Person:
Raballand, Gaël
Author Name Variants
Fields of Specialization
Public sector reform,
Public spending efficiency,
Aid effectiveness,
Public investment management
Degrees
Departments
Global Practice on Governance, World Bank
Externally Hosted Work
Contact Information
Last updated
June 7, 2023
Biography
Gaël Raballand is a lead public sector specialist based in Tanzania. He holds a PhD in economics and a degree in political science and international public law. He co-authored six World Bank books on customs reforms, transport and trade. He worked in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa in public sector reform and governance, private sector and trade and transport sectors/practices. He was based in Zambia leading the Governance Partnership Facility and now focuses on public sector reforms (including customs reforms), SOEs reforms, public spending efficiency, public investment management, governance and aid effectiveness issues.
Publication Search Results
1 - 10 of 39
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Publication
Why Does Cargo Spend Weeks in Sub-Saharan African Ports? Lessons from Six Countries
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012)This study is timely because several investments are planned for container terminals in Sub-Saharan Africa. From a public policy perspective, disentangling the reasons behind cargo delays in ports is crucial to understanding:a) whether projects by the World Bank and other donors have addressed the most salient problems; and b) whether institutional port reform and infrastructure, sometimes complemented by customs reform, are the most appropriate approaches or should be adapted. Without such identification and quantification, projects may ultimately result in a limited impact, and structural problems of long delays will remain. Dwell time figures are a major commercial instrument used to attract cargo and generate revenues. Therefore, the incentives for a port authority and a container terminal operator are increasingly strong to lower the real figure to attract more cargo. At the same time, ports are more and more in competition, so the question of how to obtain independently verifiable dwell time data is increasingly critical to provide assurance that interventions are indeed having the intended effect. -
Publication
Does the Semi-Autonomous Agency Model Function in a Low-Governance Environment? The Case of the Road Development Agency in Zambia
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-08)This paper uses Zambia as a case study to assess empirically whether political interference in a low-governance environment has diminished in the past years as expected after a semi-autonomous agency model was set up ten years ago. The road sector in Zambia has experienced some significant developments since then. The paper uses data on contract from 2008 to 2011 and analyses a number of key trends related to Road Development Agency governance and staffing dynamics as well as procurement and project selection within the institution. The main findings indicate that, after some years of implementation of these reforms, there is reason to question whether the model of semi-autonomous agency enables road management to be shielded from political interference. Zambia may be an isolated case but, so far, this model does not seem to have been able to decrease political interference in the selection or supervision of projects and there seems to have been an increased lack of accountability of civil servants working in this sector. -
Publication
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-09)Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public sector. The basis for this study is "an accidental experiment" resulting from the World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In 2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation on a project to support the Government of Cameroon to improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability of public finance management. The US$15 million project supported a number of ministries to strengthen a broad range of management systems and capacities. Independently and concurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile, technical assistance project to improve performance in Cameroon's Customs, supported by a small trade facilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approach appears to have succeeded in initiating change while the other has signally failed. The two projects of different scale, scope and design in the same governance environment offer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned but accidental for that reason) that allows insights into the nature of institutional change and the role of behavior and incentives and approaches that offer greater prospects for making reform possible. The paper confirms the value of using ideas from behavioral economics, both to design institutional reforms and to critically assess the approach to institutional reform taken by development agencies such as the World Bank. -
Publication
Estimating Informal Trade across Tunisia's Land Borders
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-12)This paper uses mirror statistics and research in the field to estimate the magnitude of Tunisia's informal trade with Libya and Algeria. The aim is to assess the scale of this trade and to evaluate the amount lost in taxes and duties as a result as well as to assess the local impact in terms of income generation. The main findings show that within Tunisian trade as a whole, informal trade accounts for only a small share (5 percent of total imports). However, informal trade represents an important part of the Tunisia's bilateral trade with Libya and Algeria, accounting for more than half the official trade with Libya and more than total official trade with Algeria. The main reasons behind this large-scale informal trade are differences in the levels of subsidies on either side of the border as well as the varying tax regimes. Tackling informal trade is not simply a question of stepping up the number of controls and sanctions, because differences in prices lead to informal trade (and to an increase in corruption levels among border officials) even in cases where the sanctions are severe. As local populations depend on cross-border trade for income generation, they worry about local authorities taking action against cross-border trade. At the same time, customs officials are concerned about the risk of local protests if they strictly enforce the tariff regimes in place. This issue will become even more significant if fuel prices in Tunisia rise again as a result of a reduction in the levels of domestic subsidies. -
Publication
Port and Maritime Transport Challenges in West and Central Africa
