Publication: What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
dc.contributor.author | Freinkman, Lev | |
dc.contributor.author | Plekhanov, Alexander | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-18T17:01:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-18T17:01:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-09 | |
dc.description.abstract | The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3710 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3710 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | AUTONOMY | |
dc.subject | BUDGET REVENUES | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL | |
dc.subject | CITIES | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVENESS | |
dc.subject | CONSENSUS | |
dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | DECISION-MAKING | |
dc.subject | DEFLATORS | |
dc.subject | DEGREE OF CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRACY | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRATIZATION | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS | |
dc.subject | DISTRICTS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC SIZE | |
dc.subject | ELASTICITY | |
dc.subject | ELECTORAL COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | EQUALIZATION | |
dc.subject | EXHIBITS | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURE | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | FEDERALISM | |
dc.subject | FEDERATIONS | |
dc.subject | FISCAL | |
dc.subject | FISCAL CENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | FISCAL FEDERALISM | |
dc.subject | FISCAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | FISCAL REVENUE | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GINI COEFFICIENT | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT LEVELS | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT REVENUE | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT REVENUES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SPENDING | |
dc.subject | HEAD OF STATE | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INFLATION | |
dc.subject | INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS | |
dc.subject | LATIN AMERICAN | |
dc.subject | LAWS | |
dc.subject | LEGAL FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | LOCAL DECISION MAKING | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | MIGRATION | |
dc.subject | MINISTRY OF FINANCE | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPALITIES | |
dc.subject | PENSIONS | |
dc.subject | PER CAPITA INCOME | |
dc.subject | PER CAPITA INCOMES | |
dc.subject | POSITIVE EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | PRIVATIZATION | |
dc.subject | PURCHASING POWER | |
dc.subject | REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | REGIONAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | REPUBLICS | |
dc.subject | REVENUE MEASURES | |
dc.subject | REVENUE SHARING | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL TRANSFERS | |
dc.subject | SOVEREIGNTY | |
dc.subject | STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | STATISTICAL ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS | |
dc.subject | SUBNATIONAL FINANCE | |
dc.subject | SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | TAX COLLECTION | |
dc.subject | TAXATION | |
dc.subject | TRANSPARENCY | |
dc.subject | URBANIZATION | |
dc.subject | VOTERS | |
dc.subject | WATER SUPPLY | |
dc.subject | WEALTH | |
dc.title | What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:31:06.617127Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox | |
okr.globalpractice | Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.guid | 892691468296683932 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3710 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000016406_20050906163024 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 6271190 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3710 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/09/06/000016406_20050906163024/Rendered/PDF/wps3710.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | Europe and Central Asia | |
okr.region.country | Russian Federation | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Governance::Regional Governance | |
okr.topic | Governance::National Governance | |
okr.topic | Urban Development::Municipal Financial Management | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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