Publication: Risk Absorption by the State : When Is It Good Public Policy?
dc.contributor.author | Anginer, Deniz | |
dc.contributor.author | de la Torre, Augusto | |
dc.contributor.author | Ize, Alain | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-19T18:06:23Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-19T18:06:23Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-12-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | The global financial crisis brought public guarantees to the forefront of the policy debate. Based on a review of the theoretical foundations of public guarantees, this paper concludes that the commonly used justifications for public guarantees based solely on agency frictions (such as adverse selection or lack of collateral) and/or un-internalized externalities are flawed. When risk is idiosyncratic, it is highly unlikely that a case for guarantees can be made without risk aversion. When risk aversion is explicitly added to the picture, public guarantees may be justified by the state's natural advantage in dealing with collective action failures (providing public goods). The state can spread risk more finely across space and time because it can coordinate and pool atomistic agents that would otherwise not organize themselves to solve monitoring or commitment problems. Public guarantees may be transitory, until financial systems mature, or permanent, when risk is fat-tailed. In the case of aggregate (non-diversifiable) risk, permanent public guarantees may also be justified, but in this case the state adds value not by spreading risk but by coordinating agents. In addition to greater transparency in justifying public guarantees, the analysis calls for exploiting the natural complementarities between the state and the markets in bearing risk. | en |
dc.identifier | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111202104813 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-5893 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3660 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5893 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ABOVE MARKET RATES | |
dc.subject | ACCESS TO FINANCE | |
dc.subject | AGENCY PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | AGENTS | |
dc.subject | ALLOCATION OF CREDIT | |
dc.subject | ANNUITIES | |
dc.subject | ARBITRAGE | |
dc.subject | ASSET MANAGERS | |
dc.subject | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | AUCTION | |
dc.subject | BAILOUT | |
dc.subject | BALANCE SHEETS | |
dc.subject | BANK POLICY | |
dc.subject | BANK RUN | |
dc.subject | BIASES | |
dc.subject | BID | |
dc.subject | BOND | |
dc.subject | BOND ISSUERS | |
dc.subject | BONDS | |
dc.subject | BORROWING | |
dc.subject | BORROWING CAPACITY | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BANK | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL ACCUMULATION | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL INJECTIONS | |
dc.subject | CC | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL BANKS | |
dc.subject | CHECKS | |
dc.subject | COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE ACTION | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | COLLEGE EDUCATION | |
dc.subject | COMMERCIAL BANK | |
dc.subject | COMMERCIAL BANKS | |
dc.subject | CONFLICTS OF INTEREST | |
dc.subject | CONSUMER CREDIT | |
dc.subject | CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK | |
dc.subject | CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT | |
dc.subject | COORDINATION FAILURES | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE FINANCE | |
dc.subject | COST OF CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | COST OF LOAN | |
dc.subject | COST SHARING | |
dc.subject | COVERAGE | |
dc.subject | CREDIT DEFAULT | |
dc.subject | CREDIT EXPANSION | |
dc.subject | CREDIT GUARANTEE | |
dc.subject | CREDIT GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | CREDIT MARKET | |
dc.subject | CREDIT MARKETS | |
dc.subject | CREDIT POLICY | |
dc.subject | CREDIT PROGRAMS | |
dc.subject | CREDIT RATIONING | |
dc.subject | CREDITORS | |
dc.subject | DEBT | |
dc.subject | DEFAULT LOSSES | |
dc.subject | DEGREE OF RISK | |
dc.subject | DEPOSIT | |
dc.subject | DEPOSIT GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | DEPOSIT INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT BANK | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT BANKS | |
dc.subject | DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION | |
dc.subject | DIRECTED CREDIT | |
dc.subject | DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS | |
dc.subject | EARNINGS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIES OF SCALE | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYEE | |
dc.subject | ENABLING ENVIRONMENT | |
dc.subject | ENTREPRENEUR | |
dc.subject | ENTREPRENEURS | |
dc.subject | EXTERNALITIES | |
dc.subject | FAIR PRICE | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL RESERVE | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL RESERVE BANK | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL CRISES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL CRISIS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL FRAGILITY | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL RISK | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SERVICES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL STABILITY | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | FISCAL CONSTRAINTS | |
dc.subject | FORM OF CREDIT | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION | |
dc.subject | GRANT PROGRAMS | |
dc.subject | GUARANTEE FUNDS | |
dc.subject | GUARANTEE SCHEME | |
dc.subject | GUARANTEE SCHEMES | |
dc.subject | GUARANTOR | |
dc.subject | GUARANTORS | |
dc.subject | HEALTH INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | HEDGE FUNDS | |
dc.subject | HOLDINGS | |
dc.subject | HOUSEHOLDS | |
dc.subject | HOUSING | |
dc.subject | IMPERFECT INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | INCOME DISTRIBUTION | |
dc.subject | INEQUALITIES | |
dc.subject | INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES | |
