Publication: Technological Asymmetry Among Foreign Investors and Mode of Entry
dc.contributor.author | Saggi, Kamal | |
dc.contributor.author | Smarzynska Javorcik, Beata | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-05T13:37:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-08-05T13:37:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | How does the preferred entry mode of foreign investors depend on their technological capability relative to that of their rivals? The authors develop a simple model of entry mode choice and evaluate its main testable implication using data on foreign investors in Eastern European countries and the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The model considers competition between two asymmetric foreign investors and captures the following tradeoffs: while a joint venture helps a foreign investor secure a better position in the product market compared with its rival, it also requires that profits be shared with the local partner. The model predicts that the efficient foreign investor is less likely to choose a joint venture and more likely to enter directly relative to the inefficient investor. The authors' empirical analysis supports this prediction: foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies and marketing skills (relative to other firms in their industry) tend to prefer direct entry to joint ventures. This empirical finding is robust to controlling for host country-specific effects and other commonly cited determinants of entry mode. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/3207944/technological-asymmetry-among-foreign-investors-mode-entry | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3196 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14789 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, D.C. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No.3196 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | JOINT VENTURES | |
dc.subject | TECHNOLOGIES | |
dc.subject | COMMODITY MARKETS | |
dc.subject | MARKETING TECHNIQUES ASSETS | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT | |
dc.subject | COMMON PROPERTY | |
dc.subject | COMPANY | |
dc.subject | COMPETITORS | |
dc.subject | CONSUMERS | |
dc.subject | COURNOT COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | DECISION-MAKING | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPED COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | DIVERSIFICATION | |
dc.subject | DIVERSIFIED COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | DUOPOLY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL STUDIES | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | EXPORTS | |
dc.subject | FIRM SIZE | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTORS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN SALES | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GDP PER CAPITA | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS | |
dc.subject | HUMAN CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | IMPORTS | |
dc.subject | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL TRADE | |
dc.subject | JOINT VENTURES | |
dc.subject | LABOR COSTS | |
dc.subject | LEGISLATION | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL COST | |
dc.subject | MARKET ENTRY | |
dc.subject | MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE | |
dc.subject | MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | POLICY MAKERS | |
dc.subject | PROFIT MAXIMIZATION | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | PURCHASING POWER | |
dc.subject | SUPPLIERS | |
dc.subject | TAX RATES | |
dc.subject | TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER | |
dc.subject | TOTAL OUTPUT | |
dc.subject | TRANSITION ECONOMIES | |
dc.subject | WTO | |
dc.title | Technological Asymmetry Among Foreign Investors and Mode of Entry | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Jobs | |
okr.crossref.title | Technological Asymmetry among Foreign Investors and Mode of Entry | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T10:48:53.478185Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/3207944/technological-asymmetry-among-foreign-investors-mode-entry | |
okr.globalpractice | Transport and ICT | |
okr.globalpractice | Environment and Natural Resources | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.guid | 490511468763218046 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3196 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000009486_20040420095339 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 3207944 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3196 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/04/20/000009486_20040420095339/Rendered/PDF/wps3196Tech.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | Europe and Central Asia | |
okr.topic | Private Sector Development::Small and Medium Size Enterprises | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Microfinance | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | International Terrorism and Counterterrorism | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | Information and Communication Technologies::ICT Policy and Strategies | |
okr.topic | Environment | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
Files
License bundle
1 - 1 of 1