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Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor: Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor?

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dc.contributor.authorBanuri, Sheheryar
dc.contributor.authorde Walque, Damien
dc.contributor.authorKeeper, Philip
dc.contributor.authorRobyn, Paul Jacob
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-11T18:48:43Z
dc.date.available2018-12-11T18:48:43Z
dc.date.issued2018-12
dc.description.abstractDo service providers respond to pecuniary incentives to serve the poor? Service delivery to the poor is complicated by the extra effort required to deliver services to them and the intrinsic incentives of service providers to exert this effort. Incentive schemes typically fail to account for these complications. A lab-in-the-field experiment with nearly 400 health workers in rural Burkina Faso provides strong evidence that the interaction of effort costs, ability, and intrinsic and extrinsic incentives significantly influences service delivery to the poor. Health workers reviewed video vignettes of medical cases involving poor and nonpoor patients under a variety of bonus schemes. Bonuses to serve the poor have less impact on effort than bonuses to serve the nonpoor; health workers who receive equal bonuses to serve poor and nonpoor patients see fewer poor patients than workers who receive only a flat salary; and bonuses operate largely through their influence on the behavior of pro-poor workers. The paper also presents novel evidence on the selection effects of contract type: pro-poor workers prefer the flat salary contract to the variable salary contract.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126181544125231736/Encouraging-Service-Delivery-to-the-Poor-Does-Money-Talk-When-Health-Workers-Are-Pro-Poor
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-8666
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/30988
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 8666
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectSERVICE DELIVERY
dc.subjectHEALTH SERVICES
dc.subjectPUBLIC HEALTH
dc.subjectACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICE
dc.subjectHEALTH WORKERS
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.titleEncouraging Service Delivery to the Pooren
dc.title.subtitleDoes Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor?en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleEncouraging Service Delivery to the Poor: Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor ?
okr.date.disclosure2018-12-06
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126181544125231736/Encouraging-Service-Delivery-to-the-Poor-Does-Money-Talk-When-Health-Workers-Are-Pro-Poor
okr.guid126181544125231736
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-8666
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b0866e70e5_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum30672026
okr.identifier.reportWPS8666
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126181544125231736/pdf/WPS8666.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeAfrica
okr.region.countryBurkina Faso
okr.statistics.combined1590
okr.statistics.dr126181544125231736
okr.statistics.drstats1289
okr.topicHealth, Nutrition and Population::Health Service Management and Delivery
okr.topicHealth, Nutrition and Population::Health and Poverty
okr.topicHealth, Nutrition and Population::Public Health Promotion
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group, Development Economics
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationb5740416-f4ef-5235-974a-47bd257d61a4
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb5740416-f4ef-5235-974a-47bd257d61a4
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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