Publication:
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

dc.contributor.authorEstache, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorIimi, Atsushi
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-19T19:09:06Z
dc.date.available2012-03-19T19:09:06Z
dc.date.issued2009-03-01
dc.description.abstractLimited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. This paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs.en
dc.identifierhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4855
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/4051
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4855
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectAFFILIATED
dc.subjectAFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
dc.subjectAUCTION
dc.subjectAUCTION MARKETS
dc.subjectAUCTION PROCESS
dc.subjectAUCTIONS
dc.subjectBID
dc.subjectBID EVALUATION
dc.subjectBID EVALUATION STAGE
dc.subjectBID PRICE
dc.subjectBIDDER
dc.subjectBIDDERS
dc.subjectBIDDING
dc.subjectBIDDING DOCUMENTS
dc.subjectBIDS
dc.subjectBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectBUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
dc.subjectBUYER
dc.subjectCAPABILITIES
dc.subjectCAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
dc.subjectCOMPETITION
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVE BIDDING
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVE TENDERS
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVENESS
dc.subjectCONSTRUCTION WORKS
dc.subjectCONTRACT
dc.subjectCONTRACT COST
dc.subjectCONTRACT DURATION
dc.subjectCONTRACTORS
dc.subjectCONTRACTS
dc.subjectCOST ESTIMATE
dc.subjectCOST ESTIMATES
dc.subjectCREDIBILITY
dc.subjectCREDITOR
dc.subjectDATA
dc.subjectDATABASE
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRY
dc.subjectDUMMY VARIABLES
dc.subjectEQUIPMENT
dc.subjectEVALUATION SYSTEM
dc.subjectEXCHANGE
dc.subjectEXPENDITURE
dc.subjectFINANCE
dc.subjectGOOD
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
dc.subjectHOLDING
dc.subjectINFORMATION
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINSTRUMENTS
dc.subjectINTEREST
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectJOINT VENTURE
dc.subjectLACK OF COMPETITION
dc.subjectLOCAL BUSINESS
dc.subjectMARKET
dc.subjectMARKET COMPETITION
dc.subjectMARKET CONCENTRATION
dc.subjectMARKET CONDITIONS
dc.subjectMARKETPLACE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOTENTIAL BIDDERS
dc.subjectPRICE AUCTIONS
dc.subjectPRICE BID
dc.subjectPRICE COMPARISON
dc.subjectPRICE COMPETITION
dc.subjectPRICE CRITERIA
dc.subjectPRICE EFFECT
dc.subjectPRICE EVALUATION
dc.subjectPRICES
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectPROCUREMENT
dc.subjectPROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
dc.subjectPROCUREMENT PRACTICES
dc.subjectPROCUREMENT PROCEDURE
dc.subjectPRODUCT
dc.subjectPROFITS
dc.subjectPROSPECTIVE BIDDERS
dc.subjectPUBLIC
dc.subjectPUBLIC CONTRACTS
dc.subjectPUBLIC PROCUREMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectPUBLIC WORKS
dc.subjectPURCHASING
dc.subjectQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
dc.subjectQUALIFIED BIDDERS
dc.subjectRENEGOTIATION
dc.subjectRESERVE
dc.subjectRESULT
dc.subjectRESULTS
dc.subjectSALE
dc.subjectSHARE
dc.subjectSUPPLY
dc.subjectTECHNICAL BIDS
dc.subjectTECHNICAL QUALIFICATION
dc.subjectTECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
dc.subjectTELECOM
dc.subjectTENDER NOTICES
dc.subjectTENDER PROCESS
dc.subjectTENDERING
dc.subjectTENDERS
dc.subjectTRANSACTION
dc.subjectTRANSACTION COSTS
dc.subjectTRANSACTIONS
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectVALUE
dc.subjectWEB
dc.subjectWINNING BID
dc.titleBidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctionsen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleBidders' Entry And Auctioneer's Rejection: Applying A Double Selection Model To Road Procurement Auctions
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T12:20:05.304081Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718
okr.guid487781468153846953
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4855
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000158349_20090304112718
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum10315783
okr.identifier.reportWPS4855
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/03/04/000158349_20090304112718/Rendered/PDF/WPS4855.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeThe World Region
okr.region.administrativeThe World Region
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationeeef1beb-b651-587f-bb16-a47ff170a096
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryeeef1beb-b651-587f-bb16-a47ff170a096
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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