Person:
Victor, David G.

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Victor, David G., Victor, David Gardiner
Fields of Specialization
Political economy, International relations, Energy policy
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Deep Carbon Initiative
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Last updated: January 31, 2023
Biography
David G. Victor is a professor of international relations and co-director of the Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (ILAR) at the School of Global Policy and Strategy. His research focuses on highly regulated industries and how regulation affects the operation of major energy markets.  Prior to UCSD, Victor led Stanford’s Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and was a professor at Stanford Law School, where he taught energy and environmental law. Earlier in his career he also directed the science and technology program at the Council on Foreign Relations and led the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

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    The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017-03-07) Inchauste, Gabriela; Victor, David G.; Inchauste, Gabriela; Victor, David G.; Addo, Sheila; Bazilian, Morgan; Beaton, Christopher; Gallina, Andrea; Mansur, Yusuf; Oguah, Sanuel; Sánchez, Miguel Eduardo; Serajuddin, Umar; Wai-Poi, Matthew
    This book proposes a simple framework for understanding the political economy of subsidy reform and applies it to four in-depth country studies covering more than 30 distinct episodes of reform. Five key lessons emerge. First, energy subsidies often follow a life cycle, beginning as a way to stabilize prices and reduce exposure to price volatility for low-income consumers. However, as they grow in size and political power, they become entrenched. Second, subsidy reform strategies vary because the underlying political economy problems vary. When benefits are concentrated, satisfying or isolating) interest groups with alternative policies is an important condition for effective reform. When benefits are diffuse, it can be much harder to identify and manage the political coalition needed for reform. Third, governments vary in their administrative and political capacities to implement difficult energy subsidy reforms. Fourth, improvements in social protection systems are often critical to the success of reforms because they make it possible to target assistance to those most in need. Finally, the most interesting cases involve governments that take a strategic approach to the challenges of political economy. In these settings, fixing energy subsidies is central to the governments’ missions of retaining political power and reorganizing how the government delivers benefits to the population. These cases are examples of “reform engineering,” where governments actively seek to create the capacity to implement alternative policies, depoliticize tariffs, and build credibility around alternative policies. The most successful reforms involve active efforts by policy leaders to identify the political forces supporting energy subsidies and redirect or inoculate them.
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    Energy Subsidy Reform Assessment Framework: Assessing the Political Economy of Energy Subsidies to Support Policy Reform Operations
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018-06-30) Schiffer, Eva; Inchauste, Gabriela; Victor, David G.
    This note comes in three sections. First, the information required for political economy analysis of energy subsidy reforms is presented. Second, a summary is given of the information that can usually be obtained through desk research to provide the context for subsequent interviews and another field research. Third, information that probably requires interviews and field data collection is provided. The ultimate audience of the proposed types of analysis lies with policy reformers themselves and with external development and policy institutions that are seeking to help governments adopt more sustainable reforms. However, the direct audience for this note are those commissioning political economy analysis of energy subsidies, and technocrats, researchers, and advisers to policy makers carrying out the analysis. Often, a team made up of sector experts and political economy experts will provide a greater depth of analysis. Significant attention is devoted here to the origins and operation of existing subsidies since that history conditions what is possible for the adoption and sustainability of future reforms. The main interest and audience for this note is forward-looking, people and institutions who need to understand what is politically possible and how to realign political forces around successful reform. The authors are mindful that this role is perhaps different from other more technocratic roles of agencies and institutions focused on technical analysis and thus they also devote some attention to the processes needed to obtain and manage sensitive information and political insights since mismanagement in that realm can, itself, affect the political prospects for reform and harm the standing of reform agents in the process. In contrast to desk research or analysis of existing datasets, field research on political economy will always be an intervention in the local system, which needs to be managed well to increase and not decrease the space for reform and coalition building.