Political Economy of Reform

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-8224

Publication:
Political Economy of Reform

dc.contributor.author	Khemani, Stuti
dc.date.accessioned	2017-10-26T15:07:27Z
dc.date.available	2017-10-26T15:07:27Z
dc.date.issued	2017-10
dc.description.abstract	This paper reviews the literature relevant to understanding political constraints to economic reforms. Reform refers to changes in government policies or institutional rules because status quo policies and institutions are not working well to achieve the goals of economic well-being and development. Further, reforms refer to the alternative policies and institutions that are available that would most likely perform better than the status quo. The main question examined in the political economy of reform literature has been why reforms are not undertaken when they are needed for the good of society. The succinct answer from the first generation of research is that conflict of interest between organized socio-political groups is responsible for some groups being able to stall reforms so that they can extract greater private rents from status quo policies. The next generation of research is tackling a more fundamental question: why does conflict of interest persist; or, why do some interest groups exert influence against reforms if there are indeed large gains to be had for society? These are questions about norms and preferences in society for public goods. The next step is to examine where norms and preferences for public goods come from, and which institutional arrangements are more conducive to solve the public goods problem of pursuing reforms. After reviewing the available and future directions for research, the paper concludes with what all of this means for policy makers who are interested in understanding the factors behind successful reforms.	en
dc.identifier	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/290071508764607858/Political-economy-of-reform
dc.identifier.doi	10.1596/1813-9450-8224
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28584
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8224
dc.rights	CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder	World Bank
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subject	POLICY REFORMS
dc.subject	POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject	INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject	NORMS
dc.subject	PREFERENCES
dc.title	Political Economy of Reform	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dc.type	Document de travail	fr
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dspace.entity.type	Publication
okr.crossref.title	Political Economy of Reform
okr.date.disclosure	2017-10-23
okr.doctype	Publications & Research
okr.doctype	Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurl	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/290071508764607858/Political-economy-of-reform
okr.guid	290071508764607858
okr.identifier.doi	10.1596/1813-9450-8224
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum	090224b0851233c5_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum	28098917
okr.identifier.report	WPS8224
okr.imported	true	en
okr.language.supported	en
okr.pdfurl	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/290071508764607858/pdf/WPS8224.pdf	en
okr.statistics.combined	6228
okr.statistics.dr	290071508764607858
okr.statistics.drstats	4614
okr.topic	Public Sector Development::Public Sector Expenditure Policy
okr.topic	Governance::National Governance
okr.topic	Governance::Political Systems and Analysis
okr.topic	Governance::Politics and Government
okr.topic	Macroeconomics and Economic Growth::Fiscal & Monetary Policy
okr.topic	Macroeconomics and Economic Growth::Political Economy
okr.unit	Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group
relation.isSeriesOfPublication	26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery	26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87