Digital Cash Transfers for Emergency Response: Lessons from Cameroon Ioana Botea and Omar Ndiaye1 Executive Summary In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Cameroon launched an emergency cash transfers program in urban areas. It aimed to mitigate the adverse economic impacts by providing temporary income support to poor informal sector workers unable to access other social protection benefits. Eighty thousand beneficiaries, mostly women, were selected to receive three transfers amounting to USD 275 (FCFA 180,000). A process evaluation was conducted in 2021 to document lessons learned from this first experience with digital government-to-people (G2P) payments in Cameroon. The evaluation combined extensive consultations with project implementors as well as focus group discussions and phone surveys with beneficiaries. The research revealed a strong demand for mobile money payments among the urban cash transfers beneficiaries. A substantial majority (78 percent) expressed a preference for payments directly into their mobile money accounts rather than in cash or through other methods. This preference can be linked to the already high penetration rates: 95 percent of beneficiaries had mobile money accounts before the project. However, it's important to acknowledge that this preference might not entirely represent the broader population, particularly in rural areas. Challenges persist in these regions concerning network coverage, civil registration, and financial literacy. 1The authors express gratitude to Heriniaina Andrianasy, Laura Bermeo, and Georgina Marin for their invaluable feedback. Additionally, special thanks to the Social Safety Nets Project Implementation Unit for their comments, and to Ambika Sharma for her inputs and editing support. This note is based on a process evaluation conducted by Amarante Consulting in collaboration with FINACTU and SAC International. Three main lessons emerged: ➢ First, digital G2P payments require an enabling legal and regulatory environment. As governments shift to large-scale digital cash transfers, a key “teething” challenge may be regulatory. In Cameroon, proof of payment restrictions for public funds prevented direct mobile money transfers. The program had to instead contract eligible financial institutions, which in turn leveraged their partnerships with mobile network operators to process digital transfers to beneficiaries. This requirement added a layer in the payment process which could be avoided through regulatory reform. ➢ Second, digital payments call for robust data management along the delivery chain. The shift from cash to digital transfers involves more than modernizing the payment methods; it entails instituting novel processes to ensure accurate and consistent beneficiary data across program activities. In Cameroon, inaccurate or incomplete data on ID, SIM card, and financial account ownership collected during beneficiary registration led to multiple validation cycles and substantial delays. Collecting reliable information on key inputs for digital payments emerged as particularly important for women due to their lower civil registration and financial inclusion rates. ➢ Third, establishing a strong and effective two-way communication with beneficiaries is key. A well-defined communication strategy between the government, its implementing partners, and beneficiaries is instrumental for ensuring transparency and expediting the identification and resolution of issues. Due to the multiple layers of actors, last-mile communication around the emergency cash transfers was not always efficient and led to confusion and distrust among some beneficiaries. The challenge was exacerbated by the limited awareness of the existence of the call center for reporting complaints and payment incidents. Robust communication and grievance redress mechanisms are, therefore, essential for meaningful beneficiary engagement and successful implementation. There have been several developments since the COVID-19 emergency response and accompanying process evaluation. Crucially, the government issued in September 2022 a decree allowing digital government-to-people and people-to-government payments. This represents a gamechanger for digital payments in Cameroon and sets the stage for scaling up the model to other safety nets beneficiaries. Overall, the Cameroon experience illustrates the commitment of governments to bring in innovative digital solutions to traditional delivery systems. It further demonstrates the feasibility of digital G2P payments once initial “teething” challenges associated with this transition are addressed. Combined with the strong preference among recipients to receive safety nets benefits directly into a mobile account (vs. cash or other means), the experience points to the COVID-19 crisis as an inflection point for digital payments in Cameroon and the Africa region more broadly. Public authorities should leverage the ongoing advancements in mobile money services to expand their efforts in digitizing social safety net payments. 