Dutt, PushanMitra, Devashish2017-09-072017-09-072009-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28159In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOABSOLUTE VALUEAGRICULTURAL TRADEAGRICULTUREASSET DISTRIBUTIONASSET INEQUALITYAUCTIONSBARRIERBARRIERS ON IMPORTSCAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONSCAPITAL GAINSCAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIESCHECKS AND BALANCESCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGECOMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMYCONSTANT RETURNSCONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALECONSUMER SURPLUSCONSUMERSCOUNTRY SIZECOUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTSCROSS-COUNTRY DATADATA SETDECREASING FUNCTIONDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEPENDENT VARIABLEDEVELOPED COUNTRIESDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPING COUNTRYDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDICTATORSHIPDOMESTIC PRICEECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC EFFICIENCYECONOMIC FACTORSECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC MODELSECONOMIC REVIEWECONOMICSECONOMY LITERATUREELASTICITYEMPIRICAL APPLICATIONEMPIRICAL APPROACHESEMPIRICAL LITERATUREEMPIRICAL RESULTSEMPIRICAL SUPPORTEMPIRICAL WORKEQUILIBRIUMEQUILIBRIUM TARIFFEXPLANATORY VARIABLESEXPORT SUBSIDYEXPORT SUPPLYEXPORTSFREE TRADEFUTURE RESEARCHGDPGDP PER CAPITAGINI COEFFICIENTGLOBALIZATIONIDEOLOGYIMPORT COMPETITIONIMPORT PROTECTIONINCOMEINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME LEVELSINCOME TAXESINCREASING FUNCTIONINCUMBENTINDUSTRIAL COUNTRIESINEQUALITYINEQUALITY MEASUREINEQUALITY WILL INCREASEINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICSINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONINTERNATIONAL TRADELABOR FORCELAND INEQUALITYLEGAL SYSTEMLOBBYINGLONG-RUN POLICYMARKET ACCESSMARKET CONDITIONSMEASURING INCOME INEQUALITYMEDIAN VOTERNEGATIVE SIGNNOMINAL RATENON-TARIFF BARRIERSOLD ISSUESOPEN ECONOMIESOUTPUTPER CAPITA INCOMEPER CAPITA INCOMESPOLICY CHANGESPOLITICAL ACTIVITYPOLITICAL CONFLICTPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL ECONOMY MODELSPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADEPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL REGIMEPOLITICAL SCIENCEPOOR COUNTRIESPRODUCTIVITYPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONPROTECTIONISMPROTECTIONISTPUBLIC FINANCEREAL WAGESREGULATION OF TRADESIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTTARIFF BARRIERSTARIFF FORMATIONTARIFF RATESTARIFF STRUCTURETAXTAX REVENUETAX REVENUESTAXATIONTERMS OF TRADETRADE BARRIERSTRADE ISSUESTRADE LEGISLATIONTRADE LIBERALIZATIONTRADE MODELSTRADE POLICIESTRADE POLICYTRADE POLICY FORMULATIONTRADE PROTECTIONTRADE REFORMSTRADE RESTRICTIONSTRANSPARENCYUNEMPLOYMENTUNEMPLOYMENT RATEUNSKILLED LABORWAGESWORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORSWORLD TRADEWorking PaperWorld Bank10.1596/28159