Publication:
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments

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dc.contributor.authorKeefer, Philip
dc.contributor.authorStasavage, David
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-09T21:42:55Z
dc.date.available2013-09-09T21:42:55Z
dc.date.issued2001-02
dc.description.abstractThe authors develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies. Theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power (checks and balances), the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs. Conversely, the authors argue that central bank independence does not solve the problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation. Exchange rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems. The authors present extensive evidence from cross-country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1000495/checks-balances-private-information-credibility-monetary-commitments
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2542
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/15746
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 2542
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectCENTRAL BANK
dc.subjectCENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
dc.subjectCENTRAL BANKS
dc.subjectCOMPETITION POLICY
dc.subjectCPI
dc.subjectCURRENCY BOARD
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectDEVALUATION
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATE
dc.subjectDOMESTIC INFLATION
dc.subjectDOMESTIC PRICES
dc.subjectECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
dc.subjectECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEXCHANGE RATE
dc.subjectEXCHANGE RATE PEG
dc.subjectEXOGENOUS SHOCKS
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectFINANCE MINISTRY
dc.subjectFISCAL DEFICIT
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICIES
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICY
dc.subjectFIXED EXCHANGE RATE
dc.subjectFIXED EXCHANGE RATES
dc.subjectFORECASTS
dc.subjectFOREIGN CURRENCY
dc.subjectFOREIGN EXCHANGE
dc.subjectFOREIGN INFLATION
dc.subjectHIGH INFLATION
dc.subjectIMPORTS
dc.subjectINFLATION RATE
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL SETTING
dc.subjectLEGISLATION
dc.subjectLONG TERM
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC POLICY
dc.subjectMONETARY FINANCING
dc.subjectMONETARY INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectMONETARY POLICIES
dc.subjectMONETARY POLICY
dc.subjectMONEY DEMAND
dc.subjectMONEY MULTIPLIER
dc.subjectMONEY SUPPLY
dc.subjectNATIONAL INCOME
dc.subjectNOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE
dc.subjectNON-OECD COUNTRIES
dc.subjectPOLICY CREDIBILITY
dc.subjectPOLICY DECISIONS
dc.subjectPOLICY MAKERS
dc.subjectPOLICY OUTCOMES
dc.subjectPOLICY REFORM
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLICY TARGETS
dc.subjectPRICE INCREASES
dc.subjectPRIVATE INFORMATION
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectRATE OF INFLATION
dc.subjectREDUCING INFLATION
dc.subjectSIGNALING
dc.subjectSTANDARD DEVIATION
dc.subjectTERMS OF TRADE
dc.subjectTRADEOFFS
dc.subjectWELFARE FUNCTION CHECKS & BALANCES
dc.subjectCENTRAL BANKS
dc.subjectCENTRAL BANK ROLES
dc.subjectEXCHANGE RATES
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectCROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS
dc.subjectINFLATION RATES
dc.subjectINFLATIONARY PRESSURES
dc.subjectECONOMIC SHOCKS
dc.titleChecks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitmentsen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleChecks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:47:24.648754Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1000495/checks-balances-private-information-credibility-monetary-commitments
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.guid164681468741387073
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2542
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000094946_01022405385912
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum1000495
okr.identifier.reportWPS2542
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/09/000094946_01022405385912/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdfen
okr.sectorOther Finance
okr.sectorFinance
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development::Financial Intermediation
okr.topicEnvironmental Economics and Policies
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Macroeconomic Management
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Stabilization
okr.unitOff of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
okr.volume1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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