dc.subject | INFORMATION ASYMMETRY | |
dc.subject | INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE MARKETS | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE PREMIUM | |
dc.subject | INTEREST PAYMENTS | |
dc.subject | INTEREST RATE | |
dc.subject | INTEREST RATES | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL BANK | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL FINANCE | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT DECISIONS | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT PROJECTS | |
dc.subject | JOINT STOCK COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | JOINT STOCK COMPANY | |
dc.subject | LACK OF COLLATERAL | |
dc.subject | LENDER | |
dc.subject | LENDER OF LAST RESORT | |
dc.subject | LENDER-OF-LAST-RESORT | |
dc.subject | LENDERS | |
dc.subject | LIABILITY | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDATION | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDATION VALUE | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDATIONS | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDITY RISK | |
dc.subject | LOAN APPLICANTS | |
dc.subject | LOAN DEFAULT | |
dc.subject | LOAN GUARANTEE | |
dc.subject | LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM | |
dc.subject | LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS | |
dc.subject | LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS | |
dc.subject | LOAN MARKET | |
dc.subject | LOAN MARKETS | |
dc.subject | LOAN PROGRAMS | |
dc.subject | LOAN REPAYMENT | |
dc.subject | LONG-TERM FINANCE | |
dc.subject | LONG-TERM INSTRUMENTS | |
dc.subject | LONG-TERM LOANS | |
dc.subject | LOW INTEREST RATES | |
dc.subject | MACROECONOMIC POLICY | |
dc.subject | MANDATES | |
dc.subject | MARKET DEPTH | |
dc.subject | MARKET FAILURE | |
dc.subject | MARKET FAILURES | |
dc.subject | MARKET INEFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | MARKET LIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | MARKET PARTICIPANTS | |
dc.subject | MATURITY | |
dc.subject | MDB | |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | |
dc.subject | MORTGAGE | |
dc.subject | MORTGAGE FINANCE | |
dc.subject | MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS | |
dc.subject | MUTUAL FUNDS | |
dc.subject | PARTIAL CREDIT | |
dc.subject | PARTIAL GUARANTEE | |
dc.subject | PARTIAL GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS | |
dc.subject | PEER PRESSURE | |
dc.subject | PENSION | |
dc.subject | PENSION FUNDS | |
dc.subject | POLICY RESPONSE | |
dc.subject | POLICY RESPONSES | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | PRICE RISK | |
dc.subject | PRICE VOLATILITY | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE BANKS | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE LENDER | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE LENDERS | |
dc.subject | PRIVATIZATION | |
dc.subject | PROBABILITY OF REPAYMENT | |
dc.subject | PROFITABILITY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC BANKS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC LENDERS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC POLICY | |
dc.subject | RATE OF RETURN | |
dc.subject | RATING AGENCIES | |
dc.subject | REAL ESTATE | |
dc.subject | REINSURANCE | |
dc.subject | REPAYMENT | |
dc.subject | REPAYMENTS | |
dc.subject | RESERVES | |
dc.subject | RETAIL INVESTORS | |
dc.subject | RETURNS | |
dc.subject | RISK AVERSION | |
dc.subject | RISK FRONTIER | |
dc.subject | RISK MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | RISK NEUTRAL | |
dc.subject | RISK PREMIUM | |
dc.subject | RISK TAKING | |
dc.subject | RISK TRANSFER | |
dc.subject | RULE OF LAW | |
dc.subject | SETTLEMENT | |
dc.subject | SHAREHOLDERS | |
dc.subject | SMALL BUSINESS | |
dc.subject | SMALL BUSINESS LOAN | |
dc.subject | SMALL FARMERS | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL WELFARE | |
dc.subject | STATE BANK | |
dc.subject | STATE BANKING | |
dc.subject | STATE BANKS | |
dc.subject | STATE GUARANTEE | |
dc.subject | STATE GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | STATE INTERVENTION | |
dc.subject | STATE LOAN | |
dc.subject | STUDENT LOAN | |
dc.subject | STUDENT LOANS | |
dc.subject | SUBSIDIZATION | |
dc.subject | SWAP | |
dc.subject | SYSTEMIC RISK | |
dc.subject | TAX | |
dc.subject | TAX SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | TRADING | |
dc.subject | TRANSFER PAYMENT | |
dc.subject | TRANSPARENCY | |
dc.subject | UNDERWRITING | |
dc.subject | UNEMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | WAGES | |
dc.subject | WHOLESALE FUNDING | |
dc.title | Risk Absorption by the State : When Is It Good Public Policy? | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Jobs | |
okr.crossref.title | Risk Absorption by the State: When is It Good Public Policy? | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2011-12-01 | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T11:06:43.056726Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.docurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111202104813 | |
okr.globalpractice | Social Protection and Labor | |
okr.guid | 231941468134726378 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-5893 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20111202104813 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 15521582 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS5893 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/12/02/000158349_20111202104813/Rendered/PDF/WPS5893.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | The World Region | |
okr.region.administrative | The World Region | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor::Labor Policies | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 35317b87-0569-5cde-bb5e-db1a425e6889 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | ddbea2d3-9cc2-52f4-ab28-94372063d761 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 35317b87-0569-5cde-bb5e-db1a425e6889 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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