Publication: Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services
dc.contributor.author | Mattoo, Aaditya | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-26T15:05:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-26T15:05:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2001-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | The new round of negotiations has begun with a mechanical sense of "since we said we would, therefore we must," says the author. To make the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) more effective ay liberalization, the author suggests improving the agreement's rules, countries' specific commitments, and the negotiating methodology: 1) Wasteful regulations, and entry restrictions pervade trade in services. Unlike the GATT, the GATS has created no hierarchy of instruments of protection. It may be possible to create a legal presumption in favor of instruments (such as fiscal measures) that provide protection more efficiently. 2) Many countries have taken advantage of the GATS to create a more secure trading environment, by making legally binding commitments to market access. The credibility of reform would increase with wider commitments to maintain current levels of openness, or to increase access in the future. 3) Multilateral rules on domestic regulations can help promote, and consolidate domestic regulatory reform, even when the rules are designed primarily to prevent the erosion of market access for foreign providers. The pro-competitive principles developed for basic communications, could be extended to other network-based services sectors, such as transport (terminals and infrastructure), and energy services (distribution networks). The "necessity test" instituted for accounting services, could be applied to instruments in other sectors (so that doctors judged competent in one jurisdiction, wouldn't have to be retrained for another, for example). 4) Anticompetitive practices that fall outside the jurisdiction of national competition law, may be important in such sectors as maritime, air transport, and communications services. Strengthened multilateral rules are needed to reassure small countries with weak enforcement capacity, that the gains from liberalization will not be appropriated by international cartels. 5) Explicit departures from the most-favored-nation rule matter most in such sectors as maritime transport, audiovisual services, and air transport services - which have been excluded from key GATS disciplines. Implicit discrimination can be prevented by developing rules to ensure the non-discriminatory allocation of quotas, and maintaining the desirable openness of the GATS provision on mutual recognition agreements. 6) Reciprocity must play a greater role in negotiations, if the GATS is to advance liberalization beyond measures taken independently. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/04/1121245/shaping-future-gats-rules-trade-services | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-2596 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19667 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2596 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | AGREEMENT ON TRADE | |
dc.subject | ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS | |
dc.subject | ANTI- COMPETITIVE PRACTICES | |
dc.subject | ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES | |
dc.subject | ANTITRUST LAW | |
dc.subject | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | BARRIERS TO ENTRY | |
dc.subject | BILATERAL AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL CONSTRAINT | |
dc.subject | COMMERCIAL BANKS | |
dc.subject | COMMERCIAL PRESENCE | |
dc.subject | COMMUNICATION SERVICES | |
dc.subject | COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION LAW | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION PRINCIPLES | |
dc.subject | COMPETITION RULES | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE PRACTICES | |
dc.subject | COMPLETE LIBERALIZATION | |
dc.subject | CONSUMER SURPLUS | |
dc.subject | CONSUMERS | |
dc.subject | CROSS-BORDER DELIVERY | |
dc.subject | CROSS-BORDER TRADE | |
dc.subject | DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC FIRMS | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC INDUSTRY | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC LAW | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC MARKET | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC MARKET STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC MEASURES | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC REGULATIONS | |
dc.subject | DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCIES | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC CASE | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC THEORY | |
dc.subject | ENERGY SERVICES | |
dc.subject | ENHANCED COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | ENTRY BARRIERS | |
dc.subject | ENTRY RESTRICTIONS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES | |
dc.subject | EXPORTS | |
dc.subject | EXTERNALITIES | |
dc.subject | EXTERNALITIES TRANSPORT | |
dc.subject | FAVOURABLE ACCESS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SERVICES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN COMPANY | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN COSTS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN ENTRY | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN EQUITY | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN EQUITY PARTICIPATION | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN EXPORTERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTORS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN MARKETS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN PROVIDERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN SERVICE PROVIDERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN SERVICE SUPPLIERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN SERVICES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN SUPPLIERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN TRADE | |
