Publication: Equilibrium Parallel Import Policies and International Market Structure
dc.contributor.author | Roy, Santanu | |
dc.contributor.author | Saggi, Kamal | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-19T18:04:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-19T18:04:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-09-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | In a North-South vertically differentiated duopoly, the analysis in this paper derives equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports. By incorporating strategic interaction at the policy-setting stage and the product market, the model sheds new light on (i) the effects of parallel import policies on pricing behavior of firms and (ii) the interdependence of national parallel import policies. If demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large, the North forbids parallel imports to ensure its firm sells in the South thereby generating international price discrimination -- the South's most preferred market outcome -- as the equilibrium. When demand structures are relatively similar across countries, the North permits parallel imports and uniform pricing -- its most preferred market outcome -- obtains. | en |
dc.identifier | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110920162458 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-5802 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3566 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5802 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ADVERSE EFFECT | |
dc.subject | ARBITRAGE | |
dc.subject | COMPETITOR | |
dc.subject | CONSUMER INTERESTS | |
dc.subject | CONSUMER SURPLUS | |
dc.subject | CONSUMERS | |
dc.subject | CONVENTIONAL INSTRUMENTS | |
dc.subject | DEMAND CURVE | |
dc.subject | DEMAND FUNCTIONS | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPING COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT POLICY | |
dc.subject | DIFFERENTIAL PRICING | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC MARKET | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC PRICE | |
dc.subject | DUOPOLY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC INTEGRATION | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC LAW | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMICS RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | ENTREPRENEURS | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM PRICE | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM PRICES | |
dc.subject | EXPANSION | |
dc.subject | EXPORTS | |
dc.subject | EXTERNALITIES | |
dc.subject | FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FIXED COSTS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN MARKET | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN MARKETS | |
dc.subject | FUTURE RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | GAME THEORY | |
dc.subject | GLOBAL MARKET | |
dc.subject | HOME MARKET | |
dc.subject | IMPERFECT COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INCREASING RETURNS | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | INEFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY | |
dc.subject | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT | |
dc.subject | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL MARKET | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL TRADE | |
dc.subject | INVENTORIES | |
dc.subject | MANUFACTURER | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL COST | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL COSTS | |
dc.subject | MARKET COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | MARKET DEMAND | |
dc.subject | MARKET ENTRY | |
dc.subject | MARKET EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | MARKET POWER | |
dc.subject | MARKET PRICES | |
dc.subject | MARKET SEGMENTATION | |
dc.subject | MARKET STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | MARKET STRUCTURES | |
dc.subject | MARKETING | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLIES | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY PRICE | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY PRICES | |
dc.subject | MULTINATIONALS | |
dc.subject | NASH EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | NATURAL MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | OLIGOPOLY | |
dc.subject | PATENTS | |
dc.subject | PRICE COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | PRICE CONTROL | |
dc.subject | PRICE CONTROLS | |
dc.subject | PRICE DISCRIMINATION | |
dc.subject | PRICE INCREASES | |
dc.subject | PRICE REGULATION | |
dc.subject | PRICING STRATEGY | |
dc.subject | PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION | |
dc.subject | PRODUCT MARKET | |
dc.subject | PRODUCT QUALITY | |
dc.subject | PROFIT MAXIMIZATION | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY CONDITIONS | |
dc.subject | RETAIL | |
dc.subject | SALE | |
dc.subject | SALES | |
dc.subject | SURPLUS | |
dc.subject | TRADE POLICY | |
dc.subject | TRADEMARK | |
dc.subject | WORLD ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | WORLD MARKETS | |
dc.subject | WTO | |
dc.title | Equilibrium Parallel Import Policies and International Market Structure | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Equilibrium Parallel Import Policies and International Market Structure | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2011-09-01 | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T11:12:15.195536Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.docurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110920162458 | |
okr.guid | 869381468161953184 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-5802 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20110920162458 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 15094631 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS5802 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/09/20/000158349_20110920162458/Rendered/PDF/WPS5802.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | The World Region | |
okr.region.administrative | The World Region | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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