Person:
Schmukler, Sergio L.

Development Research Group

Fields of Specialization

Emerging market finance, Financial development, Financial integration, Financial Sector, Private Sector Development

ORCID

0000-0003-2842-5919

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Departments

Development Research Group

Last updated January 31, 2023

Biography

Sergio Schmukler is Lead Economist at the World Bank’s Development Research Group. His research area is international finance and international financial markets and institutions. He obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1997, when he joined the World Bank's Young Economist and Young Professionals Programs. He currently teaches financial development at Columbia University. He is a member of the Money and Finance Research (Mo.Fi.R) group and Treasurer of LACEA, the Latin America and Caribbean Economic Association (since 2004). In recent years, he has visited the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Central Bank of Chile, CREI at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the Dutch Central Bank, and the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. He has taught at the Department of Economics of University of Maryland (1999-2003), worked at the International Monetary Fund Research Department (2004-2005), was Associate Editor of the Journal of Development Economics (2001-2004), and has participated in several other editorial boards. In earlier years, he worked at the Argentine Central Bank, the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Inter-American Development Bank Research Department.

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Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 101

International Financial Integration through the Law of One Price : The Role of Liquidity and Capital Controls

( 2009) Levy Yeyati, Eduardo ; Schmukler, Sergio L. ; Van Horen, Neeltje

This paper takes advantage of the fact that some stocks trade both in domestic and international markets to characterize the degree of international financial integration. The paper argues that the cross-market premium (the ratio between the domestic and the international market price of cross-listed stocks) provides a valuable measure of international financial integration and the effectiveness of capital controls. Using autoregressive (AR) models to estimate convergence speeds and non-linear threshold autoregressive (TAR) models to identify non-arbitrage bands, the paper shows that price deviations across markets are rapidly arbitraged away and bands are narrow, particularly so for liquid stocks. The paper also shows that regulations on cross-border capital flows effectively segment domestic markets. As expected, the effects of both types of capital controls are asymmetric but in the opposite direction: controls on outflows induce positive premia, while controls on inflows generate negative premia. Both vary with the intensity of capital controls.
The Financing and Growth of Firms in China and India : Evidence from Capital Markets

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-04) Didier, Tatiana ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

This paper studies the extent to which firms in China and India use capital markets to obtain financing and grow. Using a unique data set on domestic and international capital raising activity and firm performance, it finds that the expansion of financial market activity since the 1990s has been more limited than what the aggregate figures suggest. Relatively few firms raise capital. Even fewer firms capture the bulk of the financing. Moreover, firms that issue equity or bonds are different and behave differently from other publicly listed firms. Among other things, they are typically larger and grow faster. The differences between users and non-users exist before the capital raising activity, are associated with the probability of raising capital, and become more accentuated afterward. The distribution of issuing firms shifts more over time than the distribution of those that do not issue, suggesting little convergence in firm size among listed firms.
Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-09) Broner, Fernando A. ; Lorenzoni, Guido ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

The authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-term debt. They first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk-sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a tradeoff between safer long-term borrowing and cheaper short-term debt. Second, the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. They show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities. This suggests that changes in bondholders' risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises.
Coping with Risk through Mismatches : Domestic and International Financial Contracts for Emerging Economies

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-02) de la Torre, Augusto ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

The authors argue that short termism, dollarization, and the use of foreign jurisdictions are endogenous ways of coping with systemic risks prevalent in emerging markets. They represent a symptom at least as much as a problem. These coping mechanisms are jointly determined and the choice of one of them involves risk tradeoffs. Various conclusions can be derived from the analysis. First, because of the dominance of dollar contracts over short-duration contracts, dedollarization might be much more difficult to achieve than often believed. Second, one-dimensional policies aimed at reducing currency and duration mismatches might just displace risk and not diminish it. Third, as systemic risks rise, the market equilibrium settles in favor of investor protection against price risk (through dollar and short-duration contracts) at the expense of exposure to credit risk. Finally, the option value to litigate in the event of default might explain this equilibrium outcome.
Market Discipline Under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-11) Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo ; Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