dc.subject | GATS | |
dc.subject | GATS RULES | |
dc.subject | GLOBAL WELFARE | |
dc.subject | HEALTH SERVICES | |
dc.subject | IMMUNITY | |
dc.subject | INCUMBENT SUPPLIERS | |
dc.subject | INFANT INDUSTRY POLICIES | |
dc.subject | INFANT INDUSTRY TYPE | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL CARTELS | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL TRADE | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT PESSIMISM | |
dc.subject | LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMMES | |
dc.subject | LIBERALIZING INTENT | |
dc.subject | LIBERALIZING TRADE | |
dc.subject | MARKET ACCESS | |
dc.subject | MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS | |
dc.subject | MARKET FAILURE | |
dc.subject | MARKET FAILURES | |
dc.subject | MARKET STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | MAXIMUM EQUITY PARTICIPATION | |
dc.subject | MFN | |
dc.subject | MFN EXEMPTIONS | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLISTIC SUPPLIERS | |
dc.subject | MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT | |
dc.subject | MULTILATERAL APPROACH | |
dc.subject | MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES | |
dc.subject | MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS | |
dc.subject | MULTILATERAL RULES | |
dc.subject | MUTUAL RECOGNITION | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL PRODUCERS | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL PRODUCTION | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL SUPPLIERS | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL TREATMENT | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATION | |
dc.subject | NATURAL MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | NATURAL PERSONS | |
dc.subject | NEGOTIATIONS | |
dc.subject | NON-DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES | |
dc.subject | NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES | |
dc.subject | OLIGOPOLISTIC RENTS | |
dc.subject | OLIGOPOLY | |
dc.subject | OLIGOPOLY RENTS | |
dc.subject | OLIGOPOLY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | OPENNESS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | PRICE STABILITY | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE COSTS | |
dc.subject | PROFIT TAXATION | |
dc.subject | PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS | |
dc.subject | QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | |
dc.subject | QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS | |
dc.subject | QUOTAS | |
dc.subject | RECIPROCITY | |
dc.subject | RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | REGIONAL INTEGRATION | |
dc.subject | REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY BARRIERS | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY CHALLENGES | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY FAILURE | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY FREEDOM | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY PRINCIPLES | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY REFORM | |
dc.subject | RELEVANT GATS PROVISION | |
dc.subject | RENT APPROPRIATION | |
dc.subject | SAVINGS | |
dc.subject | SERVICE-PROVIDING PERSONNEL | |
dc.subject | SERVICES LIBERALIZATION | |
dc.subject | SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS | |
dc.subject | SERVICES OPERATIONS | |
dc.subject | SERVICES SECTORS | |
dc.subject | SERVICES TRADE | |
dc.subject | SERVICES TRANSACTIONS | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL OBJECTIVES | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | STATE ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | STATE MONOPOLIES | |
dc.subject | TARIFF REVENUE | |
dc.subject | TARIFF-LIKE EFFECT | |
dc.subject | TECHNICAL STANDARDS | |
dc.subject | TELECOM MONOPOLIES | |
dc.subject | TELECOM NEGOTIATIONS | |
dc.subject | TELECOM SECTOR | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | |
dc.subject | TRADE | |
dc.subject | TRADE IN SERVICES | |
dc.subject | TRADE POLICIES | |
dc.subject | TRADE PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | TRADE RESTRICTIONS | |
dc.subject | TRADE-INHIBITING EFFECT | |
dc.subject | TRADE-RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | TRADING PARTNERS | |
dc.subject | TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY | |
dc.subject | TRANSPORT COSTS | |
dc.subject | TRANSPORT SERVICES | |
dc.subject | UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION | |
dc.subject | UNIVERSAL SERVICE | |
dc.subject | UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS | |
dc.subject | URUGUAY ROUND | |
dc.subject | WELFARE GAINS | |
dc.title | Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2001-04-30 | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:29:34.978108Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/04/1121245/shaping-future-gats-rules-trade-services | |
okr.globalpractice | Transport and ICT | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.guid | 799191468740696734 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-2596 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000094946_01052404350414 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 1121245 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS2596 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/06/08/000094946_01052404350414/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf | en |
okr.theme | Economic management | |
okr.theme | Trade and integration | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Development::Decentralization | |
okr.topic | Information and Communication Technologies::ICT Policy and Strategies | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Free Trade | |
okr.topic | Payment Systems and Infrastructure | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Trade and Services | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.unit | Trade, Development Research Group | |
okr.volume | 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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