World Bank2012-06-222012-06-222005-06https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8760This report provides an assessment of Pakistan's corporate governance policy framework. In Pakistan, awareness of the importance of good corporate governance is high among policymakers and standard setters. It highlights recent improvements in corporate governance regulation, makes policy recommendations, and provides investors with a benchmark against which to measure corporate governance in Pakistan. The focus of the assessment is on listed companies, although reference is also made to banks and other financial institutions. Reform to improve corporate governance has been significant, including the introduction of a code of corporate governance and increased vigilance by regulators. Highly concentrated control by significant shareholders has limited the objectivity of boards and reduced the impact of some of the recent reforms. More generally, many smaller and family-owned companies have a limited awareness of the potential benefits of improved corporate governance. Corporate governance reform needs to percolate throughout the corporate sector, including family-owned businesses. The report concludes that further steps need to be taken to protect shareholder rights, including disclosure of beneficial ownership, and that boards must become more effective, with stronger fiduciary duties, and more capable independent directors.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCESS TO INFORMATIONACCOUNTINGACCOUNTING STANDARDSACQUISITIONASSET MANAGEMENTASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIESASSOCIATED COMPANIESAUDIT COMMITTEEAUDIT COMMITTEESAUDITINGAUDITORSAUDITSAUTHORITYBANKING SYSTEMBANKSBOARD MEMBERSBOARDS OF DIRECTORSBUSINESS COMMUNITYCAPITAL MARKETSCAPITALIZATIONCEOCEOSCHARTERED ACCOUNTANTSCHIEF EXECUTIVECLEARING HOUSESCOMMERCIAL BANKSCOMMON LAWCOMMON LAW COUNTRYCOMPANYCOMPANY LAWCONFLICT OF INTERESTCONFLICTS OF INTERESTCONFLICTS OF INTERESTSCONSENSUSCONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERSCORPORATE ASSETSCORPORATE BOARDSCORPORATE CULTURECORPORATE DECISIONSCORPORATE ENTITIESCORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLESCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMSCORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDSCORPORATE LAWCORPORATE SECTORCORPORATE STRATEGYCORPORATIONCORPORATIONSCOST OF CAPITALDEBTDIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITYDIRECTOR INDEPENDENCEDISCLOSURE CONTROLDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTSDUE DILIGENCEDUTY OF CAREDUTY OF LOYALTYECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC PERFORMANCEEMERGING MARKETSETHICAL STANDARDSEXCHANGE COMMISSIONEXTERNAL AUDITORSFAMILY OWNED COMPANIESFEDERAL GOVERNMENTFIDUCIARY DUTIESFINANCIAL CRISESFINANCIAL DISCLOSUREFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFIRMSFOREIGN COMPANIESFOREIGN INVESTORSGOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE ISSUESHOUSINGINCOMEINDEPENDENT AUDITINDEPENDENT DIRECTORINDEPENDENT DIRECTORSINDEPENDENT OVERSIGHTINSIDER TRADINGINSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSINSURANCEINTERESTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERSINTERNAL CONTROLSINVESTMENT BANKSINVESTOR PROTECTIONISLAMIC BANKJOINT STOCK COMPANIESJOINT VENTUREJUDICIARYLARGE COMPANIESLARGE COMPANYLEGAL FRAMEWORKLEGAL SYSTEMLEGISLATIONLEGISLATIVE REFORMLIMITEDLISTED COMPANIESMANAGERSMANDATESMERGERMINORITY SHAREHOLDERMINORITY SHAREHOLDERSMULTINATIONAL COMPANIESNONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONSOPERATING PERMITSOWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP STRUCTUREPENALTIESPENSIONSPOLITICAL INFLUENCEPRIVATE COMPANIESPRIVATE LIMITED COMPANIESPRIVATE PARTNERSHIPPRODUCTIVITYPROPERTY RIGHTSPROPRIETARYPROXYPRUDENTIAL REGULATIONSPUBLIC COMPANIESPUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIESPUBLIC POLICYRATING AGENCIESREGULATORY AUTHORITIESREGULATORY ENFORCEMENTREGULATORY FRAMEWORKREGULATORY REQUIREMENTSRETIREMENTRIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERSRISK MANAGEMENTRULE OF LAWSAVINGSSECURITIES LAWSECURITIES REGULATORSHAREHOLDERSHAREHOLDER ACTIONSHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTSSHAREHOLDER APPROVALSHAREHOLDER INTERESTSSHAREHOLDER MEETINGSHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONSHAREHOLDER RIGHTSSOLE PROPRIETORSHIPSSOUTH ASIANSTAKEHOLDERSTAKEHOLDERSSTATE BANKSTATE BANK OF PAKISTANSTATE ENTERPRISESSTATE OWNED ENTERPRISESSTATE OWNERSHIPSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISESSTOCK EXCHANGESTOCK EXCHANGESSUBSIDIARIESTAKEOVERTAKEOVERSTAX RATETAX RATESTECHNICAL ASSISTANCETRANSACTION COSTSTRANSPARENCYTRUSTSVOTINGWorld Bank10.1596/8760