Kosec, Katrina

Person:
Kosec, Katrina

Fields of Specialization

Governance; health; education; social protection; institutions; development economics; political economy; public economics

Departments

IFPRI
Selected Works

Last updated: March 28, 2024

Biography

Katrina is a Research Fellow in the Development Strategy and Governance Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). She is an applied microeconomist working at the intersection of development economics, political economy, and public economics. Her research focuses on the impacts of governance on public investment and outcomes for the poor. She has investigated the impacts of decentralization on growth, environmental investments, tax policy, and public service provision, as well as the effects of income inequality on local governments’ investments in the poor. Her current work examines how political competition and institutions affect the behaviors and aspirations of the poor. Katrina holds a Ph.D. in Political Economics from Stanford University, where she was a National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate Research Fellow in Economics.

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Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 9 of 9

Cash Transfers, Trust, and Inter-household Transfers: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania
(Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2023-01-24) Evans, David K.; Kosec, Katrina
Institutionalized conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs may affect pre-existing, informal safety nets such as inter-household transfers and trust among community members. This study reports on a randomized controlled trial used to test the impact of CCTs on various measures of trust and informal safety nets within communities in Tanzania. It provides evidence that the introduction of a CCT program increased program beneficiaries’ trust in other community members and their perceived ability to access support from other households (e.g., childcare). Although CCTs reduced the total size of transfers to beneficiary households in the community in the short run (after 1.75 years of transfers), that reduction had disappeared 2.75 years after transfers began. Taken together, this evidence suggests that formal CCT programs do not necessarily crowd out informal safety nets in the longer term, and they may in fact boost trust and support across households.
Cash Transfers and Health: Evidence from Tanzania
(Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2019-06) Holtemeyer, Brian; Evans, David K.; Kosec, Katrina
How do cash transfers conditioned on health clinic visits and school attendance impact health-related outcomes? Examining the 2010 randomized introduction of a program in Tanzania, this paper finds nuanced impacts. An initial surge in clinic visits after 1.5 years—due to more visits by those already complying with program health conditions and by non-compliers—disappeared after 2.5 years, largely due to compliers reducing above-minimal visits. The study finds significant increases in take-up of health insurance and the likelihood of seeking treatment when ill. Health improvements were concentrated among children ages 0–5 years rather than the elderly, and took time to materialize; the study finds no improvements after 1.5 years, but 0.76 fewer sick days per month after 2.5 years, suggesting the importance of looking beyond short-term impacts. Reductions in sick days were largest in villages with more baseline health workers per capita, consistent with improvements being sensitive to capacity constraints. These results are robust to adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing.
Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018-02) Holtemeyer, Brian; Evans, David K.; Kosec, Katrina
How does a locally-managed conditional cash transfer program impact trust in government? On the one hand, delivering monetary benefits and increasing interactions with government officials (elected and appointed) may increase trust. On the other hand, imposing paternalistic conditions, leading some to experience feelings of social stigma or guilt, and potentially permitting capture by local elites could reduce trust. This paper answers this question by exploiting the randomized introduction of a locally-managed transfer program in Tanzania in 2010, which included popular election of community management committees to run the program. The analysis reveals that cash transfers can significantly increase trust in leaders. This effect is driven by large increases in trust in elected leaders as opposed to appointed bureaucrats. Perceptions of government responsiveness to citizens' concerns and honesty of leaders also rise; these improvements are largest where there are more village meetings at baseline. One of the central roles of village meetings is to receive and share information with village residents. One indicator that governance may have improved is that records from school and health committees are more readily available in treatment villages. Notably, while the stated willingness of citizens to participate in community development projects rises, actual participation in projects and the likelihood of voting does not. Concerns that local management of a cash transfer program will destroy trust in government or reduce the quality of governance appear unfounded—especially in high-information contexts.
Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfers in Tanzania : Results from a Randomized Trial
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014-03-04) Hausladen, Stephanie; Evans, David K.; Reese, Natasha; Kosec, Katrina
Given the success of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs elsewhere, in 2010 the Government of Tanzania rolled out a pilot CCT program in three districts. Its aim was to see if, using a model relying on communities to target beneficiaries and deliver payments, the program could improve outcomes for the poor the way centrally-run CCT programs have in other contexts. The program provided cash payments to poor households, but conditioned payments on complying with certain health and education requirements. Given scarce resources, the Government randomly selected 40 out of 80 eligible villages to receive the pilot program. Households in participating and comparison villages were broadly comparable at baseline. This report describes the program and the results of a rigorous, mixed methods impact evaluation. Two and a half years into the program, participating households were healthier and more educated. Health improvements due to the CCT program were greatest for the poorest half of households—the poorest of the poor. They experienced a half a day per month reduction in sick days on average, and poor children age 0-4 in particular had a full day per month reduction in sick days. In education, the program showed clear positive impacts on whether children had ever attended school and on whether they completed Standard 7. Households were also more likely to buy shoes for children, which can promote both health and school attendance. In response to the program, households also made investments to reduce risk: Participating households were much more likely to finance medical care with insurance and much more likely to purchase health insurance than were their comparison counterparts. The program did not significantly affect savings on aeverage, although it did increase non-bank savings amongst the poorest half of households. Participating households also invested in more livestock assets, which they used to create small enterprises. The program did not, however, have significant impacts on food consumption. On the whole, the results suggest that households focused on reducing risk and on improving their livelihoods rather than principally on increasing consumption. There is also evidence that the project had positive effects on community cohesion.
