Raballand, Gaël

Person:
Raballand, Gaël

Global Practice on Governance, World Bank

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Public sector reform, Public spending efficiency, Aid effectiveness, Public investment management

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Global Practice on Governance, World Bank

Last updated: March 5, 2024

Biography

Gaël Raballand is a lead public sector specialist based in Tanzania. He holds a PhD in economics and a degree in political science and international public law. He co-authored six World Bank books on customs reforms, transport and trade. He worked in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa in public sector reform and governance, private sector and trade and transport sectors/practices. He was based in Zambia leading the Governance Partnership Facility and now focuses on public sector reforms (including customs reforms), SOEs reforms, public spending efficiency, public investment management, governance and aid effectiveness issues.

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 40

Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st Century: Four Trends and an Uncertain Outlook
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2024-03-04) Isser, Deborah H.; Raballand, Gaël; Watts, Michael John
What can be learned from the governance trajectory of African countries since the beginning of the 21st century What is the quality of governance on the African continent and how does it shape development The first decade of the millennium saw promising growth and poverty reduction in much of the continent. Yet, Sub-Saharan Africa has also been the stage of a stream of governance reform failures and policy reversals, and many countries continue to suffer from the consequences of poor governance. This paper explores the dynamics of governance reform on the continent over the past two decades and points to four key trends. First, effective state institutions, capable of maintaining peace, fostering growth, and delivering services, have developed unevenly. Second, progress has been made on enhancing the inclusiveness and accountability of institutions, but it remains constrained by the weakness of checks and balances and the persistence of patterns of centralized and exclusive power arrangements. Third, civic capacity has risen considerably, but the inability of institutions to respond to social expectations and political mobilization threatens to turn liberal civic engagement into distrust, populism, and radicalization. Fourth, the combination of these three trends contributes to the rise of political instability, which constitutes a major threat for the continent.
Customs Reform in Developing Countries – Time for a Rethink?
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2023-06-07) Arvanitis, Yannis; Raballand, Gael
Customs have been at the core of development concerns, especially in developing countries. In this context, customs are developmentally important to the extent that they sit at the intersection between fiscal imperatives—due to their revenue collection potential and trade-related prerogatives—and security implications. Security imperatives usually trump other considerations in conflict-affected countries and introduce an additional layer of complexity to the reforms supported by the World Bank. This note proposes some possible approaches to customs reforms in developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) in particular. It is intended to help practitioners within the World Bank and other development partners to better understand the key aspects and peculiarities of customs reforms, with the ultimate goal of supporting them in framing their design. However, it is not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, it serves as a “how-to” guide for those not particularly familiar with the topic. It also complements a growing stock of academic pieces linked to customs, as well as findings from other operational evaluations (World Bank 2019). It also brings together practical experiences and feedback from practitioner
State Capture Analysis: A How to Guide for Practitioners
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021-05-17) Raballand, Gael; Rijkers, Bob
This note describes how political economy analysis can be used to promote development, focusing specifically on state capture. It is intended to help practitioners within the World Bank execute and disseminate political economy analysis of state capture. It is not intended to be comprehensive but serves as a how-to guide for those not intimately familiar with the topic.
Corruption in Customs
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021-10) Chalendard, Cyril; Fernandes, Ana M.; Raballand, Gael; Rijkers, Bob
This paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates the approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers.
Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020-05) Chalendard, Cyril; Duhaut, Alice; Fernandes, Ana M.; Raballand, Gael; Rijkers, Bob; Mattoo, Aaditya
This paper examines how providing better information to customs inspectors and monitoring their actions affects tax revenue and fraud detection in Madagascar. First, an instrumental variables strategy is used to show that transaction-specific, third-party valuation advice on a subset of high-risk import declarations increases fraud findings by 21.7 percentage points and tax collection by 5.2 percentage points. Second, a randomized control trial is conducted in which a subset of high-risk declarations is selected to receive detailed risk comments and another subset is explicitly tagged for ex-post monitoring. For declarations not subject to third-party valuation advice, detailed comments increase reporting of fraud by 3.1 percentage points and improve tax yield by 1 percentage point. However, valuation advice and detailed comments have a significantly smaller impact on revenue when potential tax losses and opportunities for graft are large. Monitoring induces inspectors to scan more shipments but does not result in the detection of more fraud or the collection of additional revenue. Better information thus helps curb customs fraud, but its effectiveness appears compromised by corruption.
