Journal Issue: World Bank Research Observer, Volume 20, Issue 1
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Publication
Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
(Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank,
2005-03-01)
Several developing economies have
recently introduced conditional cash transfer programs,
which provide money to poor families contingent on certain
behavior, usually investments in human capital, such as
sending children to school or bringing them to health
centers. The approach is both an alternative to more
traditional social assistance programs and a demand-side
complement to the supply of health and education services.
Unlike most development initiatives, conditional cash
transfer programs have been subject to rigorous evaluations
of their effectiveness using experimental or
quasi-experimental methods. Evaluation results for programs
launched in Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
and Turkey reveal successes in addressing many of the
failures in delivering social assistance, such as weak
poverty targeting, disincentive effects, and limited welfare
impacts. There is clear evidence of success from the first
generation of programs in Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in
increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive health
care, and raising household consumption. Many questions
remain unanswered, however, including the potential of
conditional cash transfer programs to function well under
different conditions, to address a broader range of
challenges among poor and vulnerable populations, and to
prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
Publication
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services
(Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank,
2005-03-01)
The incentives of politicians to provide
broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries.
Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to
divert resources to political rents and private transfers
that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These
distortions can be traced to imperfections in political
markets that are greater in some countries than in others.
This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impact
on political incentives of incomplete information for
voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and
social polarization. The analysis has implications for
policy and for reforms to improve public goods provision and
reduce poverty.
Publication
The "Cotton Problem"
(Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank,
2005-03-01)
Cotton is an important cash crop in many
developing economies, supporting the livelihoods of millions
of poor households. In some countries it contributes as much
as 40 percent of merchandise exports and more than 5 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP). The global cotton market,
however, has been subject to numerous policy interventions,
to the detriment of nonsubsidized producers. This
examination of the global cotton market and trade policies
reaches four main conclusions. First, rich cotton-producing
countries should stop supporting their cotton sectors; as an
interim step, transfers to the cotton sector should be fully
decoupled from current production decisions. Second, many
cotton-producing (and often cotton-dependent) developing
economies need to complete their unfinished reform agenda.
Third, new technologies, especially genetically modified
seed varieties, should be embraced by developing economies;
this will entail extensive research to identify varieties
appropriate to local growing conditions and the
establishment of the proper legislative and regulatory
framework. Finally, cotton promotion is needed to reverse or
at least arrest cotton s decline as a share of total fiber consumption.
Publication
Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
(Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank,
2005-03-01)
During the past decade, the use of
conditional cash transfer programs to increase investment in
human capital has generated considerable excitement in both
research and policy forums. This article surveys the
existing literature, which suggests that most conditional
cash transfer programs are used for essentially one of two
purposes: restoring efficiency when externalities exist or
improving equity by targeting resources to poor households.
The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in some
instances there is tension between the efficiency and equity
objectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the
gains and losses associated with each objective.