Kane, Edward J.Demirguc-Kunt, Asli2014-08-212014-08-212001-09https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19549Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. The authors document the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design and review empirical evidence on how design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first addresing weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTINGADMINISTRATIVE COSTSAUDITSBANK CAPITALBANK DEPOSITSBANK HOLDING COMPANIESBANK PERFORMANCEBANK RISKBANK RUNSBANK SOLVENCYBANKING CRISISBANKING REGULATIONBANKING SECTORBANKING STABILITYBANKING SYSTEMBANKRUPTCYBANKSBLANKET DEPOSIT GUARANTEESBLANKET DEPOSIT INSURANCECAPITAL FLIGHTCAPITAL STANDARDSCDSCENTRAL BANKCOINSURANCECOMMERCIAL BANKSCOMPENSATIONCONTRACT ENFORCEMENTCORPORATE GOVERNANCECOVERAGECREDIT UNIONSCROSS- COUNTRY EXPERIENCEDEBTDEFAULT RISKDEPOSIT GUARANTEESDEPOSIT INSURANCEDEPOSIT INSURANCE COSTSDEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMESDEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMSDEPOSITOR PROTECTIONDEPOSITORSDEPOSITSECONOMIC GROWTHFEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCEFEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATIONFINANCIAL CRISESFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL FRAGILITYFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL INTERMEDIATIONFINANCIAL MARKETSFINANCIAL POLICIESFINANCIAL STABILITYFINANCING MECHANISMSFOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITSGAMBLINGGOVERNMENT GUARANTEESINDIRECT COSTINSOLVENCYINSOLVENT BANKSINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTINSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTINSURANCE COVERAGEINSURANCE DESIGNINSURANCE OBLIGATIONSINSURANCE SYSTEMINSURED DEPOSITSINTEREST RATESINTEREST SENSITIVITYLIQUIDITYLOOTINGMARKET DISCIPLINEMITIGATIONMORAL HAZARDNET LOSSPROBABILITY OF DEFAULTPROGRAMSPRUDENTIAL REGULATIONPRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISIONPRUDENTIAL REGULATIONSPUBLIC DEBTREGULATORY FORBEARANCERESERVESRISK FACTORSRISK PREMIUMSSAFETY NET POLICIESSAFETY NETSSAVINGSSAVINGS BANKSSHAREHOLDERSSMALL BANKSSTABILIZATIONSTATISTICAL ANALYSISSTOCK PRICESSYSTEMIC BANKING CRISESTHRIFT INSTITUTIONSTRANSPARENCY10.1596/1813-9450-2679