Publication:
Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan

dc.contributor.authorJacoby, Hanan G.
dc.contributor.authorMansuri, Ghazala
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-22T19:14:20Z
dc.date.available2012-06-22T19:14:20Z
dc.date.issued2006-02
dc.description.abstractWhen contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3826
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8825
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 3826
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectADVERSE SELECTION
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL LAND
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectCONTRACT THEORY
dc.subjectCONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
dc.subjectCOST FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectCREDIT
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATE
dc.subjectDISECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subjectEVICTION
dc.subjectEXPROPRIATION
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLDS
dc.subjectHUMAN CAPITAL
dc.subjectINCENTIVE EFFECTS
dc.subjectINCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
dc.subjectINEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectINVESTMENT INCENTIVES
dc.subjectLAND TENURE
dc.subjectLANDLORD
dc.subjectLANDLORDS
dc.subjectLANDOWNERS
dc.subjectLEASE
dc.subjectLEASING
dc.subjectLIABILITY
dc.subjectMAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectOPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subjectOPTIMAL CONTRACT
dc.subjectPRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectPRODUCTION FUNCTION
dc.subjectPROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectRETURN ON INVESTMENT
dc.subjectRISK
dc.subjectRISK AVERSION
dc.subjectRISK-NEUTRAL
dc.subjectSTATEMENTS
dc.subjectTENANCY
dc.subjectTENANTS
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.titleIncomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistanen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleIncomplete Contracts And Investment : A Study Of Land Tenancy In Pakistan
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:44:06.986124Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeSocial, Urban, Rural and Resilience
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid306621468285363642
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3826
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000016406_20060118155055
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum6541576
okr.identifier.reportWPS3826
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/01/18/000016406_20060118155055/Rendered/PDF/wps3826.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeSouth Asia
okr.region.countryPakistan
okr.topicCommunities and Human Settlements::Real Estate Development
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Investment and Investment Climate
okr.topicUrban Development::Municipal Housing and Land
okr.topicLaw and Development::Contract Law
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb0d03fbb-dd7e-537c-8153-c916bfe24452
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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