2 The COVID-19 Emergency Cash Transfers in Cameroon In response to economic shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Cameroonian government launched the COVID-19 Emergency Cash Transfer Program (ECT-COVID-19) for poor urban households. The ECT- COVID-19 was designed as an emergency component of the World Bank-financed Social Safety Net Project (SSNP). Launched at the end of 2020, the ECT-COVID-19 provided 80,000 households in the ten regional capitals with USD 275 equivalent (FCFA 180,000) over three tranches.2 The cash transfers were delivered digitally, an innovative approach that was a first for the government of Cameroon. The ECT-COVID-19 payments were processed between April and November 2021. A process evaluation of the ECT-COVID-19 program was conducted between July and December 2021 to assess the implementation of digital payments under the ECT-COVID-19 program, identify challenges and good practices, and provide recommendations for scaling up. The evaluation consisted of a preliminary desk review of the program; consultations with key stakeholders including the Ministry of Finance, the World Bank team, financial service providers, and targeting agents; and a mixed methods data collection exercise including semi-structured interviews with 50 beneficiaries and a phone survey with 502 beneficiaries about their experience with the program. DIGITAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM A key challenge with making the transfers digitally was that Cameroon did not have a legal framework authorizing the disbursement of payments from the public purse to individuals through mobile money.3 A paper proof of payment was required for transfers made by the government, which only commercial banks and microfinance institutions, duly regulated by the Central Bank (Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale, BEAC), could provide. Mobile money operators were, therefore, excluded. To work around this challenge, the project creatively devised a payment system using eligible financial institutions as intermediaries. The ECT-COVID-19 payment architecture involved five categories of actors, whose responsibilities in the payment chain are described below: • The Project Implementation Unit (PIU). The PIU acted at three levels in the payment process. First, it contacted the Autonomous Sinking Fund (Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement, CAA) to request that the Central Bank release the funds to the selected financial service providers (FSPs). Second, it sent the lists of beneficiaries to the financial service providers (FSPs) to prepare and execute the transfers to beneficiaries. Finally, it notified the beneficiaries of the payment schedule by SMS; • The Autonomous Sinking Fund (CAA). The CAA gave the order to the Central Bank—where the funds for cash transfers were housed—to transfer the funds to the FSPs in the amount requested by the PIU; • The Central Bank (BEAC). At the request of the CAA, the BEAC transferred the funds to the FSPs; 2FCFA 45,000 for the first tranche, FCFA 45,000 for the second tranche and FCFA 90,000 for the third tranche 3 The Regulation N°04/18/CEMAC/UMAC/COBAC relating to payment services in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, of December 2018, governed by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), specifies in its article 45 that: "the writing in digital form, can replace the writing on paper and recognized as equivalent, in particular with regard to its legal validity and its probatory force, .. .". However, a legal framework for doing so does not exist in Cameroon. 3 • The Financial Service Providers (FSP). The FSPs made the transfers to beneficiaries’ accounts. Once they received the transfers, beneficiaries were able to make withdrawals either at the FSP’s branches or through the partner mobile money operator. • A call center. A toll-free number was made available to beneficiaries to report complaints. The interaction between different actors in the payment process are illustrated in the diagram below: Figure 1: ECT-COVID-19 Program Payment System FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS The government hired FSPs for the ECT-COVID-19 through public tender. The FSPs were selected based on previous experience, the ability to open a bank account for each beneficiary and to link this account to a digital wallet (mobile money), and geographic coverage. Once selected, the FSPs were paid a lumpsum corresponding to the number of beneficiaries listed in their contracts. Through the public tender, two FSPs were selected: • YUP, the mobile money issuer service of Société Générale Bank; • Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union League (CamCCUL), a microfinance institution. The procurement process included the decision on the regions and number of beneficiaries to be covered by each FSP, based on the technical and financial proposals received during the bidding process. Thus, the FSPs were assigned regions (and beneficiaries) by the program rather than being chosen by beneficiaries. The 80,000 beneficiaries were divided between the two FSPs as follows: • YUP covered 6 of the 10 regions (Adamaoua, North, Far North, Centre, South, East) for a total of 45,000 beneficiaries across 21 municipalities; • CamCCUL covered the remaining 4 regions (Littoral, West, Northwest, Southwest) for a total of 35,000 beneficiaries across 15 municipalities. 