Laffont, Jean-JacquesGuasch, J. LuisStraub, Stephane2014-05-092014-05-092003-04https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18224The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTINGADVERSE SELECTIONAIRPORTSAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGYARBITRATIONASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONBOTCONCESSIONCONCESSION CONTRACTSCONSENSUSCORRUPTIONDEBTDEVELOPED COUNTRIESDIVESTITUREECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC SHOCKSECONOMICSELECTRICITYEMPIRICAL ANALYSISEMPIRICAL STUDIESENFORCEMENT MECHANISMEQUILIBRIUMEXPENDITURESGOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONINCOMEINFORMATION ASYMMETRIESINSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTSJUDGESMARGINAL COSTMONOPOLYMORAL HAZARDMOTIVATIONSNATURAL MONOPOLYPOLICY DECISIONSPOLICY RESEARCHPOLITICIANSPORTSPOTENTIAL INVESTORSPOVERTY ALLEVIATIONPRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMANDPRIVATE ENTERPRISESPRIVATE INFORMATIONPRIVATE SECTORPRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATIONPRODUCTIVITYPROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTUREPUBLIC FINANCINGPUBLIC FUNDSPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTUREREGULATORREGULATORSREGULATORY BODYREGULATORY CAPTUREREGULATORY FRAMEWORKREGULATORY INSTITUTIONSROADSSECTOR RESTRUCTURINGSOCIAL COSTSOCIAL SECTORSSOCIAL WELFARESTATE OWNED ENTERPRISESTAXTAX SYSTEMTELECOMMUNICATIONSTRANSACTION COSTSUTILITIES CONCESSIONS; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; CONTRACT NEGOTIATION; INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY; ECONOMIC SHOCKS; DATA ANALYSIS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; ENERGY SECTOR; WATER SECTOR; TRANSPORT SECTOR; POLICY FORMATIONUTILITIESCONCESSIONS10.1596/1813-9450-3011