Oyefusi, Aderoju2012-06-042012-06-042007-04https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7002This paper attempts to explain the determinants of the propensity to armed struggle and the probability of participation by individuals in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria using primary (micro) data. While grievance appears to be pervasive among individuals and communities in the region and can be systematically explained, neither the grievance level nor its commonly cited causal factors appear to be strong enough to create a disposition toward armed rebellion. Rather, factors that reduce the opportunity cost and risk of participation or increase the perceived benefits appear to be more important. The study identifies three of these factors that are amenable to the policymaker's (government's) control as income level, educational attainment, and government presence.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCESS TO EDUCATIONACCESS TO EMPLOYMENTCITIZENCITIZENSCIVIL CONFLICTCIVIL WARCIVIL WARSCOLLECTIVECOLLECTIVE ACTIONCOLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMCOMMUNITIESCOMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTCOMMUNITY LEADERSCOMMUNITY MEMBERSCONFLICT PREVENTIONCONFLICT RISKCONFLICTSCORPORATIONCOST OF REBELLIONCOUNTER-INSURGENCYCRIMINAL ACTIVITYDELTADEMOCRATIC REPUBLICDOMINANT ETHNIC GROUPDRUGSECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIMEECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIESECONOMIC POLICIESEDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGEETHNIC GROUPSEXTORTIONFOREGONE INCOMEFORMAL EDUCATIONGOVERNMENT REPRESSIONGREED-GRIEVANCEHIGH RISKHUMAN CAPITALHUMAN RIGHTSIDEASIMMIGRATIONINDIVIDUALSINTENSITY OF CONFLICTINVESTIGATIONLABOR MARKETLARGE POPULATIONLIMITEDLOCAL CONTROLLOOT-SEEKING REBELLIONMILITARY PRESENCEMINORITYMONOPOLYNATURAL GASNATURAL RESOURCENATURAL RESOURCESNON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONSNUMBER OF PERSONSOPPORTUNITY COSTOPPORTUNITY FOR REBELLIONPEACEPOLICY MAKERSPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPERPOLITICAL PARTICIPATIONPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL RIGHTSPOLITICAL VIOLENCEPOST-CONFLICTPRIMARY EDUCATIONPROBABILITY OF VICTORYPROGRESSPUBLIC PERCEPTIONSREBEL ARMYREBEL FORCEREBEL FORCESREBEL GROUPREBEL GROUPSREBEL LEADERREBEL ORGANIZATIONREBELLIONRELIGIOUS DIVISIONSRELIGIOUS IDENTITYRISK OF REBELLIONSECONDARY EDUCATIONSOCIAL CAPITALSOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURESOCIAL NETWORKSSOCIAL SERVICESSOCIETIESSOCIETYTERTIARY EDUCATIONTRANSPORTATIONUNEMPLOYMENTVIOLENT CONFLICTVOCATIONAL TRAININGWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4194