Publication:
Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy

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dc.contributor.authorCampante, Filipe R.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Francisco H.G.
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-10T17:13:43Z
dc.date.available2013-07-10T17:13:43Z
dc.date.issued2004-03
dc.description.abstractThe authors investigate the theoretical effects of lobbying and pressure group activities on both economic efficiency and on equity. Looking at lobbying as a political activity that takes place alongside production, they find that lobbies may generate economic inefficiency as part of the process of shifting the allocation of government expenditures in their favor. Outcomes of this non-electoral political process will always be biased toward the group with a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. In a context where the main political conflict is one between "the rich" and "the poor," political equilibria may be either populist (inefficiently pro-poor) or oligarchic (inefficiently pro-rich), depending on each group's lobbying effectiveness.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3056035/inefficient-lobbying-populism-oligarchy
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3240
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/14442
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No.3240
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectAGENTS
dc.subjectALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
dc.subjectBARRIERS TO ENTRY
dc.subjectBENCHMARK
dc.subjectCAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
dc.subjectCAPITAL MARKETS
dc.subjectCENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
dc.subjectCOALITIONS
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES
dc.subjectCOMPENSATING VARIATION
dc.subjectCONFLICT OF INTERESTS
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING PROCESS
dc.subjectDECISION-MAKING
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATES
dc.subjectDISPOSABLE INCOME
dc.subjectDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
dc.subjectECONOMIC ACTIVITY
dc.subjectECONOMIC ANALYSIS
dc.subjectECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFECTS
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectECONOMIC MODELS
dc.subjectECONOMIC OUTCOMES
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectECONOMIC RESOURCES
dc.subjectECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subjectECONOMISTS
dc.subjectELITES
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectFINANCIAL SUPPORT
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT DECREE
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT POLICIES
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT SPENDING
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT'S BUDGET
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT'S POLICY
dc.subjectIMPORTS
dc.subjectINCOME DISTRIBUTION
dc.subjectINEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectINHERITANCE
dc.subjectLABOR SUPPLY
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectLOBBYISTS
dc.subjectMARGINAL COST
dc.subjectMARGINAL COSTS
dc.subjectMARGINAL PRODUCT
dc.subjectMINIMUM WAGES
dc.subjectNASH EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectOLIGARCHY
dc.subjectPARETO EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectPERFECT INFORMATION
dc.subjectPOLICY DECISIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTIES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PROCESS
dc.subjectPOPULISM
dc.subjectPRICE INCREASES
dc.subjectPRIVATE CONSUMPTION
dc.subjectPRIVATE GOODS
dc.subjectPRODUCTION FUNCTION
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURE
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectREAL WAGES
dc.subjectREPRESENTATIVES
dc.subjectRESOURCE ALLOCATION
dc.subjectSCIENTISTS
dc.subjectSOCIAL WELFARE
dc.subjectTAX RATE
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTOTAL OUTPUT
dc.subjectTRANSACTION COSTS
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.subjectWELFARE FUNCTION LOBBYING
dc.subjectPOPULISM
dc.subjectOLIGARCHY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURES & THE POOR
dc.subjectECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEQUITY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ACTIVITY & THE POOR
dc.titleInefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchyen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaJobs
okr.crossref.titleInefficient Lobbying, Populism, and Oligarchy
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:33:48.531214Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3056035/inefficient-lobbying-populism-oligarchy
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeTransport and ICT
okr.globalpracticeSocial Protection and Labor
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid842831468761427984
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3240
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000012009_20040326142907
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum3056035
okr.identifier.reportWPS3240
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/26/000012009_20040326142907/Rendered/PDF/WPS3240.pdfen
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Knowledge Economy
okr.topicEnvironmental Economics and Policies
okr.topicSocial Protections and Labor::Labor Policies
okr.topicInformation and Communication Technologies::ICT Policy and Strategies
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicFiscal and Monetary Policy
okr.unitOff of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
relation.isAuthorOfPublication2aa2ddfe-f591-50b2-961d-c4991bd3b876
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery2aa2ddfe-f591-50b2-961d-c4991bd3b876
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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