Publication: Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan
dc.contributor.author | Jacoby, Hanan G. | |
dc.contributor.author | Mansuri, Ghazala | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-22T19:14:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-22T19:14:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3826 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8825 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3826 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ADVERSE SELECTION | |
dc.subject | AGRICULTURAL LAND | |
dc.subject | AGRICULTURE | |
dc.subject | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | CONTRACT THEORY | |
dc.subject | CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS | |
dc.subject | COST FUNCTIONS | |
dc.subject | CREDIT | |
dc.subject | DISCOUNT RATE | |
dc.subject | DISECONOMIES OF SCALE | |
dc.subject | EVICTION | |
dc.subject | EXPROPRIATION | |
dc.subject | HOUSEHOLDS | |
dc.subject | HUMAN CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | INCENTIVE EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS | |
dc.subject | INEFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT INCENTIVES | |
dc.subject | LAND TENURE | |
dc.subject | LANDLORD | |
dc.subject | LANDLORDS | |
dc.subject | LANDOWNERS | |
dc.subject | LEASE | |
dc.subject | LEASING | |
dc.subject | LIABILITY | |
dc.subject | MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION | |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | |
dc.subject | OPPORTUNITY COST | |
dc.subject | OPTIMAL CONTRACT | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION FUNCTION | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | RENTS | |
dc.subject | RETURN ON INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | RISK | |
dc.subject | RISK AVERSION | |
dc.subject | RISK-NEUTRAL | |
dc.subject | STATEMENTS | |
dc.subject | TENANCY | |
dc.subject | TENANTS | |
dc.subject | WEALTH | |
dc.title | Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Incomplete Contracts And Investment : A Study Of Land Tenancy In Pakistan | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T10:44:06.986124Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.guid | 306621468285363642 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3826 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000016406_20060118155055 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 6541576 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3826 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/01/18/000016406_20060118155055/Rendered/PDF/wps3826.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | South Asia | |
okr.region.country | Pakistan | |
okr.topic | Communities and Human Settlements::Real Estate Development | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth::Investment and Investment Climate | |
okr.topic | Urban Development::Municipal Housing and Land | |
okr.topic | Law and Development::Contract Law | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | b0d03fbb-dd7e-537c-8153-c916bfe24452 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | b0d03fbb-dd7e-537c-8153-c916bfe24452 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
Files
License bundle
1 - 1 of 1