Person:
Hasnain, Zahid

Global Practice for Governance, The World Bank

Fields of Specialization

Public administration reform, Governance, Public sector, Public financial management

Departments

Global Practice for Governance, The World Bank

Last updated: September 4, 2024

Biography

Zahid Hasnain is the Global Lead for Human Resource Management at the World Bank Group. He has been with the World Bank for 15 years, where he has worked on public administration reform, public sector performance, public financial management, transparency and accountability, and digital governance. He has published a number of papers in peer reviewed journals on these topics, was a core member of the World Development Report 2016 “Digital Dividends”, and has led analytical and lending projects for the World Bank in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Serbia, and Vietnam. Zahid has a Bachelors degree in Physics and Government from Cornell University, a Masters in Development from University of Cambridge, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago.

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Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 13

Does E-Government Improve Government Capacity? Evidence from Tax Compliance Costs, Tax Revenue, and Public Procurement Competitiveness
(Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2020-02) Kochanova, Anna; Hasnain, Zahid; Larson, Bradley
Using cross-country data on e-government systems, this paper analyzes whether e-filing of taxes and e-procurement implementation improves the capacity of governments to raise and spend fiscal resources through lowering tax compliance costs, improving tax collection and public procurement competitiveness, and reducing corruption. Adopting e-filing systems reduces tax compliance costs as measured by the time to prepare and pay taxes, the likelihood and frequency of firms being visited by a tax official, and the perception of tax administration as an obstacle to firms’ operation and growth. E-filing is also associated with a moderate increase in the income tax revenue to GDP ratio. The results for e-procurement are weaker, with the number of firms securing or attempting to secure a government contract increasing only in countries with higher levels of development and better institutions. There is no strong relationship between e-government and corruption.
Are Public Sector Workers in Developing Countries Overpaid? Evidence from a New Global Data Set
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019-02) Newhouse, David; Gindling, T. H.; Shi, Rong; Hasnain, Zahid
This paper examines the public sector wage premium using nationally representative household surveys from 91 countries. The public sector generally pays a wage premium compared to all private sector salaried employees, but the size of the premium is sensitive to the choice of the private sector comparator and varies considerably by worker characteristics. For most countries, the average premium disappears when the public sector is compared to only formal sector private employees, especially when controlling for occupation. The public sector wage premium is higher for women and low-skilled workers. In contrast, high-skilled public sector employees are most often paid the same as their private sector counterparts or may even pay a penalty for working in the public sector. Consistent with this, the public sector premium is greater for employees with less education, those working in lower paid occupations, and those whose earnings fall in the lower part of the conditional earnings distribution. Across countries, the wage premium is only weakly associated with countries’ level of development. These findings nuance the existing consensus that public sector workers tend to enjoy a significant wage premium over their private sector counterparts, and that this premium is especially large in low-income countries.
Does E-Government Improve Government Capacity?: Evidence from Tax Administration and Public Procurement
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016-04) Kochanova, Anna; Hasnain, Zahid; Larson, Bradley
Using a cross-country data set on e-government systems, this paper analyzes whether e-filing of taxes and e-procurement adoption improves the capacity of governments to raise and spend resources through the lowering of tax compliance costs, improvement of public procurement competitiveness, and reduction of corruption. The paper finds that information and communications technology can help improve government capacity, but the impact of e-government varies by type of government activity and is stronger in more developed countries. Implementation of e-filing systems reduces tax compliance costs as measured by the number of tax payments, time required to prepare and pay taxes, likelihood and frequency of firms being visited by a tax official, perception of tax administration as an obstacle, and incidence of bribery. The effects of e-procurement are weaker, with the number of firms securing or attempting to secure a government contract increasing with e-procurement implementation only in countries with higher levels of development and better quality institutions. The paper finds no systematic relationship between e-procurement and bureaucratic corruption.
The Promise of Performance Pay?: Reasons for Caution in Policy Prescriptions in the Core Civil Service
(Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2014-08-05) Hasnain, Zahid; Manning, Nick
There is a vast body of literature on performance-related pay (PRP), with strongly held views from opponents and proponents. This study reviews this literature, disaggregating the available evidence by the different public sector contexts, particularly the different types of public sector jobs, the quality of the empirical study, and the economic context (developing country or OECD settings), with the aim of distilling useful lessons for policy-makers in developing countries. The overall findings of the review are generally positive across these contextual categories. In particular, the findings from high quality studies, based on a simple scoring method for internal and external validity, of PRP in public sector-equivalent jobs show that explicit performance standards linked to some form of bonus pay can improve the desired service outcomes, at times dramatically. This evidence primarily concerns “craft” jobs, such as teaching, health care, and revenue administration, apparently negating (at least in the short term) the behavioral economics concern about the crowding out of intrinsic incentives. The available evidence suggests that if policy-makers are sensitive to design and vigilant about the risks of gaming, then PRP may result in performance improvements in these jobs in developing countries. