Bown, Chad P.2013-04-112013-04-112013-03https://hdl.handle.net/10986/13158Use of temporary trade barriers has proliferated across countries, industries, and even policy instruments. This paper constructs a panel of bilateral, product-level United States steel imports that are matched to a unique data set on trade policy exclusions that are associated with the 2002 United States steel safeguard in order to compare the trade impacts that result from application of various temporary trade barrier policies over 1989-2003. The analysis finds that the trade effects of an applied safeguard -- which is statutorily expected to follow the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment -- can nevertheless compare closely with the application of the explicitly discriminatory antidumping policy. The results on trade policy substitutability complement other recent research on these increasingly important forms of import protection.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOAD VALOREMAGGREGATE TRADEAGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDSAGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIESANTIDUMPINGANTIDUMPING ACTIONSANTIDUMPING POLICIESANTIDUMPING POLICYANTIDUMPING PROCESSAPPLIED TARIFFBASIC TRADE POLICYBUSINESS CYCLESCOMMERCECOMMERCIAL POLICYCONSTRUCTIONCOUNTERVAILING DUTIESCOUNTERVAILING MEASURESCOUNTRY MARKETSCUSTOMSCUSTOMS UNIONDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDIFFERENTIAL TREATMENTDOMESTIC DEMANDDOMESTIC INDUSTRYDOMESTIC PRODUCERSDOMESTIC SUBSIDIESEQUILIBRIUMEUROPEAN UNIONEXCHANGE RATEEXCHANGE RATESEXPORT PRODUCTSEXPORT SUPPLYEXPORTERSEXPORTING COUNTRIESEXPORTING COUNTRYEXPORTSFAIRFOREIGN COMPETITORSFOREIGN COUNTRIESFOREIGN COUNTRYFOREIGN EXPORTERSFOREIGN FIRMFOREIGN FIRMSFOREIGN PRODUCERSFOREIGN SOURCESFOREIGN SUBSIDIESGENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFSIMPORT DATAIMPORT PRODUCTIMPORT PRODUCTSIMPORT PROTECTIONIMPORT RESTRICTIONIMPORT RESTRICTIONSIMPORT TARIFFSIMPORT VALUEIMPORT VOLUMEIMPORTED PRODUCTSINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTSINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICSINTERNATIONAL TRADEINTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTSINTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSIONINVENTORIESMACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONSMACROECONOMIC SHOCKSMANAGED TRADEMARKET ACCESSMARKET POWERMARKET SHAREMULTILATERAL POLICYOPTIMAL TARIFFSPOLICY RESEARCHPREFERENTIAL ACCESSPREFERENTIAL TRADEPREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTPREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTSPREFERENTIAL TREATMENTQUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONSSAFEGUARD ACTIONSSAFEGUARD MEASURESSAFEGUARD PROTECTIONSOURCINGSPREADSUBSTITUTESUBSTITUTESSUBSTITUTIONSUNSET REVIEWSSUPPLIERSUPPLIERSSUSPENSION AGREEMENTSUSPENSION AGREEMENTSTARIFF LEVELSTARIFF RATETARIFF RATE QUOTATARIFF RATESTARIFF SCHEDULETARIFF-RATE QUOTATRADE AGREEMENTSTRADE BARRIERTRADE BARRIERSTRADE DATATRADE DEFLECTIONTRADE DISPUTETRADE DISPUTESTRADE DIVERSIONTRADE EFFECTSTRADE FLOWSTRADE LAWTRADE LAWSTRADE NEGOTIATORSTRADE POLICIESTRADE POLICYTRADE PROTECTIONTRADE VOLUMETRADEMARKTRADING SYSTEMVALUE OF IMPORTSWELFARE LOSSESWORLD TRADEWORLD TRADE ORGANIZATIONHow Different are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies toward SteelWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-6378