Bodea, CristinaElbadawi, Ibrahim A.2012-06-082012-06-082007-11https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7519The most influential recent work on the determinants of civil wars found the factors associated with the grievance motivation to be largely irrelevant. Our paper subjects the results of this empirical work to further scrutiny by embedding the study of civil war in a more general analysis of varieties of violent contestation of political power within the borders of the state. Such an approach, we argue, will have important implications for how we think theoretically about the occurrence of domestic war as well as how we specify our empirical tests. In the empirical model, the manifestation of domestic conflict range from low intensity violence and coups to civil war. Our multinomial specification of domestic conflict supports the hypothesis that diversity accentuates distributional conflict and thus increases the risk of civil war. We also find that democracies may be more efficient than autocracies in reducing the risk of civil war.CC BY 3.0 IGOARMED CONFLICTARMED FORCESARMYBANKSBOUNDARIESCITIZENSCIVIL CONFLICTCIVIL PEACECIVIL WARCIVIL WAR DATACIVIL WAR VARIABLECIVIL WARSCOLD WARCONFLICTCONFLICT MANAGEMENTCONFLICT RESOLUTIONCONFLICTSCOSTS OF REBELLIONCOUPS D'ETATCYCLE OF VIOLENCEDEATHSDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONSDEMOCRATIC POLITICSDEMOGRAPHIC FACTORSDEPENDENCEDISCRIMINATIONDISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTDISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTSDOMESTIC VIOLENCEECONOMIC GROWTHELECTIONSENTREPRENEURSETHNIC CONFLICTETHNIC DIVERSITYETHNIC DIVISIONETHNIC DOMINANCEETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATIONETHNIC GROUPETHNIC GROUPSETHNIC HETEROGENEITYETHNIC MAJORITYETHNIC MINORITIESETHNIC POLARIZATIONEXPLOITATIONEXTERNAL SHOCKEXTERNAL SHOCKSEXTORTIONGOVERNMENT REPRESSIONGRIEVANCE MOTIVATIONGROWTH COLLAPSESHIGH RISKHUMAN CAPITALINCOME PER CAPITAINEQUITIESINSTITUTIONAL CAPACITYINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL SECURITYJOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTIONJOURNALISTSLARGE POPULATIONSLOCAL COMMUNITIESLOW INTENSITY CONFLICTMEASURE OF FRACTIONALIZATIONMIGRATIONMILITARY SPENDINGMILITARY STRATEGYMINORITYMODEL OF CONFLICTNATIONALISMNATIONSNATURAL RESOURCESNUMBER OF DEATHSPEACEPEACE RESEARCHPEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTPOLARIZATIONPOLICEPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPERPOLITICAL CHANGEPOLITICAL CONFLICTPOLITICAL INSTABILITYPOLITICAL PARTICIPATIONPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL PROCESSPOLITICAL RIGHTSPOLITICAL SYSTEMSPOLITICAL VIOLENCEPOPULOUS COUNTRIESPOST-CONFLICTPROGRESSREBELREBEL GROUPSREBEL LEADERSREBEL MOVEMENTSREBEL ORGANIZATIONREBEL ORGANIZATIONSREBEL RECRUITMENTREBELLIONREBELLIONSREBELSRECONSTRUCTIONREFUGEESRELIGIOUS DIVERSITYRELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATIONRESPECTRICHER COUNTRIESRIOTRIOTSRISK OF CONFLICTRISK OF WARSOCIAL CONFLICTSOCIAL CONFLICTSSOCIAL DIVERSITYSOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATIONSPATIAL DISPERSIONSTATE UNIVERSITYTERRORISMTERRORISTURBAN BIASVIOLENCEVIOLENT CONFLICTVIOLENT MEANSVIOLENT PROTESTRiots, Coups and Civil War : Revisiting the Greed and Grievance DebateWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4397