, as is likely in India, profits for transnational corporations are likely to be small, but if private health insurance is permitted in India, reducing the price-sensitivity of demand, patent-holders' profits could increase substantially. In light of the fact that the TRIPS Agreement strengthens patent rights in most developing countries, pharmaceutical companies may do more research on, for example, tropical diseases.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2352
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/21481
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 2352
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectadvertising
dc.subjectbrand loyalty
dc.subjectbrand name
dc.subjectbrand names
dc.subjectbrands
dc.subjectcommercialization
dc.subjectcomplex task
dc.subjectconstant marginal costs
dc.subjectconsumers
dc.subjectcournot competition
dc.subjectdemand elasticity
dc.subjectdemand functions
dc.subjectdeveloped countries
dc.subjectduopoly
dc.subjecteconomic circumstances
dc.subjecteconomic consequences
dc.subjecteconomic theory
dc.subjecteconomies of scale
dc.subjectelasticities
dc.subjectelasticity of substitution
dc.subjectequilibrium
dc.subjectexchange rate
dc.subjectexclusive rights
dc.subjectexports
dc.subjectfixed costs
dc.subjectimperfect substitutes
dc.subjectimports
dc.subjectincome
dc.subjectinsurance
dc.subjectlegislation
dc.subjectmanufacturing industry
dc.subjectmarginal cost
dc.subjectmarket behavior
dc.subjectmarket demand
dc.subjectmarket power
dc.subjectmarket segments
dc.subjectmarket share
dc.subjectmarket structure
dc.subjectmarketing
dc.subjectmergers
dc.subjectmonopolies
dc.subjectmultilateral trade
dc.subjectnash equilibrium
dc.subjectpatents
dc.subjectperfect competition
dc.subjectprice ceilings
dc.subjectprice control
dc.subjectprice controls
dc.subjectprice increases
dc.subjectprice index
dc.subjectproducers
dc.subjectproduct differentiation
dc.subjectproperty rights
dc.subjectpublic health
dc.subjectpublicity
dc.subjectsales
dc.subjectsubstitutes
dc.subjectsubstitution
dc.subjectsurplus
dc.subjectsurpluses
dc.subjecttechnical assistance
dc.subjecttotal sales
dc.subjecttrademarks
dc.subjectutility function
dc.subjectWorld Trade Organization
dc.subjectWTO
dc.subjectpatents
dc.subjectpatent agreements
dc.subjectpharmaceutical industry
dc.subjectdrug industry
dc.subjectintellectual property rights
dc.subjectdrug prices
dc.subjectnontariff trade barriers
dc.titleHow Stronger Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior of Transnational Pharmaceutical Industriesen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleHow Stronger Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior of Transnational Pharmaceutical Industries
okr.date.disclosure2000-05-31
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:53:53.635670Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.globalpracticeTrade and Competitiveness
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid378781468756280668
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2352
okr.identifier.reportWPS2352
okr.language.supporteden
okr.region.administrativeSouth Asia
okr.region.countryIndia
okr.topicEnvironment::Environmental Economics & Policies
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade::Access to Markets
okr.topicLaw and Development::Real & Intellectual Property Law
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Theory & Research
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Markets and Market Access
okr.topicWater Resources::Water and Industry
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade::Intellectual Property Rights
okr.unitTrade, Development Research Group
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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