Publication: Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance
dc.contributor.author | Cordella, Antonio | |
dc.contributor.author | Cordella, Tito | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-03T14:56:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-03T14:56:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-12 | |
dc.description.abstract | Monitoring technologies and pay for performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where agents' motivations vary and so does the effectiveness of monitoring technologies. In such a set-up the model shows that: (i) monitoring technologies should be introduced only if agents' motivations are poor; (ii) optimal pay for performance contracts are nonlinear/non-monotonic in agents' motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii) investments aimed at improving agents' motivations and monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are motivated, complements otherwise; and (iv) if the agents' "type" is private information, the more and less motivated agents could be separated through a menu of pay for performance/non pay for performance contracts, such that only the less motivated choose the pay for performance ones. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance | |
dc.identifier.citation | Policy Research Working Paper No. 7128 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-7128 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/20608 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank Group, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7128 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ADVERSE SELECTION | |
dc.subject | AGENTS | |
dc.subject | BASIC | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES | |
dc.subject | COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY | |
dc.subject | COMPONENTS | |
dc.subject | CONTROL SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | DIGITAL | |
dc.subject | E-GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | E-GOVERNMENT PROJECTS | |
dc.subject | ||
dc.subject | EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SERVICES | |
dc.subject | HUMAN RESOURCE | |
dc.subject | HUMAN RESOURCES | |
dc.subject | ICT | |
dc.subject | IMAGE | |
dc.subject | INCENTIVE PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING | |
dc.subject | INFORMATION SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN | |
dc.subject | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | |
dc.subject | INSPECTION | |
dc.subject | INTRINSIC MOTIVATION | |
dc.subject | KNOW HOW | |
dc.subject | LABOR ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | LEARNING | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL COSTS | |
dc.subject | MEDIA | |
dc.subject | MENU | |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | |
dc.subject | MOTIVATION | |
dc.subject | OPEN ACCESS | |
dc.subject | ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES | |
dc.subject | OUTPUTS | |
dc.subject | PERFORMANCE INDICATORS | |
dc.subject | PERFORMANCE MEASURES | |
dc.subject | PERFORMANCES | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | PROGRAMS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION | |
dc.subject | PUBLISHING | |
dc.subject | RESULT | |
dc.subject | RESULTS | |
dc.subject | SEARCH | |
dc.subject | SERVANTS | |
dc.subject | SERVICE DELIVERY | |
dc.subject | STANDARD CONTRACT | |
dc.subject | TEXT | |
dc.subject | WAGES | |
dc.subject | WEB | |
dc.title | Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.associatedcontent | https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29339 Accepted journal manuscript | |
okr.crossref.title | Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2014-12-02 | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:23:26.318623Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance | |
okr.globalpractice | Transport and ICT | |
okr.globalpractice | Social Protection and Labor | |
okr.guid | 929041468169746856 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-7128 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20141201151632 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 20454325 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS7128 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/12/01/000158349_20141201151632/Rendered/PDF/WPS7128.pdf | en |
okr.topic | Information and Communication Technologies::ICT Policy and Strategies | |
okr.topic | Private Sector Development::E-Business | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor::Labor Policies | |
okr.topic | Technology Industry | |
okr.topic | Education::Education for the Knowledge Economy | |
okr.topic | Industry | |
okr.unit | Operations and Strategy Unit, Development Economics Vice Presidency | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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