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-05)This Working Paper presents the current trends in maritime transport and port sectors in West and Central Africa (WCA), and proposes several policy recommendations to improve maritime transport and port efficiency in order to enhance economic growth. West and Central African economies, which depend on maritime transport for an overwhelming proportion of their trade, rely on efficient maritime transport and port sectors to be competitive on world markets. This paper was prepared for the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP), in the overall context of the World Bank's efforts for trade facilitation in Sub- Saharan Africa2 as a follow-up to the 1997 Second Cotonou meeting of West and Central Africa (WCA) Ministers. -
Publication
Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-02)Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various business models and practices, which are product-specific. Overall, what matters first are customs brokers' practices. Information asymmetries mark transactions between brokers and importers and are accompanied by misperceptions of the costs and risks of informal brokers working among informal importers. In a low-governance environment with widespread informal practices, blanket policies should be avoided in order to discourage activities of unprofessional and systematic bribe-taker brokers. It is also essential that customs officials disrupt information asymmetries and better disseminate information to informal importers on customs processes and official costs. Finally, customs should more strongly sanction some informal brokers in order to reduce collusion with some customs officers. -
Publication
The Cost of Being Landlocked : Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-06)A large proportion of the least developed countries are landlocked and their access to world markets depends on the availability of a trade corridor and transit systems. Based on empirical evidence from World Bank projects and assessments in Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere, this paper proposes a microeconomic quantitative description of logistics costs. The paper theoretically and empirically highlights that landlocked economies are primarily affected not only by a high cost of freight services but also by the high degree of unpredictability in transportation time. The main sources of costs are not only physical constraints but widespread rent activities and severe flaws in the implementation of the transit systems, which prevent the emergence of reliable logistics services. The business and donor community should push toward implementation of comprehensive facilitation strategies, primarily at the national level, and the design of robust and resilient transport and transit regimes. A better understanding of the political economy of transit and a review of the implementation successes and failures in this area are needed. -
Publication
How do Differing Standards Increase Trade Costs? The Case of Pallets
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-02)The pallet is a platform used for storing, handling, and transporting products. There are hundreds of different pallet sizes around the world. The case of pallets is examined to illustrate the impact of multiplicity of standards on trade costs. We select this case because pallets are used all around the world, pallet standards are not too sophisticated, and data on the impact of pallet standards are to some extent available. The paper examines why there are so many different pallet sizes, the associated trade costs and the reasons why countries have not harmonized pallet sizes to eliminate such costs. It then presents options for exporters to mitigate the adverse effects of standards multiplicity while complying with destination markets' standard requirements. The range of options is limited in the case of exporters from less developed countries because of the lack of rental and exchange pallet markets. To mitigate the costs of this multiplicity of standards, the World Bank's strategy should be divided in two directions: to develop awareness of costs related to the multiplicity of standards and to support actively harmonization at the global level (within International Organization for Standardization) and at the regional level (within regional cooperation agreements). -
Publication
Reform by Numbers : Measurement Applied to Customs and Tax Administrations in Developing Countries
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013)This paper is organized as follows. In chapter two, Samson Bilangna and Marcellin Djeuwo from the Cameroon customs administration present the history and the outcomes of the performance measurement policy launched by their administra-tion: the General Directorate of Customs signed 'performance contracts' with the frontline customs officers in 2010 and with some importers in 2011. In chapter three, Jose-Maria Munoz, an anthropologist, offers a complementary view of the introduction of figures in the Cameroon tax administration. The fourth chapter ends the book's first part, which focuses on performance measurement. Xavier Pascual from the French customs administration describes the system implemented by his administration to measure the collective performance of customs units and bureaus. In chapter five, Anne-Marie Geourjon and Bertrand Laporte, who are both economists, and Ousmane Coundoul and Massene Gadiaga, who are from the Senegalese customs administration, present the use of data mining to select imports for inspection. This project is being developed in Senegal and embodies the concept of risk analysis. Sharing the same global aim to make controls more efficient, economists Gael Raballand and Guillermo Arenas from the World Bank and anthropologist Thomas Cantens from the World Customs Organization suggest, in chapter six, using mirror statistics to detect potentially fraudulent import flows. Mirror statistics calculate the gaps of foreign trade statistics between two trading partner countries. To conclude the second part on the integration of measurement in information systems, Soyoung Yang from the Korea Customs Service (KCS), in chapter eight, offers a case study on KCS's implementation of a single window system. With respect to risk analysis, the concept of single window is widespread in the trade and customs environments, but few concrete achievements have been presented and analyzed. -
Publication
Success Factors for Improving Logistics in a Middle-Income Country
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2006-10)This note presents the main lessons drawn from an analytical and sector work on trade logistics in Morocco. Public and private counterparts recognized the positive impact of the World Bank's report to catalyze and accelerate reforms' pace and to facilitate cooperation between public and private parties involved in logistics reforms. A careful preparation process and a strong buy-in from public and private stakeholders involved in logistics in Morocco made this Economic Sector Work (ESW) successful. To achieve this outcome, the Bank team based efforts on a tailored approach to commission background studies, knowledge dissemination during preparatory work and a detailed action plan in order to create a rapid and positive impact on improving logistics. The Moroccan example also demonstrates that, in a middle-income country, detailed and relevant action plan under a strong political willingness and commitment to reform can achieve rapid and significant results.