Publication:
From Government to Regulatory Governance

dc.contributor.authorBortolotti, Bernardo
dc.contributor.authorPerotti, Enrico
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30T07:12:32Z
dc.date.available2012-03-30T07:12:32Z
dc.date.issued2007-03-01
dc.description.abstractThis article reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and control. Optimal governance systems depend on the path of institutional development. Nevertheless, the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the private sector often yields a desirable governance system, because it may be more difficult for citizens to constrain political abuse than for governments to regulate private activity. In weak institutional environments, however, the process needs to be structured to avoid capture of the regulatory process. The speed of transfer should be matched to progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. After all, “institutions” are simply governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests. The gradual creation of institutions partially shielded from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The article presents suggestions for establishing accountability in regulatory governance, in particular by creating an internal control system based on a rotating board with representatives of users, producers, and civil society, in a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure.en
dc.identifier.citationWorld Bank Research Observer
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/4404
dc.identifier.issn1564-6971
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/4404
dc.publisherWorld Bank
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorld Bank Research Observer
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectaccountability
dc.subjectcitizens
dc.subjectconstituencies
dc.subjectdegree of autonomy
dc.subjectdisclosure
dc.subjectfinancial crises
dc.subjectfinancial institutions
dc.subjectinstitutional development
dc.subjectnationalization
dc.subjectpolitical power
dc.subjectpoliticians
dc.subjectpublic control
dc.subjectpublic subsidies
dc.subjectrepresentatives
dc.subjectsocial control
dc.subjectsocial equity
dc.subjectstate enterprises
dc.subjectstate ownership
dc.subjectstate planning
dc.subjectstate-owned enterprises
dc.titleFrom Government to Regulatory Governanceen
dc.title.alternativePrivatization and the Residual Role of the Stateen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaPublic-Private Partnerships
okr.date.doiregistration2025-05-06T11:20:17.289147Z
okr.doctypeJournal Article
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.globalpracticeTrade and Competitiveness
okr.identifier.report1
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pagenumber53
okr.pagenumber66
okr.pdfurlwbro_22_1_53.pdfen
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.region.countryRussian Federation
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Emerging Markets
okr.topicBanks and Banking Reform
okr.topicPublic Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Privatization
okr.volume22
relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication560b2ad2-10eb-4fd1-9d0a-bd7cb91c8990
relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication.latestForDiscovery560b2ad2-10eb-4fd1-9d0a-bd7cb91c8990
relation.isJournalOfPublication9e5fbe82-492f-4142-8378-17d50245d9de
relation.isJournalVolumeOfPublicationae9dcaa4-e2d9-4e9a-b9f4-3ec74d20184b
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