Strobbe, FrancescoMiller, Candace2012-03-192012-03-192011-10-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3588This paper investigates the short-run consumption expenditure dynamics and the interaction of public and private arrangements of ultra-poor and labor-constrained households in Malawi using an original dataset from the Mchinjii social cash transfer pilot project (one of the first experiments of social protection policies based on unconditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa). The authors exploit the unique source of exogenous variation provided by the randomized component of the program in order to isolate the effect of cash transfers on consumption expenditures as well as the net crowding out effect of cash transfers on private arrangements. They find a statistically significant reduction effect on the level of consumption expenditures for those households receiving cash transfers, thus leading to the rejection of the perfect risk sharing hypothesis. Moreover, by looking at the effects of cash transfers on private arrangements in a context characterized by imperfect enforceability of contracts and by a social fabric heavily compromised by high HIV/AIDS rates, the analysis confirms the presence of crowding out effects on private arrangements when looking at gifts and (to a lesser extent) remittances, while informal loans seem to be completely independent from the cash transfer's reception. From a policy perspective, the paper offers a contribution to the evaluation of the very recent wave of social protection policies based on (unconditional) cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that there might be an important role for public interventions aimed at helping households to pool risk more effectively.CC BY 3.0 IGOAGRICULTURAL INPUTSAGRICULTURAL OUTPUTAMOUNT OF RISKASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONBENEFICIARIESBORROWERBORROWINGCAPITAL MARKETSCASH TRANSFERCASH TRANSFERSCHILD POVERTYCHRONIC POVERTYCOLLATERALCONSUMPTION EXPENDITURECONSUMPTION EXPENDITURESCONSUMPTION SMOOTHINGCONTRACT ENFORCEMENTCOPING BEHAVIORSCREDIT MARKETCREDIT MARKET CONSTRAINTSCREDIT TRANSACTIONSCROP YIELDSCROWDING OUTDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDROUGHTDURABLEECONOMIC CONDITIONSECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC SHOCKSEMPLOYMENTENFORCEABILITYENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTSEXTENDED FAMILIESFOOD AIDFOOD CONSUMPTIONFOOD CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURESFOOD DISTRIBUTIONFOOD INSECURITYFOOD ITEMSFOOD POLICYFOOD PRICESFOOD SECURITYFREE FOODGOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONSGROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTHOUSEHOLD COMPOSITIONHOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTIONHOUSEHOLD HEADHOUSEHOLD HEADSHOUSEHOLD INCOMEHOUSEHOLD LEVELHOUSEHOLD SIZEHOUSEHOLD SURVEYHOUSEHOLD SURVEYSHOUSEHOLD TRANSFERSHUMAN DEVELOPMENTHUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEXHUMAN RESOURCESIDIOSYNCRATIC RISKIDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKSINCOMEINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME SHOCKSINFLATIONINFLATION RATEINFORMAL INSURANCEINFORMAL LOANSINFORMAL SUPPORTINSTRUMENTINSURANCE MARKETSINSURANCE SCHEMESINTERNATIONAL BANKINVESTINGLABOR MARKETLABOURLEGAL FRAMEWORKSLIVESTOCK OWNERSHIPLOANLOCAL CURRENCYMALNUTRITIONMEDICAIDMORTALITYNATIONAL POVERTYNATIONAL POVERTY LINENEGATIVE SHOCKSOLD AGEOLD AGE PENSIONSPARTIAL RISKPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOORPOOR HEALTHPOOR HOUSEHOLDPOOR HOUSEHOLDSPOVERTY LINEPOVERTY REDUCTIONPRIVATE INSURANCEPRIVATE TRANSFERSPROTECTION MECHANISMSPROTECTION POLICIESPROTECTION POLICYPROVISION OF ASSISTANCEPUBLIC INTERVENTIONPUBLIC INTERVENTIONSPUBLIC PENSIONPUBLIC TRANSFERPUBLIC TRANSFERSREMITTANCEREMITTANCESREPAYMENTRISK SHARINGRISK SHARING ARRANGEMENTSRURALRURAL AREASRURAL COMMUNITYRURAL CREDITRURAL CREDIT MARKETRURAL CREDIT MARKETSRURAL HOUSEHOLDSRURAL VILLAGESSAFETYSAFETY NETSAFETY NETSSHOCKSHOCKS TO INCOMESMALLHOLDER FARMINGSOCIAL ASSISTANCESOCIAL INSURANCESOCIAL PROTECTIONSOCIAL SAFETY NETSOCIAL SAFETY NETSSOCIAL SECURITYSOCIAL TRANSFERSOCIAL WELFARETARGETINGTAXTRADINGTRANSFER BENEFICIARIESTRANSFER PROGRAMTRANSFER PROGRAMSTRANSFER RECIPIENTTRANSFER RECIPIENTSTRANSITORY SHOCKSULTRA POORVALUABLE ASSETSVILLAGE ECONOMIESVULNERABLE PEOPLEWEALTH EFFECTWORKING CONDITIONSWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-5824