Algeria–Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality
(Taylor and Francis, 2017-07-03) Bensassi, Sami; Brockmeyer, Anne; Pellerin, Mathieu; Raballand, Gaël
This paper estimates the volume of informal trade between Algeria and Mali and analyzes its determinants and mechanisms, using a multi-pronged methodology. In addition to mirror statistics analysis, we provide evidence of the importance of informal trade, drawing on satellite images and surveys with informal traders in Mali and Algeria. We estimate that the weekly turnover of informal trade fell from approximately US$2 million in 2011 to US$0.74 million in 2014, but that trade continues to play a crucial role in the economies of northern Mali and southern Algeria. We also show that official trade statistics are meaningless in this context because they capture less than 3% of total trade. Meanwhile, profit margins of 20–30% on informal trade help to explain the relative prosperity of northern Mali. Informal trade probably plays a strong role in poverty reduction, especially in the Kidal region.
Central Asia: The New Silk Road Initiative’s Questionable Economic Rationality
(Taylor and Francis, 2015-11-15) Peyrouse, Sebastien; Raballand, Gael
This paper explores how the New Silk Road Initiative, which is presented as a concept founded on economic rationality, tends to offer an ideological perspective on transport and trade for the Central Asian region. The New Silk Road Initiative advocates for more transport infrastructure in Central Asia without tackling the most significant barriers to trade: production patterns, widespread corruption, and poor management practices at borders.
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice: Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016-07-19) Sergenti, Ernest; Al-Dahdah, Edouard; Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina; Raballand, Gael; Ababsa, Myriam
The primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies more systematically enforced than others? Are “good” laws likely to be enacted, and if not, what stands in the way? We answer these questions using a theoretical framework and detailed empirical data and illustrate with case studies from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. We believe that the best way to understand the variation in the drafting and implementation of laws and policies is to examine the interests and incentives of those responsible for these tasks – policymakers and bureaucrats. If laws and their enforcement offer concrete benefits to these ruling elites, they are more likely to be systematically enforced. If they don't, implementation is selective, discretionary, if not nil. Our first contribution is in extending the application of the concept of the rule of law beyond its traditional focus on specific organizations like the courts and the police, to economic sectors such as customs, taxation and land inheritance, in a search for a direct causal relationship with economic development outcomes. Instead of limiting ourselves to a particular type of organization or a legalistic approach to the rule of law, we present a broader theory of how laws are made and implemented across different types of sectors and organizations. Our second contribution is in demonstrating how powerful interests affect implementation outcomes. The incentives elites have to build and support rule-of-law institutions derive from the distribution of power in society, which is partly a historical given. The point we make is that it is not deterministic. Realigning the incentive structures for reform among key actors and organizations, through accountability and competition, can dramatically improve the chances that rule-of-law institutions will take root. On the other hand, building the capacity of organizations without first changing institutional incentives is likely to lead to perverse outcomes.
Political Connections and Tariff Evasion Evidence from Tunisia
(Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2017-06-01) Rijkers, Bob; Raballand, Gael
Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? This paper presents evidence suggesting firms owned by President Ben Ali and his family were more prone to evade import tariffs. During Ben Ali's reign, evasion gaps, defined as the difference between the value of exports to Tunisia reported by partner countries and the value of imports reported at Tunisian customs, were correlated with the import share of connected firms. This association was especially strong for goods subject to high tariffs, and driven by underreporting of unit prices, which diminished after the revolution. Consistent with these product-level patterns, unit prices reported by connected firms were lower than those reported by other firms and declined faster with tariffs than those of other firms. Moreover, privatization to the Ben Ali family was associated with a reduction in reported unit prices, whereas privatization per se was not.
The Use of Detailed Statistical Data in Customs Reform: The Case of Madagascar
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016-04) Chalendard, Cyril; Raballand, Gael; Rakotoarisoa, Antsa
To carry out their various missions (collecting revenue, facilitating trade, and ensuring security), many customs administrations have established a risk management unit. In developing countries, however, because of the lack of dedicated human and material resources, intelligence and risk analysis remain insufficiently developed. In view of the lack of resources, this paper proposes a simple methodology aiming at detecting risky import operations. The mirror analysis first helps to identify and target products or sectors with the greatest risk. Based on the examination of customs declarations patterns (data mining), it is possible to identify and target higher risk economic operators (importers and customs brokers). When implemented in Madagascar, this method has helped to reveal probable fraud cases in the present context of customs reform. Estimates suggest that, in 2014, customs fraud reduced non-oil customs revenues (duties and import value-added tax) by at least 30 percent.