Khemani, Stuti2012-03-192012-03-192010-09-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3907This paper examines a puzzle in the political economy of infrastructure in India -- the co-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending in public budgets alongside evidence of large demand for village infrastructure from poor voters. It argues that this pattern is due to infrastructure projects being used at the margin for political rent-seeking, while spending on employment and welfare transfers are the preferred vehicles to win votes for re-election. New suggestive evidence on the variation of public spending composition across states, and within states over time is offered that is consistent with this argument. This evidence underscores a growing argument in the development literature that the level and composition of public spending per se may not be sufficient metrics to assess the quality of public goods policies -- greater infrastructure spending in some contexts may go to political rents rather than to the actual delivery of broad public goods for growth and poverty reduction.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTINGANTI-CORRUPTIONBENEFICIARYBUDGET CONSTRAINTBUDGET CONSTRAINTSCAPITAL PROJECTSCHECKSCITIZEN ENGAGEMENTCITIZENSCOALITION GOVERNMENTSCONSTITUENCIESCONSTITUENCYCONSTITUENTSCORRUPTIONDEBTDEBT SERVICINGDECENTRALIZATIONDECISION-MAKINGDECISION-MAKING POWERDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDISCLOSUREDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATIONECONOMIC ELITESECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC PERFORMANCEELECTIONELECTORAL COMPETITIONELECTORAL PERFORMANCEELECTRICITYENABLING ENVIRONMENTEVASIONFINANCESFISCAL POLICIESFISCAL POLICYFISCAL RESOURCESGOVERNMENT BUDGETGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEESGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURESGOVERNMENT PERFORMANCEGOVERNMENT POLICYGOVERNMENT PROGRAMSGOVERNMENT SPENDINGGOVERNORHOLDINGHOUSINGHUMAN DEVELOPMENTINCOME TAXINFORMATION DISSEMINATIONINSTITUTIONAL REFORMINSTITUTIONAL REFORMSINTEREST PAYMENTSINTERNATIONAL BANKINVESTMENT PROJECTSINVESTMENT SPENDINGLABOR MARKETSLEGISLATORLEGISLATORSLEVYLOCAL GOVERNMENTLOCAL GOVERNMENTSLOCAL INFRASTRUCTURELOCAL LEVELLOCAL REVENUEMASS MEDIAMAYORSMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONSMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTSMUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTUREMUNICIPALITIESNATIONAL ELECTIONSPARLIAMENTPOLICY MAKERSPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL MOBILIZATIONPOLITICAL PARTICIPATIONPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL PARTYPOLITICIANSPOOR GOVERNANCEPOPULISMPOVERTY REDUCTIONPRIVATE INVESTMENTSPRIVATE INVESTORSPROPERTY TAXESPUBLICPUBLIC ACTIONPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONPUBLIC AGENCYPUBLIC BENEFITSPUBLIC BUDGETSPUBLIC CHOICEPUBLIC ECONOMICSPUBLIC EXPENDITUREPUBLIC EXPENDITURESPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSPUBLIC HEALTHPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTUREPUBLIC INVESTMENTPUBLIC MANAGEMENTPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC POLICIESPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC PROGRAMSPUBLIC PROVISIONPUBLIC RESOURCESPUBLIC SCHOOLSPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SERVICESPUBLIC SPENDINGPUBLIC UTILITIESRESERVERESERVE BANKRESOURCE ALLOCATIONRETURNRETURNSREVOLUTIONROADSSAVINGSSOCIAL CAPITALSOCIAL COSTSOCIAL PROGRAMSSOCIAL SECTORSSTATE ADMINISTRATIONSTATE BUDGETSSTATE EMPLOYEESSTATE GOVERNMENTSSTATE INCOMESTATE OWNED ENTERPRISESSUFFRAGETAXTAX BURDENTAX RATETAX REVENUETAX REVENUESTAX SYSTEMTAXATIONURBAN AREASURBAN INFRASTRUCTUREUSER CHARGESUTILITIESVOTER PARTICIPATIONVOTER TURNOUTVOTERSVOTINGWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-5423