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the review about the effect of PRP in core civil service jobs for three reasons. First, there are very few studies of PRP in these organizational contexts. The work of senior administrators in the civil service is very different from that of many private sector jobs and is characterized by task complexity and the difficulty of measuring outcomes. Second, although some studies have shown that PRP can work in even the most dysfunctional bureaucracies in developing countries, there are few cases illustrating its effectiveness or otherwise outside OECD settings. Finally, few studies follow PRP effects over time, providing little information on long-term effects and adjustments in staff behavior. We conclude that more empirical research is needed to examine the effects of PRP in the core civil service in developing countries.
Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014) Hasnain, Zahid
Why do politicians distort public investments? And given that public investments are poor, because presumably that is what is politically rational, what types of reforms are likely to be both Efficiency improving and compatible with the interests of politicians? This chapter explores these two questions in the context of Mongolia. It argues that Mongolian members of parliament MPs have an incentive to over spend on smaller projects that bring benefits to specific geographical localities and to under spend on large infrastructure that will bring economic benefits to Mongolia on the whole. The incentive for the former is that MPs internalize the political benefits from the provision of particular, targeted benefits to specific communities. This chapter is inductive in its structure. First, the broader public expenditure patterns in Mongolia are analyzed in order to identify policy maker s priorities that are, revealed preferences. Then the public investment management system is examined in depth, identifying the main Technical and structural weaknesses in the system. Following that is an analysis of the interests of Key political actors that are served by poor investments. Given these political incentives, the final section proposes some incentive compatible reform options.
Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-10) Pierskalla, Jan Henryk; Manning, Nick; Hasnain, Zahid
Many Governments wrestle with the issue of designing an appropriate set of human resource practices to motivate public servants to perform. Identifying the right set of practices for the public sector is a source of some controversy, and passions run high particularly in relation to the use of monetary incentives, often referred to as performance-related pay or performance based pay. This GET note reviews recent research on a range of practices Governments utilize to drive employee performance, which rest on the assumptions that public servants are motivated in two ways: (i) ‘intrinsically’ (i.e. internal factors motivated by ‘the right thing to do’), and (ii) ‘extrinsically’ (i.e., external validation from rewards offered by others). Generally, a Human Resource Management (HRM) system designed to motivate employee performance will utilize practices in two broad categories related to: (i) ‘external incentives’ (e.g., financial incentives), and (ii) ‘opportunities to perform’ focusing on ‘intrinsic’ factors (i.e. self-directed work). Within ‘external incentives,’ a financial incentive may either act over the long term (e.g., deferred compensation) or in the short term (e.g., performance-related pay). This note applies this conceptual framework to more clearly understand the range of practices Governments are using to improve staff performance, as well as the pre-conditions for their success. Given the recent attention on performance-related pay, we take a deeper look at the evidence underlying the shorter term performance-related pay, reviewing evidence from both OECD and middle income countries. Annex one provides a brief overview on the theories of motivation for those interested in the theoretical underpinnings of the work, and annex two presents’ experiences of performance pay in practice. This Note draws heavily from performance-related pay in the public sector: A review of theory and evidence (Hasnain and others 2012), a recent review of the literature in fields including political science, public administration, business management, and psychology.
South-South Cooperation : How Mongolia Learned from Chile on Managing a Mineral-Rich Economy
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-09) van den Brink, Rogier; Sayed, Arshad; Barnett, Steve; Aninat, Eduardo; Parrado, Eric; Hasnain, Zahid; Khan, Tehmina
Mongolia's mineral-rich economy was hit extremely hard by the global downturn during 2008-9, when copper prices plunged, external demand fell, and growth collapsed. The shock exposed serious underlying weaknesses in the management of the country's natural resource wealth, particularly the lack of policies to insulate the economy from commodity cycles and real exchange rate appreciation pressures, an inadequate safety net, and poor public investment planning. These issues gained further urgency with the signing of a major copper mining deal in 2009 that further increased the country's mineral dependence. As part of its reform efforts and with the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government began an intensive south-south exchange, notably with Chile, another major copper producer, on strengthening the policy environment. The dialogue proved critical in the passage of several landmark laws within the space of a few years, including a fiscal stability law modeled after Chile, and the accompanying integrated budget and procurement and social welfare laws. These reforms will be crucial in managing the boom-bust cycle of mineral prices and mitigating Dutch disease effects by anchoring a prudent countercyclical fiscal policy, strengthening public financial management, increasing savings, and providing a fiscally sustainable social safety net targeted to the poor.
Performance-related Pay in the Public Sector : A Review of Theory and Evidence
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-04) Pierskalla, Jan Henryk; Hasnain, Zahid; Manning, Nick