4 The FSPs performed several key roles: • Opening a financial bank account for each beneficiary in accordance with legal regulations; • Connecting the bank account of each beneficiary to her/his mobile money wallet; • Training beneficiaries on how to access their accounts using their phones: enrollment centers were set up in each urban area, where beneficiaries received face-to-face training on how to secure the mobile money account, how to withdraw money, and how to use other mobile money services; • Facilitating secure access to accounts through the phone, including by assisting beneficiaries to register SIM cards and retrieve their mobile money PIN code; • Transferring the funds to beneficiary accounts according to a schedule defined by the PIU; • Sending to the PIU the proof of payment, i.e., computerized listings and transfer orders dated, signed, and sealed by the FSP; • Sharing with the PIU a payment report after each payment tranche, indicating any difficulties and a summary statement of the amount received by the FSP, the amount transferred to the beneficiaries, the amount not transferred, and the list of beneficiaries to whom the money was not transferred; • Sharing with the PIU, after the completion of all three tranches, a final financial report indicating the total amount received, the total amount transferred to the beneficiaries, the total amount not received, and the list of beneficiaries who did not receive their transfers; • Returning to the CAA any money from beneficiary accounts that had no withdrawals or transactions for two months after the transfer. Given the level of poverty and vulnerability of the households, a lack of any transaction upon receiving the transfer would was considered highly unlikely. OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION CYCLE The ECT-COVID-19 implementation cycle consisted of the following five steps: 1) Sensitization: The program started by raising awareness among the target population on key objectives, eligibility criteria, and activities. 2) Targeting: Emergency Targeting Agents (ETAs) identified 120,000 potential beneficiary households, who were then administered a short questionnaire to estimate poverty status. All interviewed households received a randomly generated alphanumeric identification code. The 80,000 households selected as beneficiaries were then invited to register using their unique code. 3) Registration: An adult, usually a woman, from each household was registered as the recipient by providing basic information, including national ID card number and phone number. 4) Enrollment: The FSPs opened an account for each registered cash transfer recipient using their national ID card. The account was then linked to a mobile money wallet. 5) Payment: The funds were transferred to beneficiary accounts and could be withdrawn either directly at the FSP branches or through—the larger network of—mobile money agents. The registration, enrollment, and payment phases most directly related to digital transfers are discussed in more detail below. 5 BENEFICIARY REGISTRATION AND ENROLLMENT The beneficiary registration and enrollment process was developed and implemented jointly by the PIU and FSP teams. Enrollment centers were set up in each urban area to limit travel time for beneficiaries and to expedite processing times. Four workstations were set up at each enrollment center, as follows: • An identification station managed by the PIU, where the identity of selected beneficiary was verified using their national ID card. Confirmed beneficiaries were then provided with an identification form to present at the registration station. • A registration station managed by the PIU, where the beneficiary was registered into the program. The beneficiary’s information was collected and recorded in the SSNP's Management Information System (MIS) and assigned a unique program ID code. • A commitment station managed by the PIU, where the beneficiary received additional information about the ECT-COVID-19 program and signed a “moral contract”.4 • An enrollment station managed by the FSP, which collected the beneficiary's identification information to create the financial account. Beneficiaries were required to show a form of valid national ID to open an account.5 Beneficiaries were also guided on how to use the account and the digital wallet using their phones (mobile money). The account creation process was similar at YUP and CamCCUL, with one difference: o At YUP, the account number corresponds to the 12-digit telephone number of the beneficiary and is associated with a mobile money wallet; o At CamCCUL, the account is an MFI account number which is connected/linked to the recipient’s mobile phone number. To ensure safe management of the influx of beneficiaries at the enrollment centers and to limit physical contact in accordance with the requirements of the COVID-19 pandemic, the enrollment schedule was communicated by the SSNP to beneficiary households in advance via SMS. DIGITAL PAYMENTS Payments were processed was as follows: • The FSPs received the allocated funds from the BEAC. • The FSPs received a list of beneficiaries from the PIU in a pre-agreed format. • Following beneficiary enrollment, the FSPs created an Excel file containing the first name, last name, the unique program ID code, telephone number or bank account number, and amount to be transferred for each beneficiary. 4 The "moral contract" is signed by the beneficiaries upon registration into the SSNP. It specifies what is expected of beneficiaries, including how the funds were to be used (schooling of children, creation of an income-generating activity, etc.). 