Kee, Hiau LooiOlarreaga, MarceloSilva, Peri2013-06-262013-06-262004-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTSAGRICULTUREANTI-DUMPING DUTIESCENTRAL AMERICACONSUMER SURPLUSCONSUMERSDEMOCRACYDICTATORSHIPDOMESTIC MARKETDOMESTIC PRODUCERSDUMPINGECONOMETRIC ANALYSISECONOMIC FACTORSELASTICITYEMPIRICAL STUDIESEQUILIBRIUMEXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSIONEXPENDITURESEXPORT GROWTHEXPORTERSEXPORTING COUNTRIESEXPORTING COUNTRYEXPORTSFISHINGFOREIGN EXPORTERSFOREIGN PRODUCERSFREE TRADEFREE TRADE AGREEMENTSFREE TRADE AREAGOVERNMENT AGENCIESGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSIMPORTING COUNTRYIMPORTSINCOMEINTERNATIONAL TRADELATIN AMERICANLEGISLATIONLOBBYINGLOBBYISTSMARKET ACCESSMINIMIS LEVELNATIONALSNON-TARIFF BARRIERSPOLICY INSTRUMENTSPOLITICAL ECONOMYPREFERENTIAL ACCESSPREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTSPREFERENTIAL TARIFFPREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIMEPRODUCER SURPLUSPRODUCERSQUOTASSOUTH AMERICASOUTH AMERICANSUBSTITUTION EFFECTTARIFF BARRIERSTARIFF NEGOTIATIONSTARIFF PREFERENCETARIFF PREFERENCESTARIFF RATESTARIFF REDUCTIONSTARIFF REVENUETRADE BARRIERSTRADE ISSUESTRADE POLICIESTRADE POLICYTRADE PREFERENCESTRADING PARTNERSUTILITY FUNCTIONWELFARE FUNCTIONWORLD TRADEWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3198