Berger, Allen N.Clarke, George R. G.Cull, RobertKlapper, LeoraUdell, Gregory F.2012-06-152012-06-152005-06https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8229The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect. However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.CC BY 3.0 IGOAFFILIATESBALANCE SHEETSBANK ASSETSBANK DEPOSITSBANK LENDINGBANK MANAGEMENTBANK MERGERSBANK PERFORMANCEBANK PORTFOLIOSBANK PRIVATIZATIONBANK SIZEBANK SUPERVISIONBANKING CRISISBANKING SYSTEMBANKING SYSTEMSBANKSCAPITAL ADEQUACYCAPITAL MARKETSCENTRAL BANKCOMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITSCOMMERCIAL BANKSCONSOLIDATIONCORPORATE GOVERNANCEDEBTDEPOSITORSDEREGULATIONECONOMIC GROWTHEQUITY CAPITALFEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEMFINANCIAL ASSETSFINANCIAL ASSISTANCEFINANCIAL CRISESFINANCIAL HEALTHFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL RATIOSFINANCIAL SYSTEMFOREIGN BANKSFOREIGN ENTRYFOREIGN OWNERSHIPGLOBALIZATIONGOVERNANCE INDICATORSGOVERNMENT AUTHORITIESGOVERNMENT POLICIESGUIDELINESINSOLVENCYLATIN AMERICANLEGISLATIONLIQUIDATIONLIQUIDITYMIGRATIONMORTGAGESNATIONSNONPERFORMING LOANSPRIVATIZATIONPRIVATIZATION OF STATEPRODUCTIVITYPROFITABILITYPRUDENTIAL REGULATIONRETURN ON EQUITYSAVINGSSECURITIESSHAREHOLDERSSHORT-TERM DEBTSMALL BANKSSTATE OWNERSHIPVOTINGWESTERN EUROPEWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3632