5 From a regulatory point of view, in terms of the Know Your Customer (KYC) procedure, Regulation N°04/18/CEMAC/UMAC/COBAC, relating to payment services in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, governed by the BEAC, stipulates in its article 38 that: "The opening of a payment account or the subscription to a payment service is subject to the conclusion by the payment service provider or its distributor, where applicable, and the customer, of a contract which clearly establishes, in a legible manner, under penalty of nullity: the identification of the payment service provider; the identity of the customer in accordance with a valid official document presented by the customer; ... ". 6 • The consolidated Excel file was loaded into the FSP payment platform. Upon validation, beneficiary accounts were instantly credited with the specified transfer amount. In the case of YUP, the funds were transferred directly into the mobile money wallet of each beneficiary. In the case of CamCCUL, the financial provider made a simple transfer to the microfinance account of each beneficiary. Beneficiaries then received notifications on their phones indicating that the money had been transferred. • YUP beneficiaries could withdraw their money at YUP mobile money distribution points. • CamCCUL beneficiaries could either withdraw money at the local CamCCUL branch or, if they opted to link their bank accounts to an e-wallet during enrollment, withdraw their money at MTN mobile money distribution networks points. MANAGING COMPLAINTS AND PAYMENT INCIDENTS The SSNP set up a call center with a toll-free line to collect and process beneficiary inquiries and complaints. However, rollout of the call center was delayed, and many beneficiaries were not aware of the call center and did not use it. The beneficiaries complained about the lack of information on the procedure and the means of reporting complaints during the focus groups in the process evaluation. At the same time, some beneficiaries acknowledged that they had received an incident reporting number or had been trained in the complaint reporting procedure but complained about the quality of the training and technical malfunctions of the call platform. At the call center level, "non-payment" was the most common type of compliant, followed by "request for information”. The diagram below, taken from the information system of the call center contractor (Lamatel, LMT) in July 2021, shows the different requests and complaints at the call center. Figure 2 Distribution of reasons for calls received at the call center level Source: Lamatel MIS report, July 2021 7 Lessons from the Emergency Cash Transfer – COVID 19 The main challenges, impacts, and beneficiary feedback from the process evaluation are presented below. CHALLENGES Key challenges The program faced three key challenges to which the PIU adapted through design and implementation: • Lack of a regulatory and legal framework for digital G2P payments. In Cameroon, the Ministry of Finance did not accept digital proof of payments, which excluded mobile money operators. The absence of a legal framework authorizing the transfer of state funds to individuals through mobile money was, therefore, a key “teething challenge” for the ECT-COVID-19 and the adoption of digital G2P payments more broadly. To address this challenge, the SSNP contracted instead FSPs regulated by the Central Bank which, in turn, partnered with mobile money operators. This legal limitation introduced a new layer in the payment process that added complexity to the implementation of the program. • Lack of national ID cards among beneficiaries. Beneficiaries had to present proof of identity to open bank accounts with the FSPs. Those who had to apply for new ID cards were issued with 3-month receipts while the cards were being processed. FSPs accepted the temporary receipt as proof of identification, but beneficiaries faced the same issue after the three months expired and they were unable to access subsequent payments. Other challenges included a lack of required documentation to apply for the national ID card and damage to existing ID cards or temporary receipts. Because women faced these challenges disproportionately, the program had to register a relatively high share of men (28 percent). • ID mismatches between SIM cards, mobile money accounts, and financial accounts. Beneficiaries were often not able to provide phone numbers or mobile money account numbers at the time of enrollment. Among those who were, many did not have the SIM card or mobile money account registered in their name. The SIM cards were registered either in another household member’s name or had been acquired from informal markets without a formal ID registration process. As a result, many beneficiaries had to obtain new SIM cards and/or create new mobile money accounts using the same national ID card. In addition, there were discrepancies on beneficiary information between the SSNP and FSP databases. Reconciling these mismatches and inconsistencies required repeated validation efforts and caused significant implementation delays.6 6During the first attempt, only 38,133 out of the 80,000 beneficiaries were identified and had accounts created by April 2021. Three subsequent validation efforts were conducted: 29,000 additional beneficiaries were identified and enrolled in July 2021, another 9,000 beneficiaries were added in September 2021, and a final batch of 3,867 beneficiaries was included in November 2021. 