Person:
Baghdadi, Leila

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Last updated:October 7, 2025
Biography
Leila Baghdadi is Senior Economist at the MENAAP Chief Economist Office, World Bank. Prior to that, Leila was a Professor of Economics at ESSECT, University of Tunis, where she held the World Trade Organization Chair. She was an executive board member of the Central Bank of Tunisia from August 2019 to June 2023. She was appointed as a member of the Tunisian Council of Economic Analysis reporting to the Chief of Government from November 2017 to February 2021. Her research interests focus on international and development economics. Leila received her PhD from University Paris 1, Pantheon Sorbonne in 2008. In 2006, she was a WTO PhD fellow. She joined University of Rome Tor Vergata as a Marie Curie Researcher in September 2007.

Publication Search Results

Now showing1 - 4 of 4
  • Publication
    MENAAP Economic Update, October 2025: Jobs and Women: Untapped Talent, Unrealized Growth
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025-10-07) Gatti, Roberta; Özden, Çağlar; Torres, Jesica; Baghdadi, Leila; Sergenti, Ernest John; Islam, Asif M.; Gaddis, Isis; Mele, Gianluca; Chun, Sumin; Parro, Francisco; Mousa, Mennatallah Emam; Ramirez, Angel; Newsome, Richard; Suvanov, Ilias
    Growth prospects in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAAP) are improving, in line with global trends, but conflict, fragility, and displacement remain persistent challenges. Regional GDP is projected to grow by 2.8% in 2025 and 3.3% in 2026, up from 2.3% in 2024, driven by stronger-than-expected performance in Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Developing Oil Importers. The latest MENAAP Economic Update, "Jobs and Women: Untapped Talent, Unrealized Growth", argues that job creation and fully leveraging the region's workforce are essential to raising living standards. In this context, the low levels of female labor force participation in the region remain a major obstacle. The report analyzes the barriers—from household dynamics and social norms to legal frameworks and a sluggish private sector—that limit women’s economic participation and makes a compelling case for expanding their role in MENAAP labor markets.
  • Publication
    The Dynamics of High-Growth Firms: Evidence from Tunisia
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020-02) Baghdadi, Leila; Cruz, Marcio; Arouri, Hassen
    This paper examines the dynamics and characteristics of high-growth firms in Tunisia. Further knowledge about the dynamics of these firms can inform the design of business support policies, especially toward small and medium-size firms. The analysis suggests that between 1999 and 2015, about 9 to 10.5 percent of the firms in Tunisia achieved high-growth status per year, on average, depending on the definition used, and these shares have been remarkably stable over time. Although a small share of firms achieves high growth annually, almost one in every three firms that survive for more than a decade has achieved high-growth status at least once. High-growth status is more prevalent among small and young firms, as well as firms that export, import, or receive foreign direct investments.
  • Publication
    Political Connections and Tariff Evasion Evidence from Tunisia
    (Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2017-06-01) Baghdadi, Leila; Rijkers, Bob; Raballand, Gael
    Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? This paper presents evidence suggesting firms owned by President Ben Ali and his family were more prone to evade import tariffs. During Ben Ali's reign, evasion gaps, defined as the difference between the value of exports to Tunisia reported by partner countries and the value of imports reported at Tunisian customs, were correlated with the import share of connected firms. This association was especially strong for goods subject to high tariffs, and driven by underreporting of unit prices, which diminished after the revolution. Consistent with these product-level patterns, unit prices reported by connected firms were lower than those reported by other firms and declined faster with tariffs than those of other firms. Moreover, privatization to the Ben Ali family was associated with a reduction in reported unit prices, whereas privatization per se was not.
  • Publication
    Political Connections and Tariff Evasion: Evidence from Tunisia
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015-06) Baghdadi, Leila; Rijkers, Bob; Raballand, Gael
    Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? This paper presents evidence suggesting firms owned by President Ben Ali and his family were more prone to evade import tariffs. During Ben Ali’s reign, evasion gaps, defined as the difference between the value of exports to Tunisia reported by partner countries and the value of imports reported at Tunisian customs, were correlated with the import share of connected firms. This association was especially strong for goods subject to high tariffs, and driven by underreporting of unit prices, which diminished after the revolution. Consistent with these product-level patterns, unit prices reported by connected firms were lower than those reported by other firms, and declined faster with tariffs than those of other firms. Moreover, privatization to the Ben Ali family was associated with a reduction in reported unit prices, whereas privatization per se was not.