Person:
Ahmad, Junaid

South Asia
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Last updated: January 31, 2023
Biography
Junaid Ahmad is the Country Director for the World Bank in India. He joined the World Bank’s Delhi office on 1 September 2016. Junaid, a Bangladeshi national, was formerly the Chief of Staff to World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim. He joined the World Bank in 1991 as a Young Professional and worked on infrastructure development in Africa and Eastern Europe. He has since held several management positions, leading the Bank’s program in diverse regions including Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in India and South Asia.  Prior to joining the President’s office in January 2016, Junaid was the Senior Director for the Water Global Practice, a position he held since the creation of the Global Practices in July 2014. In this role, Junaid has built a strong and collaborative Global Practice and has brought a strong track record of management and leadership in the area of service delivery and international partnerships, combining intellectual and analytical rigor with strategic operational focus. Junaid has championed the Practice’s focus on water and the economy, and emphasized institutions and resilience in water management. Junaid spent 10 years in the field, first as the Deputy Resident Representative and Principal Economist in Johannesburg, and then as Regional Team Leader of the Water and Sanitation Program in New Delhi. In 2004, he was a team member of the World Development Report (WDR): Making Services Work for Poor People. From 2004-2008, he was the Sector Manager for Social Development in South Asia Region and subsequently for Urban Water & Sanitation before taking on the latter responsibility for the Africa Region in 2010. He was also the Director for Sustainable Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region, a position he held from 2012-2014. He holds a PhD in Applied Economics from Stanford University, an MPA from Harvard University, and a BA in Economics from Brown University.

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Publication
    India's Growth Story
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018-10) Blum, Florian; Ahmad, Junaid Kamal; Gupta, Poonam; Jain, Dhruv
    India has attained much economic success in the past three decades. Yet an economic deceleration in recent years has generated worried commentaries about the country's growth outlook. This paper offers a long-term perspective on India's growth experience. Analyzing the past five decades of data, the paper notes that growth has slowly but steadily accelerated, become less erratic, and been well diversified across sectors and states. A more granular assessment of the period since the early 1990s finds that there were three distinct phases of growth: a period of slow acceleration from 1991 to the early 2000s; a short period of unusually rapid growth, with certain features of unsustainability, during 2004-08; and a corrective slowdown that started with the global financial crisis in 2008. The slowdown has been reflected most profoundly in investment, credit, and exports. Even as the economy has now recovered to a growth rate of 7 to 7.5 percent, durably accelerating it to a higher level will require a concerted policy momentum that succeeds in reversing the slowdown in investment, credit supply, and exports; and support from the global economy. Maintaining the hard-won macroeconomic stability, implementing a definite and durable solution to the banking sector issues, and realizing the expected growth and fiscal dividend from the Goods and Services Tax are some of the other factors that can help attain a higher growth rate.
  • Publication
    Decentralization and Service Delivery
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-05) Khemani, Stuti; Ahmad, Junaid; Shah, Shekhar; Devarajan, Shantayanan
    Dissatisfied with centralized approaches to delivering local public services, a large number of countries are decentralizing responsibility for these services to lower-level, locally elected governments. The results have been mixed. The paper provides a framework for evaluating the benefits and costs, in terms of service delivery, of different approaches to decentralization, based on relationships of accountability between different actors in the delivery chain. Moving from a model of central provision to that of decentralization to local governments introduces a new relationship of accountability-between national and local policymakers-while altering existing relationships, such as that between citizens and elected politicians. Only by examining how these relationships change can we understand why decentralization can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better service delivery. In particular, the various instruments of decentralization-fiscal, administrative, regulatory, market, and financial-can affect the incentives facing service providers, even though they relate only to local policymakers. Likewise, and perhaps more significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a profound effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service delivery outcomes.
  • Publication
    Decentralizing Borrowing Powers
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-01) Ahmad, Junaid
    The note highlights the importance of sound intergovernmental fiscal relations, and proper regulation for successful sub-national borrowing, and illustrates the potential macroeconomic hazards of decentralizing borrowing powers, arguing that the impact of a possible moral hazard problem, namely, the access to financial markets by sub-national governments, may generate unplanned liabilities for central governments. Yet academia, and country experiences do not suggest adverse links between decentralized borrowing powers, and the central government's ability to maintain fiscal discipline, and macroeconomic stability. Rather the key seems to lie in the design of fiscal decentralization, particularly the regulatory framework under which borrowing powers are decentralized. The note outlines the reasons why sub-national governments require access to financial markets: to finance capital spending, and foster political accountability, which can be achieved through direct borrowing by central government, through a public financial intermediary, or, through direct borrowing. As per designing the regulatory framework, the note suggests better information systems, bankruptcy laws, and access to tax bases, in addition to separate fiscal/financial systems, and sound legislation to impose budget discipline, enabling access to capital markets to complement fiscal powers devolution to regional authorities.