Publication:
Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s
Box for Developing Countries?
dc.contributor.author | Fredriksson, Per G. | |
dc.contributor.author | Mani, Muthukumara | |
dc.contributor.author | Wollscheid, Jim R. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-21T21:58:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-21T21:58:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymaking in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environmental policy due to more intensive lobbying by capital owners and workers. They test this prediction using novel cross-sectional developing country data. The results are consistent with the prediction of the model, in particular for air pollution policies. The authors also find that the effect of decentralization declines with a greater degree of trade openness. They believe this is the first developing country evidence on the environmental policy effects of federalism. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6596734/environmental-federalism-panacea-or-pandoras-box-developing-countries | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8738 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3847 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ABATEMENT | |
dc.subject | ABATEMENT COSTS | |
dc.subject | ACCOUNTABILITY | |
dc.subject | AIR POLLUTION | |
dc.subject | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | AUTONOMY | |
dc.subject | BENCHMARK | |
dc.subject | CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL FLIGHT | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL FLOWS | |
dc.subject | CLEAN WATER | |
dc.subject | CONSERVATION | |
dc.subject | CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE | |
dc.subject | DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | DEVOLUTION | |
dc.subject | DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | DUMPING | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRICS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC GROWTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC POLICIES | |
dc.subject | EFFECTIVE USE | |
dc.subject | EMISSION | |
dc.subject | EMISSION REDUCTION | |
dc.subject | EMISSIONS | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTALISM | |
dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTALISTS | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | EXOGENOUS VARIABLES | |
dc.subject | EXPORTS | |
dc.subject | EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
dc.subject | FISHERIES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | FORESTRY | |
dc.subject | FREE TRADE | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT | |
dc.subject | GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY | |
dc.subject | IMPORTS | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL PLANTS | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION | |
dc.subject | INFLATION | |
dc.subject | INFORMAL REGULATION | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL TRADE | |
dc.subject | LAWS | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENT | |
dc.subject | LOCAL GOVERNMENTS | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL PRODUCT | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL PRODUCTS | |
dc.subject | MARGINAL SOCIAL DAMAGE | |
dc.subject | MUNICIPALITIES | |
dc.subject | NASH EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | NATURAL RESOURCE | |
dc.subject | NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | NATURAL RESOURCES | |
dc.subject | NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | NITROGEN OXIDES | |
dc.subject | POLICY DECISIONS | |
dc.subject | POLICY FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | POLICY INSTRUMENTS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL PRESSURE | |
dc.subject | POLLUTION CONTROL | |
dc.subject | POLLUTION DAMAGE | |
dc.subject | POLLUTION LEVELS | |
dc.subject | POLLUTION MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | POLLUTION REGULATION | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC GOOD | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC POLICY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC SERVICES | |
dc.subject | PURCHASING POWER | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY COMPLIANCE | |
dc.subject | RESOURCES MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | SAVINGS | |
dc.subject | SCARCE CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | SUSTAINABLE GROWTH | |
dc.subject | SUSTAINABLE USE | |
dc.subject | TAXATION | |
dc.subject | THEORETICAL MODELS | |
dc.subject | TOTAL OUTPUT | |
dc.subject | TRADE LIBERALIZATION | |
dc.subject | UTILITY FUNCTIONS | |
dc.subject | WASTE | |
dc.subject | WASTE MANAGEMENT | |
dc.subject | WATER POLLUTION | |
dc.subject | WATER QUALITY | |
dc.title | Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries? | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6596734/environmental-federalism-panacea-or-pandoras-box-developing-countries | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Environment and Natural Resources | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3847 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000016406_20060214124724 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 6596734 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3847 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/02/14/000016406_20060214124724/Rendered/PDF/wps3847.pdf | en |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Environment :: Environmental Governance | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | Environment :: Green Issues | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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