Publication:
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?

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dc.contributor.authorWane, Waly
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-19T14:09:10Z
dc.date.available2013-06-19T14:09:10Z
dc.date.issued2004-06
dc.description.abstractThe author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3325
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No.3325
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectAID
dc.subjectAID AGENCIES
dc.subjectAID ALLOCATION
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectDESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT IMPACT
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ISSUES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
dc.subjectFATIGUE
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINTEREST RATES
dc.subjectINTERMEDIARIES
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL AID
dc.subjectMANAGERS
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOVERTY REDUCTION
dc.subjectPROGRAMS
dc.subjectQUALITY OF LIFE
dc.subjectSCREENING
dc.subjectSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
dc.subjectSUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID
dc.subjectFOREIGN ASSISTANCE
dc.subjectPROJECT DESIGN
dc.subjectPROJECT QUALITY
dc.subjectPROJECT QUALITY CONTROL
dc.titleThe Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?en
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleThe Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:49:02.549626Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives
okr.globalpracticePoverty
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.globalpracticeHealth, Nutrition, and Population
okr.guid171951468765313837
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3325
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000160016_20040729130731
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum4983704
okr.identifier.reportWPS3325
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/07/29/000160016_20040729130731/Rendered/PDF/wps3325.pdfen
okr.region.geographicalWorld
okr.topicHealth Monitoring and Evaluation
okr.topicBanks and Banking Reform
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Decentralization
okr.topicHealth Economics and Finance
okr.topicPoverty Monitoring and Analysis
okr.topicDevelopment Economics and Aid Effectiveness
okr.topicHealth, Nutrition and Population::Public Health Promotion
okr.topicPoverty Reduction
okr.unitOff of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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