World Bank2012-08-132012-08-132011-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11067The level of shareholders' expertise and experience needs to be questioned as they wield greater clout and become more deeply involved in strategic issues that should be the board's purview. This misdirected involvement distracts shareholders from their principal and most important role: electing and overseeing boards. To play that role, shareholders must have the basic tools from soliciting proxies of holders of voting securities to having the ability to seek court relief for a company's oppressive conduct. One of the important principles of good governance is the empowerment of shareholders. Unless they are able and willing to hold boards to account, then there is little hope, short of tough and intrusive regulation, of ensuring that company management acts in anything other than their own narrow self-interest. But the question is: how far should shareholders go? Peter Dey's paper brings an important perspective of someone who is both committed to good governance and experienced as a corporate director. This report heralded a new era of increased attention to the responsibilities of Canadian boards as stewards of shareholder value. Internationally, the author has been associated with the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) for the last ten years and has been an active participant in the Global Corporate Governance Forum, serving as a chairman.CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGOACQUISITIONACQUISITIONSAGENCY COSTAGENCY COSTSALLEGIANCEASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONBANKSBENEFICIARIESBOARD MEETINGSBUSINESS COMMUNITYBUSINESS CORPORATIONBUSINESS CORPORATION LAWSCAPITAL MARKETSCEOCHAIRMAN AND CEOCOMMON LAWCOMPANYCONFLICTS OF INTERESTCONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERSCORPORATE BOARDCORPORATE DECISIONCORPORATE DIRECTORCORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMCORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDSCORPORATE PERFORMANCECORPORATIONCORPORATIONSCOST OF CAPITALCOST REDUCTIONDECISION MAKINGDECISION-MAKINGDECISION-MAKING PROCESSDERIVATIVEDERIVATIVE ACTIONDEVELOPING COUNTRIESEMERGING MARKETSEMERGING-MARKETEXECUTIONFINANCE CORPORATIONFINANCIAL CRISISFIRMSFUND MANAGERGLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCEGLOBAL PRIVATE SECTORGOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCEGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE GUIDELINESGOVERNANCE ISSUESGOVERNANCE PRACTICESGOVERNANCE SYSTEMGOVERNANCE SYSTEMSGOVERNMENT AGENCIESHOLDINGHOLDINGSINDEPENDENT DIRECTORSINDIVIDUALSINSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSINTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCEINTERNATIONAL FINANCEINTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIOINTERNATIONALIZATIONINVESTEE COMPANIESINVESTIGATIONINVESTINGINVESTMENT BANKINGINVESTOR INTERESTISSUANCELEGAL AUTHORITYLEGAL FRAMEWORKLEGAL RIGHTSLIMITEDLISTED COMPANIESLOCAL INSTITUTIONSMAJORITY VOTINGMARKET CAPITALIZATIONMARKET DEVELOPMENTMARKET PRICEMERGERSNATIONAL BANKOUTSOURCINGPENSIONPENSION REFORMPORTFOLIO INVESTMENTPORTFOLIOSPUBLIC POLICYREGULATORREGULATORSREGULATORY FRAMEWORKREGULATORY STRUCTURESRISK MANAGEMENTSECURITIESSEESSHAREHOLDERSHAREHOLDER ACTIVISMSHAREHOLDER ADVOCATESHAREHOLDER APPROVALSHAREHOLDER MEETINGSHAREHOLDER VALUESHAREHOLDER VOTESHAREHOLDERSSOCIETYSTAKEHOLDERSSTOCK EXCHANGESTOCK EXCHANGESSTOCK MARKETSTOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATIONSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTSUBSIDIARYTRUST FUNDWorld Bank10.1596/11067