Publication: Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital
dc.contributor.author | Himmelberg, Charles P. | |
dc.contributor.author | Hubbard, R. Glenn | |
dc.contributor.author | Love, Inessa | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-28T13:22:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-28T13:22:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | The authors combine the agency theory of the firm with risk diversification incentives for insiders. Principal-agent problems between insiders and outsiders force insiders to retain a larger share in their firm than they would under a perfect risk diversification strategy. The authors predict that this higher share of insider ownership and the resulting exposure of insiders to higher idiosyncratic risk will result in underinvestment and higher cost of capital. Using firm-level data from 38 countries, the authors provide evidence in support of their theoretical model, showing that the premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk varies between zero and six percent and decreases in the level of outside investor protection. The results of the study imply that policies aimed at strengthening investor protection laws and their enforcement will improve capital allocation and result in higher growth. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1783726/investor-protection-ownership-cost-capital | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-2834 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14288 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, D.C. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No.2834 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | INVESTOR PROTECTION | |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | COST OF CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | AGENCY CONCEPT | |
dc.subject | RISK DIVERSIFICATION | |
dc.subject | INCENTIVES ACCOUNTING | |
dc.subject | AGENCY PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | BALANCE SHEET | |
dc.subject | BENCHMARK | |
dc.subject | BOOK VALUE | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL PROJECTS | |
dc.subject | CD | |
dc.subject | CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT | |
dc.subject | CONTROL TRANSACTIONS | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE FINANCE | |
dc.subject | COST OF CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | COUNTRY COMPARISONS | |
dc.subject | DEBT | |
dc.subject | DEMAND CURVE | |
dc.subject | DIVESTITURES | |
dc.subject | DIVIDENDS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC GROWTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC REFORMS | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | EXCISE TAXES | |
dc.subject | EXPECTED UTILITY | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL DATA | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | FIXED CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTORS | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INVESTOR PROTECTION | |
dc.subject | LAWS | |
dc.subject | LEGAL PROTECTION | |
dc.subject | LEGAL REGIMES | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL COST | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL COSTS | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL PRODUCT | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL UTILITY | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL VALUE | |
dc.subject | MERGERS | |
dc.subject | MONETARY POLICY | |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | |
dc.subject | OPPORTUNITY COST | |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | PAYOUT | |
dc.subject | PENALTIES | |
dc.subject | PORTFOLIO | |
dc.subject | PREDICTIONS | |
dc.subject | PRICE ELASTICITY | |
dc.subject | PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION FUNCTION | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY | |
dc.subject | PROFITABILITY | |
dc.subject | PROPRIETORSHIP | |
dc.subject | PURCHASE PRICE | |
dc.subject | RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS | |
dc.subject | REORGANIZATION | |
dc.subject | RESEARCH AGENDA | |
dc.subject | RISK AVERSION | |
dc.subject | RISK PREMIUM | |
dc.subject | SHAREHOLDERS | |
dc.subject | TAKEOVER | |
dc.subject | TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | VALUE ADDED | |
dc.subject | WEALTH | |
dc.title | Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:28:28.672390Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1783726/investor-protection-ownership-cost-capital | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.guid | 436491468766219543 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-2834 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000094946_02051604452761 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 1783726 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS2834 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/05/30/000094946_02051604452761/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf | en |
okr.sector | Other Finance | |
okr.sector | Finance | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | International Terrorism and Counterterrorism | |
okr.topic | Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring | |
okr.topic | Fiscal and Monetary Policy | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Capital Markets and Capital Flows | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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