Cash Transfers and Health: Evidence from Tanzania
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016-11) Holtemeyer, Brian; Evans, David K.; Kosec, Katrina
How do conditional cash transfers impact health-related outcomes? This paper examines the 2010 randomized introduction of a program in Tanzania and finds nuanced impacts. An initial surge in clinic visits after 1.5 years -- due to more visits by those already complying with program health conditions and by non-compliers -- disappeared after 2.5 years, largely due to compliers reducing above-minimal visits. The study finds significant increases in take-up of health insurance and the likelihood of seeking treatment when ill. Health improvements were concentrated among children ages 0–5 years rather than the elderly, and took time to materialize; the study finds no improvements after 1.5 years, but 0.76 fewer sick days per month after 2.5 years, suggesting the importance of looking beyond short-term impacts. Reductions in sick days were largest in villages with more baseline health workers per capita, consistent with improvements being sensitive to capacity constraints. These results are robust to adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing.
Early Child Education : Making Programs Work for Brazil’s Most Important Generation
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012-05-29) Evans, David K.; Kosec, Katrina
This report draws deeply on the extraordinary efforts and innovations demonstrated by early child development policy makers around Brazil. This report draws on background papers about innovations in early child education in Rio de Janeiro and in caregiver training and supervision in two municipalities within Sao Paulo state. The year 2011 marked the beginning of a new administration in Brazil. The Ministry of education clearly identified early child education (ECE) as one of the top priorities of the new administration, along with secondary school and improving the reputation of the teaching profession. Early child development interventions are essential to both increasing the productivity of Brazil as a whole and to providing equitable opportunities for the disadvantaged. These programs benefit the poor more than other populations, and the poor are most in need of these benefits. Education interventions are crucial. Creches and preschools provide opportunities for stimulation and development that can wire children for future success. Therefore, early child education can particularly benefit the poor, helping to close the gap in cognitive development across income groups. A World Bank study compares adults from two regions of Brazil (the Northeast and the Southeast) who attended preschool to those who did not and found that pre-school attendance is associated with additional total years of education.
Politics and Preschool : The Political Economy of Investment in Pre-Primary Education
(2011-05-01) Kosec, Katrina
What drives governments with similar revenues to publicly provide very different amounts of goods for which private substitutes are available? Key examples are education and health care. This paper compares spending by Brazilian municipalities on pre-primary education -- a good that is also provided privately -- with spending on public infrastructure like parks and roads, which lacks private substitutes. Panel data from 1995-2008 reveal how the distribution of income affects public investment. Revenue is endogenous to investment outcomes, and the analysis addresses this problem by exploiting a 1998, nationwide education finance reform and several revisions to the policy. The author constructs a variable that captures exogenous variation in revenue generated by nonlinearities of the law to instrument for observed revenue. Municipalities with higher median income and more inequality are less likely to allocate revenue to education or to expand pre-primary enrollment. They are more likely to allocate revenue to public infrastructure. There is suggestive evidence that this occurs for two reasons, hypothesized in two separate literatures. In rich and unequal municipalities, fewer total people support public education spending (the collective choice channel), and also, any given poor person wanting public education has less influence over policymakers there (the political power channel).
Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence from Latin America
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004-11) Wallsten, Scott; Kosec, Katrina; Clarke, George R. G.
Introducing private sector participation (PSP) into the water and sewerage sectors in developing countries is difficult and controversial. Empirical studies on its effects are scant and generally inconclusive. Case studies tend to find improvements in the sector following privatization, but they suffer from selection bias, and it is difficult to generalize from their results. To explore empirically the effects of PSP on coverage, we assemble a new dataset of connections to water and sewerage services at the city, and province level, based on household surveys in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. The household surveys, conducted over a number of years, allow us to compile data, before and after the introduction of PSP, as well as from similar (control) regions that never privatized at all. Our analysis reveals that, in general, connection rates to piped water and sewerage, improved following the introduction of PSP, consistent with the case study literature. We also find, however, that connection rates similarly improved in the control regions, suggesting that PSP, per se, may not have been responsible for those improvements. On the other hand, connection rates for the poorest households also tended to increase in the regions with PSP, and in the control regions, suggesting that-in terms of connections at least-PSP did not harm the poor.
Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence from Latin America
(2009) Clarke, George R. G.; Kosec, Katrina; Wallsten, Scott
Introducing private sector participation (PSP) into the water and sewerage sectors is difficult and controversial. Empirical studies on its effects are scant and generally inconclusive. Case studies tend to find improvements following privatisation, but they suffer from selection bias and it is difficult to generalise their results. To explore empirically the effects of private sector participation on coverage, we assemble a new dataset of connections to water and sewerage services at the city and province level based on household surveys in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. The household surveys, conducted over a number of years, allow us to compile data before and after the introduction of private sector participation as well as from similar (control) regions did not privatise. Our analysis reveals that, in general, the share of households connected to piped water and sewerage improved following the introduction of private sector participation, consistent with the case study literature. We also find, however, that the share of households connected similarly improved in the control regions, suggesting that private sector participation, per se, may not have been responsible for those improvements. Results are similar when looking only at the poorest households. The share of poor households connected to piped water and sewerage increased similarly in areas both with and without private sector participation, suggesting that--in terms of connections at least--private sector participation did not harm the poor.