Dercon, StefanAli, Daniel AyalewGautam, Madhur2012-03-302012-03-302011Agricultural Economics01695150https://hdl.handle.net/10986/5532This article provides evidence from one of the poorest countries in the world that the institutions of property rights matter for efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears far off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been made legal, but transfer rights remain restricted and the perception of continuing tenure insecurity remains quite strong. Using a unique panel data set, this study investigates whether transfer rights and implied tenure insecurity affect household investment decisions, focusing on trees and shrubs. The panel data estimates suggest that limited perceived transfer rights negatively affects the long-term investment in Ethiopian agriculture, contributing to the low returns from land and perpetuating low growth and poverty.ENMeasurement and Analysis of Poverty I320Property Law K110Economic Development: AgricultureNatural ResourcesEnergyEnvironmentOther Primary Products O130Formal and Informal SectorsShadow EconomyInstitutional Arrangements O170Land Ownership and TenureLand ReformLand UseIrrigationAgriculture and Environment Q150Agricultural PolicyFood Policy Q180Property Rights in a Very Poor Country: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in EthiopiaAgricultural EconomicsJournal ArticleWorld Bank