8 Other challenges SSNP • Communication challenges: Difficulties related to the message and the channels used to communicate with beneficiaries were noted. Some beneficiaries, although informed by SMS and through spots broadcasted on national radio, did not show up during the enrollment phases planned with the FSPs. Financial Service Providers • Organizational limitations: Other challenges included the fact that enrollment agents were often late, the enrollment process moved slowly, and there were errors in the enrollment data that delayed the control and reconciliation between the beneficiary databases of SSNP and the FSPs. • ID challenges: During beneficiary enrollment, FSPs faced administrative difficulties such as invalid national ID cards, mismatches between the SIM card and the ID card, errors in the SSNP unique ID codes, duplicates in the beneficiary database provided by the SSNP, etc. • Unanticipated expenses: The need to multiple field operations due to the ID challenges mentioned above generated additional costs for the FSPs. • Unreliable network reception: Enrollment was carried out by agents using tablets connected to the FSPs’ remote servers via mobile networks. As a result, the lack of a stable, high-quality cell phone network connection delayed enrollment operations in some locations. • Reputational risk: Some beneficiaries blamed the FSPs for late payments even when the delays were out of their control. • Requests from non-beneficiaries: A spike in activity overloaded the client network and slowed down the access platform for beneficiaries who received failure messages after entering USSD codes. Beneficiaries • Long waiting lines: Beneficiaries sometimes experienced long waiting lines at the payment points due to technical malfunctions at the FSP payment platform, lack of cash at the payment point, and a rush of beneficiaries to certain payment points. • Unexpected withdrawal fees: Some agents charged recipients additional amounts to withdraw money from their accounts. While 95 percent of beneficiaries reported paying under USD 1.5 (FCFA 1000), 4.8 percent spent USD 1.5 to 4.5 (FCFA 1000 to 3000) and 0.6 percent paid up to USD 7.5 (FCFA 5000). • Need for new SIM cards: Some beneficiaries who had Orange SIM cards had to urgently acquire MTN SIM cards to receive payments with CamCCUL. A "black market" for SIM cards developed in some enrollment centers, where SIM cards were sold at a steep premium (e.g., as much as FCFA 1000 instead of the standard 9 FCFA 100). In addition, the acquisition of SIM cards from informal markets (unidentified SIM cards) amplified the problem of ID mismatch.7 • Long payment delays: Beneficiaries reported a substantial lag between registration and the notification that the first transfer was available. These delays led some beneficiaries to mistrust the program and thus not visit the enrollment centers despite the invitation SMS. • Dormant accounts: Several beneficiaries didn’t make any withdrawals, usually because they were not aware that the transfers had been made. In other instances, beneficiaries lost their phones, lost their cash withdrawal PIN code, or changed their phone numbers. These issues were predominantly related to the first transfer and increased the number of complaints related to beneficiary selection. Figure 3: Challenges encountered during the payment phase Source: Sample survey (based on a sample of 502 randomly selected recipients) 7The issue has since been resolved through a partnership between CamCCUL and Orange that now makes it possible for CamCCUL to also make payments to beneficiaries with Orange phone numbers. 10 BENEFICIARY EXPERIENCE AND SATISFACTION Beneficiaries felt that overall, the ECT-COVID 19 initiative was admirable and helpful. They particularly appreciated the focus on low-income families. Most beneficiaries were satisfied with the mobile money customer experience and the quality of service in general. However, there were notable concerns among a substantial portion of beneficiaries regarding the system for receiving and addressing complaints and payment issues. Beneficiaries reported that the FSPs resolved their issues diligently. In cases when beneficiaries had lost an essential document, forgotten a password, or unintentionally erased their PIN code contained in the SMS transmitted by the financial service provider, they had difficulty accessing their payments.8 However, in most cases, the FSPs found solutions so that the beneficiaries could receive their money. Further, during information sessions held for enrolled beneficiaries, the FSPs clarified and emphasized that digital payments were secure. This seems to have reassured and convinced beneficiaries about the payment system and process. Figure 4: Level of satisfaction with the ECT-C payment system Source: Sample survey (based on a sample of 502 recipients) 8 At account opening the beneficiary receives an initial PIN code with the possibility to change it. 11 In terms of financial inclusion, the phone survey revealed that 95 percent of beneficiaries already had a mobile money account before joining the program. Among them, more than 84 percent had an account for more than three years, which confirms the high penetration rate of mobile money in the targeted urban areas. Nevertheless, the program seems to have led to meaningful changes in usage patterns. A quarter (24 