Publication: Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Trap: Implications for Reform Strategy
| dc.contributor.author | Stephenson, Matthew C. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-11T18:17:19Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-01-11T18:17:19Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-07 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Corruption is widely believed to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, in the sense that the incentive to engage in corrupt acts increases as corruption becomes more widespread. Some argue that corruption's self-reinforcing property necessarily implies that incremental anticorruption reforms cannot be effective, and that the only way to escape a high-corruption equilibrium “trap” is through a so-called “big bang” or “big push.” However, corruption's self-reinforcing property does not logically entail the necessity of a big bang approach to reform. Indeed, corruption's self-reinforcing property may strengthen the case for pursuing sustained, cumulative incremental reforms. While there may be other reasons to prefer a big bang approach to an incremental approach, this conclusion cannot be grounded solely or primarily on corruption's self-reinforcing character. | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | World Bank Research Observer | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/36810 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1564-6971 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/36810 | |
| dc.publisher | Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | World Bank Research Observer | |
| dc.rights | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO | |
| dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
| dc.subject | SELF-REINFORCING BEHAVIOR | |
| dc.subject | REFORM STRATEGY | |
| dc.subject | INCREMENTALISM | |
| dc.subject | BIG PUSH | |
| dc.subject | PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM | |
| dc.title | Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Trap | en |
| dc.title.subtitle | Implications for Reform Strategy | en |
| dc.type | Journal Article | en |
| dc.type | Article de journal | fr |
| dc.type | Artículo de revista | es |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| okr.date.disclosure | 2022-01-11 | |
| okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-05-06T11:30:22.478277Z | |
| okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
| okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Journal Article | |
| okr.identifier.doi | 10.1093/wbro/lkaa003 | |
| okr.journal.nbpages | 192-226 | |
| okr.language.supported | en | |
| okr.peerreview | Academic Peer Review | |
| okr.topic | Governance::Politics and Government | |
| okr.topic | Public Sector Development::Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures | |
| okr.topic | Public Sector Development::Public Sector Management and Reform | |
| okr.topic | Private Sector Development::Corporate Governance and Corruption | |
| okr.volume | 35(2) | |
| relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication | 806e25f4-7594-4c0d-9535-2b2b380da687 | |
| relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 806e25f4-7594-4c0d-9535-2b2b380da687 | |
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| relation.isJournalVolumeOfPublication | 9114dde9-ed7f-4df4-9de1-174aae48ff20 |