Publication:
State Ownership: A Residual Role?

dc.contributor.authorPerotti, Enrico
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-27T20:22:40Z
dc.date.available2013-06-27T20:22:40Z
dc.date.issued2004-09
dc.description.abstractThe author reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the capture of the privatization process itself. In addition, the speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. In many countries institutional weakness limits regulatory capacity and reliability, yet the author's conclusion is that in such environments, maintaining state control undermines the very emergence of institutional capacity, and so the balance should tip toward progressively less direct state control. After all, what are "institutions" if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The author offers some suggestions about creating maximum accountability in regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a rotating board representative of users, producers, and civic organizations, to be elected by a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5175906/state-ownership-residual-role
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3407
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/14270
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No.3407
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectABUSE OF POWER
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectASSETS
dc.subjectAUTONOMY
dc.subjectBANKING CRISES
dc.subjectBANKRUPTCY
dc.subjectBANKS
dc.subjectBARGAINING POWER
dc.subjectBIDDING
dc.subjectCENTRAL BANKS
dc.subjectCITIZENS
dc.subjectCIVIL SOCIETY
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCIES
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCY
dc.subjectCONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectDEMOCRATIZATION
dc.subjectDEPOSIT INSURANCE
dc.subjectDEPOSITORS
dc.subjectDEREGULATION
dc.subjectDISCLOSURE
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectELECTED REPRESENTATIVES
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectENDOWMENTS
dc.subjectEXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectFINANCIAL CRISES
dc.subjectFINANCIAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINVESTOR PROTECTION
dc.subjectLATIN AMERICAN
dc.subjectLAWS
dc.subjectLEGISLATION
dc.subjectLEGITIMACY
dc.subjectLEVEL PLAYING FIELD
dc.subjectLOCAL AUTHORITIES
dc.subjectLOCAL POLITICIANS
dc.subjectMARKET DISCIPLINE
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectMORTALITY
dc.subjectNATIONALIZATION
dc.subjectNATURAL MONOPOLIES
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CONTROL
dc.subjectPOLITICAL POWER
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEM
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPRIVATE BANKS
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC OPINION
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICE
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectPUBLIC WELFARE
dc.subjectREGULATORY FRAMEWORK
dc.subjectRENT SEEKING
dc.subjectREPRESENTATIVES
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDERS
dc.subjectSTATE ASSETS
dc.subjectSTATE BANKS
dc.subjectSTATE OWNERSHIP
dc.subjectSTATE REGULATION
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTRANSITION ECONOMIES
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectVOLATILITY
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.titleState Ownership: A Residual Role?en
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleState Ownership: A Residual Role?
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:28:18.586327Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5175906/state-ownership-residual-role
okr.globalpracticeSocial, Urban, Rural and Resilience
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid599311468778196254
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3407
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000012009_20041014130810
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum5175906
okr.identifier.reportWPS3407
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/10/14/000012009_20041014130810/Rendered/PDF/WPS3407.pdfen
okr.topicBanks and Banking Reform
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Decentralization
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicFinancial Crisis Management and Restructuring
okr.topicGovernance::Governance Indicators
okr.topicUrban Development::Municipal Financial Management
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development
okr.unitOff of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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