percent) of interviewed beneficiaries indicated that they’d use mobile money services more following participation in the program. The ECT-COVID-19 program did lead to a substantial increase in the number of bank accounts opened by beneficiaries. Nearly 25 percent of beneficiaries opened an account in a financial institution for the first time as part of the program: 15 percent at YUP and 10 percent at CamCCUL. Figure 5: Changes in payment instrument usage patterns Source: Sample survey (based on a sample of 502 recipients) The survey further confirmed a clear preference for mobile money transfers among the target population. A large majority (78 percent) of interviewed beneficiaries mentioned mobile money as their preferred method to receive the transfers. Only 17 percent of respondents mentioned cash. Figure 6: Preferred method of payment for emergency cash transfers Source: Sample survey (based on a sample of 502 recipients) 12 USE OF THE CASH TRANSFER BY BENEFICIARIES Beneficiaries primarily used the emergency cash transfer for school expenses, investment in income-generating activities, contingency expenses, health expenses, and payment of utilities (e.g., electricity, water, rent). As part of the enrollment process, beneficiaries were asked to sign a ‘moral contract’ with the project which included the intended uses of the cash transfer (including schooling of children, creation of an income-generating activity). This labeling of intended use of the grant appears to have influenced the beneficiaries’ usage of the funds.9 While initial payments of the first tranche were made April-May 2021, mop-up payments of this tranche occurred during the July-September period. As a result, recipients used some of the funds to pay for school fees at the beginning of the academic year in September. Figure 4: Recipient use of ECT-COVID-19 payments Source: Sample survey (based on a sample of 502 recipients) 9 It should be noted that this information was self-reported by beneficiaries. 13 Lessons from the Digital Emergency Cash Transfer in Cameroon As several countries in Africa and beyond shift large-scale cash transfer programs from physical to digital models, the experience of Cameroon in piloting digital cash transfers for the COVID-19 response has relevant lessons. First, digital G2P payments require an enabling legal and regulatory environment. As governments shift to large-scale digital cash transfers, a key “teething” challenge may be regulatory. In Cameroon, proof of payment restrictions for public funds prevented direct mobile money transfers. The program had to instead contract eligible financial institutions, which in turn leveraged their partnerships with mobile network operators to process digital transfers to beneficiaries. This requirement added a layer in the payment process which could be avoided through regulatory reform. Second, digital payments call for robust data management along the delivery chain. The shift from cash to digital transfers involves more than modernizing the payment methods; it entails instituting novel processes to ensure accurate and consistent beneficiary data across program activities. In Cameroon, inaccurate or incomplete data on ID, SIM card, and financial account ownership collected during beneficiary registration led to multiple validation cycles and substantial delays. Collecting reliable information on key inputs for digital payments emerged as particularly important for women due to their lower civil registration and financial inclusion rates. Third, establishing a strong and effective two-way communication with beneficiaries is key. A well-defined communication strategy between the government, its implementing partners, and beneficiaries is instrumental for ensuring transparency and expediting the identification and resolution of issues. Due to the multiple layers of actors, last-mile communication around the emergency cash transfers was not always efficient and led to confusion and distrust among some beneficiaries. The challenge was exacerbated by the limited awareness of the existence of the call center for reporting complaints and payment incidents. Robust communication and grievance redress mechanisms are, therefore, essential for meaningful beneficiary engagement and successful implementation. There have been several developments since the COVID-19 emergency response and accompanying process evaluation. Crucially, the government issued in September 2022 a decree allowing digital government-to-people and people-to-government payments. This represents a gamechanger for digital payments in Cameroon and sets the stage for scaling up the model to other safety nets beneficiaries. Overall, the Cameroon experience illustrates the commitment of governments to bring in innovative digital solutions to traditional delivery systems. It further demonstrates the feasibility of digital G2P payments once initial “teething” challenges associated with this transition are addressed. Combined with the strong preference among recipients to receive safety nets benefits directly into a mobile account (vs. cash or other means), the experience points to the COVID-19 crisis as an inflection point for digital payments in Cameroon and the Africa region more broadly. Public authorities should leverage the ongoing advancements in mobile money services to expand their efforts in digitizing social safety net payments. 14