Publication:
A Fish Cartel for Africa

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dc.contributor.authorEnglander, Gabriel
dc.contributor.authorCostello, Christopher
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-07T15:15:09Z
dc.date.available2023-11-07T15:15:09Z
dc.date.issued2023-11-07
dc.description.abstractMany countries sell fishing rights to foreign nations and fishers. Although African coastal waters are among the world’s most biologically rich, African countries earn much less than their peers from selling access to foreign fishers. African countries sell fishing access individually (in contrast to some Pacific countries that sell access as a bloc). This paper develops a bilateral oligopoly model to simulate the effects of an African fish cartel. The model shows that wielding market power entails both ecological and economic dimensions. Africa would substantially restrict access catch, which would increase biomass by 16 percent. This would confer economic benefits to all African nations, raising profits by an average of 23 percent. These benefits arise because market power shifts from foreign buyers to African sellers. Although impediments to sustainable development, like corruption, are hard to change in the medium term, deeper African integration is an already emerging solution to African countries’ economic and ecological challenges.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099528011032341633/IDU044b7309903a1b0401f097e406532c42b6cc4
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10594
dc.identifier.urihttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/40576
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWashington, DC: World Bank
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; 10594
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectAFRICAN FISHERIES
dc.subjectAFRICAN INTEGRATION
dc.titleA Fish Cartel for Africaen
dc.typeWorking Paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.associatedcontenthttps://reproducibility.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/70 Link to reproducibility package
okr.crossref.titleA Fish Cartel for Africa
okr.date.disclosure2023-11-03
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-07T08:15:19.776832Z
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-08T16:06:50.895016Z
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-09T02:48:00.728193Z
okr.date.lastmodified2023-11-03T00:00:00Zen
okr.doctypePolicy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099528011032341633/IDU044b7309903a1b0401f097e406532c42b6cc4
okr.guid099528011032341633
okr.identifier.docmidIDU-44b73099-3a1b-401f-97e4-6532c42b6cc4
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10594
okr.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10594
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum34191204
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum34191204
okr.identifier.reportWPS10594
okr.import.id2234
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099528011032341633/pdf/IDU044b7309903a1b0401f097e406532c42b6cc4.pdfen
okr.region.geographicalAfrica
okr.topicIndustry::Fishing Industry
okr.topicIndustry::Agricultural Industry
okr.topicAgriculture::Fisheries & Aquaculture
okr.topicWater Resources::Coastal and Marine Resources
okr.unitDEC-Sustainability & Infrastruct (DECSI)
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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