The authors show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.
Pricing Currency Risk: Facts and Puzzles from Currency Boards

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2002-03) Schmukler, Sergio L. ; Servén, Luis

The authors investigate the patterns and determinants of the currency risk premium in two currency boards-Argentina and Hong Kong. Despite the presumed rigidity of currency boards, currency premium is almost always positive and at times very large. Its term structure is usually upward sloping, but flattens out or even becomes inverted at times of turbulence. Currency premia differ across markets. The forward discount typically exceeds the currency premium derived from interbank rates, particularly during times of crisis. The large magnitude of these cross-market differences can be the consequence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities, market segmentation, or other risks embedded in typical measures of currency risk. The premium and its term structure depend on domestic and global factors related to devaluation expectations and risk perceptions.
Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in Emerging Economies to International Centers

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2002-03) Claessens, Stijn ; Klingebiel, Daniela ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

The authors study the determinants of the growing migration of stock market activity to international financial centers. They use a sample of 77 countries and document that higher economic growth and more macroeconomic stability help stock market development. Countries with higher income per capita, sounder macroeconomic policies, more efficient legal systems, better shareholder protection, and more open financial markets tend to have larger and more liquid stock markets. The authors show that these factors also drive the degree with which capital raising, listing, and trading have been migrating to international financial centers. As fundamentals improve and technology advances, this migration will likely increase and domestic stock market activity may become too little to support local markets. For many emerging economies, the best policy is to establish sound fundamentals but not necessarily the trading, or even listing of securities locally.
Mutual Fund Investment in Emerging Markets : An Overview

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001-05) Kaminsky, Graciela L. ; Lyons, Richard K. ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

International mutual funds are key contributors to the globalization of financial markets and one of the main sources of capital flows to emerging economies. Despite their importance in emerging markets, little is known about their investment allocation and strategies. This article provides an overview of mutual fund activity in emerging markets. It describes their size, asset allocation, and country allocation and then focuses on their behavior during crises in emerging markets in the 1990s. It analyzes data at both the fund-manager and fund-investor levels. Due to large redemptions and injections, funds' flows are not stable. Withdrawals from emerging markets during recent crises were large, which is consistent with the evidence on financial contagion.
On the International Transmission of Shocks : Micro-Evidence from Mutual Fund Portfolios

(Elsevier, 2012-11) Raddatz, Claudio ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

Using micro-level data on mutual funds from different financial centers investing in equity and bonds, this paper analyzes how investors and managers behave and transmit shocks across countries. The paper shows that the volatility of mutual fund investments is quantitatively driven by both the underlying investors and fund managers through (i) injections into/redemptions out of each fund and (ii) managerial changes in country weights and cash. Both investors and managers respond to country returns and crises and adjust their investments substantially, e.g., generating large reallocations during the global financial crisis. Their behavior tends to be pro-cyclical, reducing their exposure to countries during bad times and increasing it when conditions improve. Managers actively change country weights over time, although there is significant short-run pass-through from returns to country weights. Capital flows from mutual funds do not seem to have a stabilizing role and expose countries in their portfolios to foreign shocks.
Emerging Markets Instability : Do Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns?

(World Bank, 2002-05-30) Kaminsky, Graciela ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

Financial market instability has been the focus of attention of both academic and policy circles. Rating agencies have been under particular scrutiny lately as promoters of financial excesses, upgrading countries in good times and downgrading them in bad times. Using a panel of emerging economies, this paper examines whether sovereign ratings affect financial markets. We find that changes in sovereign ratings have an impact on country risk and stock returns. We also find that these changes are transmitted across countries, with neighbor-country effects being more significant. Rating upgrades (downgrades) tend to occur following market rallies (downturns). Countries with more vulnerable economies, as measured by low ratings, are more sensitive to changes in U.S. interest rates.