The objective of this paper is to provide a review of the theoretical and, in particular, empirical literature on performance-related pay in the public sector spanning the fields of public administration, psychology, economics, education, and health with the aim of distilling useful lessons for policy-makers in developing countries. This study to our knowledge is the first that aims to disaggregate the available evidence by: (i) the quality of the empirical study; (ii) the different public sector contexts, in particular the different types of public sector jobs; and (iii) geographical context (developing country or OECD settings). The paper's main findings, based on a comprehensive review of 110 studies of public sector and relevant private sector jobs are as follows. First, we find that overall a majority (65 of 110) of studies find a positive effect of performance-related pay, with higher quality empirical studies (68 of the 110) generally more positive in their findings (46 of the 68). These show that explicit performance standards linked to some form of bonus pay can improve, at times dramatically, desired service outcomes. Second, however, these more rigorous studies are overwhelmingly for jobs where the outputs or outcomes are more readily observable, such as teaching, health care, and revenue collection (66 of the 68). There is insufficient evidence, positive or negative, of the effect of performance-related pay in organizational contexts that that are similar to that of the core civil service, characterized by task complexity and the difficulty of measuring outcomes, to reach a generalized conclusion concerning such reforms. Third, while some of these studies have shown that performance-related pay can work even in the most dysfunctional bureaucracies in developing countries, there are too few cases to draw firm conclusions. Fourth, several observational studies identify problems with unintended consequences and gaming of the incentive scheme, although it is unclear whether the gaming results in an overall decline in productivity compared to the counterfactual. Finally, few studies follow up performance-related pay effects over a long period of time, leaving the possibility that the positive findings may be due to Hawthorne Effects, and that gaming behavior may increase over time as employees become more familiar with the scheme and learn to manipulate it.
How Capital Projects are Allocated in Papua New Guinean Villages : The Influence of Local Collective Action, Local-level Institutions, and Electoral Politics
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-08) Keefer, Philip; Hasnain, Zahid; Menzies, Nicholas
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has implemented numerous institutional changes over the past fifteen years with the avowed aim of bringing government closer to the people, improving accountability and, by extension, local infrastructure development and service delivery. To date however, there has been little empirical evidence to establish whether these changes have impacted the provision of local infrastructure. Similarly, there is little empirical evidence revealing the main political economy factors that influence the way that resources are actually planned, spent, and impact communities at the sub-national level. This report investigates the determinants of local infrastructure projects at the ward level, the lowest level of government in PNG, to assess the impact of these institutional changes and to identify the importance of other factors, in particular local collective action. It does this through a survey covering more than 1000 households across 49 yards in nine PNG districts. It also presents descriptive statistics on the basic characteristics of the households that were surveyed, their knowledge of local level institutions, their participation in groups, and their voting behavior. The report explores especially the determinants of variation within districts in terms of the presence of new projects. Common wisdom in PNG suggests that the home wards of Members of Parliament (MPs) should be especially favored with projects. In six districts, the data includes this ward; these six home wards are no different from other wards in their district with respect to the presence of new projects. The survey asked questions about electoral behavior, the provision of cash and other gifts in exchange for votes and electoral violence. The survey found significant inter-district variation, with vote-buying dramatically higher in the three Highlands districts, where 42 percent of respondents report receiving cash, compared to 9 percent in the other districts. Within districts, vote-buying and the provision of local public works projects are inversely related. Vote-buying is also far more common in the three districts that exhibit the most electoral violence.
The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines
(2011-06-01) Matsuda, Yasuhiko; Hasnain, Zahid
This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive to "capture" an electric utility and use it for the purposes of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that the level of capture is determined by the incentives of, and the interactions between, local and national politicians, where the concepts of "local" and "national" are context specific. A local politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction lies within the utility s catchment area; by contrast, a national politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction includes two or more utility catchment areas. These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations for local and national politicians: because of "spillover" effects, local politicians have a greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a national politician as they capture only a portion of the political gains from utility performance improvements as some of the benefits of improved service will go to other electoral jurisdictions within the utility s catchment area. The authors posit that three variables impact the magnitude of these incentives of local and national politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents that can be extracted from an electricity cooperative (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local politics; and (iii) the political salience of an electricity cooperative s catchment area for national politicians. The authors illustrate this framework through case studies of specific power utilities, and suggest some policy implications.