Person:
Dom, Roel

Fiscal Policy and Sustainable Growth Unit, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment Global Practice
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Tax Policy, Tax Administration, Fiscal Policy
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0000-0002-7787-836X
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Fiscal Policy and Sustainable Growth Unit, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment Global Practice
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Last updated: March 25, 2025
Biography
Roel Dom is a Young Professional and economist with the Fiscal Policy and Sustainable Growth Unit in the World Bank, focusing on tax and customs, and in particular on the role of trust and digitization in tax systems. Prior to joining the World Bank, he worked as a Research Fellow for the International Centre for Tax and Development and for the Overseas Development Institute, where he worked closely with revenue administrations in lower-income countries and fragile states. He holds a PhD in Development Economics from the University of Nottingham and an MSc in Development Studies from the London School of Economics.

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2020 - 202522000 - 20191
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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    Effective Tax Rates, Firm Size and the Global Minimum Tax
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025-03-25) Bachas, Pierre; Brockmeyer, Anne; Dom, Roel; Semelet, Camille
    This paper documents new facts on corporate taxation and the revenue potential of corporate minimum taxes, leveraging firm-level tax returns from 16 countries. First, effective tax rates follow a humped-shaped pattern with firm size: small firms benefit from reduced rates, while large firms take up tax incentives, leaving mid-sized firms with the highest effective rates. On average, the effective tax rate for the largest 1 percent of firms is 2.2 percentage points lower than the average effective tax rate for the top decile of firms. Second, although statutory tax rates are above 15 percent in all sample countries, over a quarter of top firms face an effective rate below 15 percent, challenging the simple tax haven versus non-haven dichotomy. Third, a simple 15 percent domestic minimum tax for the top 1 percent firms could raise corporate taxes by 14 percent on average across countries, absent behavioral responses. In contrast, the global minimum top-up tax would only raise a quarter of this revenue due to its generous deductions and smaller number of firms in scope.
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    Innovations in Tax Compliance: Building Trust, Navigating Politics, and Tailoring Reform
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022-02-17) Dom, Roel; Custers, Anna; Davenport, Stephen R.; Prichard, Wilson
    Recent decades have seen important progress in strengthening country tax systems. Yet many areas of reform have remained stubbornly resistant to major improvements. Overall, revenue collection still falls short of that needed for effective governance and service delivery. Tax collection is too often riddled with high rates of evasion among large corporations and the rich and by disproportionate, though often hidden, burdens on lower-income groups. As countries around the world deal with the large debt burdens induced by COVID-19, an in-depth look at how to strengthen tax systems is especially timely. Innovations in Tax Compliance: Building Trust, Navigating Politics, and Tailoring Reform takes a fresh look at tax reform. The authors draw on recent research and experience for their new conceptual framework to guide more effective approaches to reform. Building on the achievements of recent decades, they argue for a greater emphasis on the overlapping goals of building trust, navigating political resistance, and tailoring reform to unique local contexts—an emphasis achieved by identifying the most binding constraints on reform. This focus not only can lead to greater compliance, a fairer system, and higher revenues, but also can contribute to building state capacity, sustained political support for further reforms, and a stronger fiscal contract between citizens and governments.
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    Innovations in Tax Compliance: Conceptual Framework
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019-10) Roscitt, Michael; Prichard, Wilson; Custers, Anna; Dom, Roel; Davenport, Stephen R.
    This paper presents a conceptual framework for developing more effective approaches to tax reform and compliance. The framework proposes that by combining complementary investments in enforcement, facilitation, and trust, reformers can not only strengthen enforced compliance but can also (a) encourage quasi-voluntary compliance, (b) generate sustainable political support for reform, and (c) create conditions that are more conducive to the construction of stronger fiscal contracts. A key challenge for governments lies in finding the right combination of these three measures -- enforcement, facilitation, and trust—to achieve revenue and broader development goals. The framework proposes greater reliance on locally grounded binding constraints analysis, coupled with careful attention to understanding politics and the drivers of trust in particular contexts, to guide analysis of how best different investments may be combined, prioritized, or sequenced. This framework can help policy makers to think about the right combination of strategies in specific contexts, and thus to allocate resources most effectively.