Badruddoza, SyedKhandker, Shahidur R.Koolwal, Gayatri B.2013-07-102013-07-102013-04https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14446Over the past 20 years, Bangladesh has witnessed strong competition among microfinance institutions. Using program-level panel data from 2005-2010, this paper studies the microfinance institutions' recent competitive roles in their pricing of products, targeting strategies and portfolio shifts, as well as their ability to recover loans. The findings do not support the view that newer microfinance institutions are less risk-averse in their targeting, or that increased borrowing among households due to microfinance institution competition has lowered recovery rates. There is also a considerable urban-rural distinction; although newer microfinance institutions tend to attract riskier clients in urban areas, the opposite is true in rural areas. Loan recovery rates are also the highest among the newest microfinance institutions for women in rural areas, suggesting that microfinance institutions may offer distinct products in these areas to attract better-risk clients. The portfolio of newer microfinance institutions also has a greater share of lending for agriculture, and fewer savings products.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCESS TO MARKETSACCOUNTINGADVERSE SELECTIONAGRICULTURAL CREDITASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONAVAILABILITY OF CREDITBANK POLICYBORROWERBRANCHBRANCHESCENTRAL BANKCLIENT BASECOLLATERALCOMMERCIAL BANKSCOMMERCIAL INVESTMENTCOMPETITIVE MARKETCONSTRAINTS ON BORROWERSCONSUMER PROTECTIONCOOPERATIVESCREDIT ACCESSCREDIT BUREAUCREDIT BUREAUSCREDIT MARKETCREDIT MARKETSCREDIT PRODUCTSCREDIT PROGRAMSCREDIT SCORINGCROP LOANSDEBTDEFAULT RATESDEFAULTSDEMAND FOR CREDITDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDISBURSEMENTDISBURSEMENTSDIVERSIFICATIONECONOMIC CRISISEXPANSIONSFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIESFINANCIAL REGULATIONFINANCIAL STUDIESGRAMEEN BANKGROUP SAVINGSGROWTH RATEHOUSINGHOUSING LOANSINCOMEINCOMESINDEBTEDNESSINFORMATION ON BORROWERSINSTITUTIONAL FUNDSINSTRUMENTINTEREST RATEINTEREST RATESINTEREST RATES FOR LOANSINTEREST RATES ON LOANSINTERNATIONAL BANKJOINT LIABILITYLEGISLATIONLENDERLENDERSLENDING INSTITUTIONSLIABILITYLITERACYLOANLOAN CONTRACTSLOAN DEFAULTSLOAN PARTICIPANTSLOAN RECOVERYLOAN REPAYMENTLOAN REPAYMENTSLOAN SIZESMARKET ENTRYMARKET INFORMATIONMFIMICRO-CREDITMICROBANKINGMICROCREDITMICROFINANCEMICROFINANCE INDUSTRYMICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONMICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONSMICROFINANCE LENDINGMICROFINANCE MARKETMICROFINANCE MARKETSMICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONSMICROFINANCE PROGRAMMICROFINANCE PROGRAMSMICROFINANCE REGULATIONMICROLENDINGMICROLOANSMONEYLENDERSNET SAVINGSNEW ENTRANTSOPERATING COSTSOPERATING EXPENSESOUTREACHPARTICULAR COUNTRYPARTYPENALTIESPOOL OF BORROWERSPOOR HOUSEHOLDSPORTFOLIOPORTFOLIOSPOVERTY ALLEVIATIONPRIVATE BANKSPROFITABILITYPUBLIC POLICIESPUBLIC POLICYRAPID EXPANSIONREGULATORY AGENCYREGULATORY AUTHORITYREMOTE AREASREPAYMENTREPAYMENT BEHAVIORREPAYMENT SCHEDULERETURNRETURNSRISKY BORROWERSRURAL BORROWERSSAVINGS RATESSMALL BUSINESSSMALL BUSINESS LOANSSUBSIDIARYSUSTAINABLE MICROFINANCETRANSACTIONTRANSACTION COSTSWHOLESALE FUNDINGHow Does Competition Affect the Performance of MFIs? Evidence from BangladeshWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-6408